

THE CARIBBEAN
ITS HEMISPHERIC ROLE

EDITED BY
A. CURTIS WILGUS

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


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
ITS HEMISPHERIC ROLE

SERIES ONE

VOLUME XVII

A publication of the

CENTER FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
*which contains the papers delivered at the seventeenth conference on the Caribbean held at the
University of Florida, December 1, 2, and 3, 1966*



Conference on the Caribbean, University
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Papers

The

CARIBBEAN:

ITS HEMISPHERIC ROLE

edited by A. Curtis Wilgus



1967

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Foreword

BEGINNING in 1950, the University of Florida has sponsored a series of conferences on the Caribbean area generally with the cooperation of business organizations, and with a gathering of experts from the Hemisphere and overseas, including scholars, businessmen, and government officials. This volume is an account of the seventeenth and final conference held in the series. The success and significance of these conferences can be attributed in large measure to the capable leadership of Professor A. Curtis Wilgus, who for thirteen years served as Director of the University of Florida's School of Inter-American Studies. The selection of a wide variety of topics for discussion and the invitations to speakers have been under his supervision and direction.

Beginning with the first meeting, the Caribbean area has been considered to include Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, and the independent islands. This definition has made possible the wide description and comparison of the many factors influencing the region. Indeed, the Caribbean was originally selected as a conference topic because most problems found elsewhere in Latin America may also be found in this area, and since Florida is virtually a part of the Caribbean geographically, it seemed logical to select this portion of the Hemisphere as our province for consideration.

This series of conferences has reflected the interest of the University of Florida in Latin America and the University's leadership in examining the problems of the Caribbean area. Each year a volume of proceedings, containing the papers delivered at the meetings, has been published in an attractive format by the University of Florida Press and advertised all over the world. The University of Florida feels proud that it has been able to play a prominent part by means of these conferences in promoting a better understanding of the countries to the South while at the same time developing a superb faculty with extensive course offerings in the field of Latin American affairs.

J. WAYNE REITZ, *President*
University of Florida

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Introduction

THE CARIBBEAN TODAY AND TOMORROW

IN THIS SERIES of conferences during the past seventeen years, an attempt has been made to examine carefully and fully the many details and aspects of the culture, life, and history of the Caribbean area. Experts from the Americas and elsewhere have brought their special knowledge to bear on many aspects of Caribbean affairs. Virtually no phase of knowledge relating to this area has been omitted. In consequence, the volume of proceedings resulting from each conference has made a contribution to the better understanding of the region. Not all of the papers have been of equal value or significance, but each in itself has presented a point of view of the author which has served a variety of purposes for the reader. Although the volumes have never been intended as textbooks, several of them have been used in classes. Others have been assigned as up-to-date references, which no teacher of the Caribbean area should omit from his list of readings.

The University of Florida owes a debt of gratitude to the more than 360 different speakers in these seventeen conferences who helped make this Institution an outstanding academic leader in Caribbean interests. This appreciation is here recognized by the many persons connected with the conferences over the years, and as Director and organizer of these meetings, I wish personally to record my feelings of satisfaction and gratification.

In planning this final conference in the series, I thought it wise to select a topic which would evaluate the various facets and factors in Caribbean life today in order to catch a glimpse of the immediate future and, without predicting what may happen, to consider possible trends. This attempt seems all the more reason-

able now because the first conference in 1950 tried to summarize the various factors and conditions in the Caribbean at mid-century, when in some respects the area was on the threshold of a great leap forward.

For the purposes of these conferences, we have considered the Caribbean in its broadest sense to include Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, Colombia and the islands; but we cannot and should not make any generalized conclusions regarding the area as a whole. This region has a vast storehouse of historical information which extends back several thousand years. But like facts in other areas of history, possibly nine-tenths of these have disappeared. Unlike research in certain scientific fields, we cannot press any computer buttons in the Caribbean to retrieve this lost knowledge. A student of this area therefore works with what information he has, with what knowledge he can find, and with what conclusions he can reach.

Before 1800 the area presented a great many similarities, and its history was more uniform than in later years. But the nineteenth century saw upheavals, some a backwash from Europe, which brought independence to many of the countries and innumerable attendant disorders. If the colonial period was one of childhood, the nineteenth century was one of adolescence and was marked by growing pains of every type: political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental. The twentieth century brought new responsibilities and consequent disorders. The two world wars permanently affected life in all of its ramifications in the Caribbean area. But not all of these countries have proceeded along the path of progress with equal rapidity. Indeed, some like Haiti have taken backward steps, while new forward-looking governments have been born in the former colonies of Great Britain.

I

National advancement in many countries has been limited and determined by what is appropriately called nationalism. This includes the development of a national personality for each country in political, economic, social, cultural, and other areas. In many instances, nationalism has prevented international cooperation and has cut across lines of contact with the United States. On the other hand, for example, nationalism has not prevented the development of the Central American Common Market. Whenever boundary disputes have arisen, and boundary problems still remain, nationalism again expresses itself, quite often in bel-

ligerent attitudes. But no one will criticize nationalism for its many weaknesses since the practice of nationalism has been the key to and the cause of wide and progressive development in most of the countries of the Caribbean.

Viewing the Caribbean area as a whole, we see that it contains a collection of civilizations and cultures similar to one another in many ways but differing radically in others. For example, there are a number of different political philosophies found in the several governments which result in political constitutions reflecting local history, philosophies, prejudices, and aspirations. Despite the inroads and influences of foreign political ideologies, the concept of the nation-state in the Caribbean has been steadily growing. Yet in all political development, theory and practice have usually been poles apart.

In each of the countries, political factions have first tended to multiply and then to coalesce and combine, only to fracture once again. The franchise in the Caribbean has been broadening during the last three decades. Women now enjoy political rights in all of the countries except Haiti. Frequently the widening of the franchise has given rise to pressure groups, and in every country, with the possible exception of Costa Rica, the army and other branches of the military may at any time constitute a powerful pressure group. Military *coups d'état* are of frequent occurrence, for the armed services constitute a continuous threat to every government in the Caribbean. On the other hand, various non-violent methods of changing the government are now practiced in the area.

Dictators have existed in all of the countries, and constitutions are frequently refurbished or replaced by new political instruments which sometimes are more literary than politically practical. In all countries, the use and abuse of executive power has occurred. The *caudillo* psychosis is still present in many of the countries, and while personal ambitions are often denied, the actions taken by egocentric politicians to win power are anything but modest.

In some countries, conflicts of interest between the central government and local governments result not only from constitutional provisions, or the lack of them, but also from the selfish ambitions of military or church leaders or of local politicians with national and international ambitions. Unfortunately, both local and national governments are subject to the machinations of dishonest officials, and corruption in everyday political life is observable in many localities.

No one would be so bold as to predict the political future of any country in the Caribbean. The problems facing democratic institutions in all of them are innumerable and appear in some instances to be insoluble. This condition is aggregated frequently because of the political control of the press which can be both a benefit and a threat to the party in power. Perhaps the most general and persistent criticism leveled at the governments of Latin America has come from the Inter-American Press Association, which each year evaluates the degree of press freedom or control in each Latin American country. Theoretically, such criticism is beneficial, but it often leads to unhappy results, especially for editors and newspapers.

In looking at the political prospects of these countries, one may conclude that, until detrimental traditions and conditions have been overcome and logical practical politics can be adopted, permanent political improvement in many of these Caribbean countries is still on the far horizon.

II

Political factors and characteristics are so related to environment that national advancement cannot be considered without full reference to economic factors. In early days the colonies in the Caribbean were widely separated by water, but in the past half century these countries have been closely connected by water. Likewise, rivers, once effective barriers, are now convenient means of transportation, as are railroads, highways, and air routes. Internally, moreover, each country has had a problem of water supply. Some areas, Mexico for example, are arid and need water obtained through irrigation. In other regions, especially along the Pacific coast of Central America, rainfall is much too abundant and constitutes a handicap to economic development. In several countries the building of dams has helped to solve related problems of economic life, while in some of the Lesser Antilles rain-water must be stored for drinking. Many of the countries are without first-class natural harbors, although some have been artificially improved. Even though the countries have had a Catholic background, the fishing industries have not been developed in a number of them to the ultimate potential. At any time the warm waters of the Caribbean may breed storms of a dangerous nature, and several of the countries have suffered from time to time economic disaster from these "acts of God."

All of the countries of the Caribbean area have depended in large part upon agriculture. But when this has not been developed

to its fullest extent, numerous products have had to be imported, especially those which are consumed by a majority of the people such as corn and rice. On the other hand, there are surpluses of certain products, for example sugar, coffee, and bananas, and while these have had to compete in the international market, the United States, being nearby, has absorbed many of these exports. Another important factor affecting agriculture is soil, and various specialized studies are being conducted, such as those supervised by the University of Florida, in selected Central American areas.

Mineral resources are also of great importance, especially in Venezuela and Mexico. Petroleum and natural gas have provided large revenues for further national development. Mexico and Venezuela also produce an abundance and variety of minerals in use in the world markets as well as in the United States.

Industrialization has developed unevenly in various countries, and assistance from the United States and elsewhere has been needed. In recent years, the Inter-American Bank, the International Bank, and the Alliance for Progress have stimulated economic development in all of the countries of the Caribbean. Unfortunately, many of these area governments cannot contribute their share to this mutual undertaking, nor can they, as in the case of Puerto Rico, pull themselves up by their economic bootstraps. But economic progress is encouraging in most of these Caribbean countries, and even though Cuba is outside of the economic sphere of the Alliance for Progress, it has attempted with assistance from other sources to solve a number of critical economic problems.

The economic future of the Caribbean is still somewhat clouded, but if the United States can continue to render assistance through financial gifts, loans, and technical cooperation, the whole area should become a region of increasing economic prosperity. In this connection, however, one must always keep in mind the possibility of national expropriation of land and industries and of various other economic tinkering by national governments in their practice of nationalism. Besides, one must remember also that the labor factor, like that in the United States, often becomes a disrupting influence in local industries and in various sensitive occupations.

III

In some respects, the Achilles' heel crippling national development in the Caribbean is found in the realm of education. Illiteracy has been a key factor in all of the countries although Costa

Rica, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba have the lowest percentages. One of the most illiterate countries in the world is Haiti, but no one has suggested an effective cure for this condition. All countries recognize the problems connected with illiteracy because they affect everyday aspects of life. In several of the countries nearly a half or more of the population is of school age, yet there are not enough schools for them to attend and not enough teachers to supply the schools that exist. Adequate financing in education is a problem in each Caribbean country. About the best that can be done in most of them is to afford as many people as possible an elementary education, sometimes through the sixth grade or even the eighth grade. In several instances, private instruction supported by funds from the Catholic Church or from Protestant missionary organizations has helped develop schools and courses far ahead of those in the public state-supported schools. In some countries, non-denominational schools are available for students but these are used chiefly by children of foreign parents or by upper-class nationals. Technical vocational schools are needed everywhere in addition to schools for the training of teachers.

At the college and university level, many current educational methods and procedures are antiquated, and some date back to colonial days. Even the educational reform movement which began in Córdoba, Argentina in 1918, and reached Mexico in 1921, has failed to bring about serious improvement in many of the national educational systems. Generally, students in Latin American universities take a greater interest in politics than do those in the United States—at least until recently. Student influence in Latin American universities, especially in administration and management, has always been greater than in the United States. Because of student and faculty participation in political activities, many universities in Latin America have frequently been closed by the governments for long periods of time. This disruption of the education of college students has been a nationwide problem in the Caribbean countries.

For a century and a half, young men and more recently some women, have sought training in law and other professions including medicine, dentistry, engineering, and architecture. In some countries large numbers of students educated in the professions have gone first to Europe and more recently to the United States for further training in their specialties. The Catholic Church for almost a century and a half has attracted large numbers of men and women seeking careers in its activities. Currently, however,

fewer and fewer have been attracted to the church by its ministerial and propaganda branches.

Since the Second World War an increasing number of students from Latin America have come to the United States, while students from the United States have gone to Latin America, although in fewer numbers. Many young men and women from these countries have come as exchange students to particular universities in the United States. Under the Fulbright-Hays Act a growing number of teachers and students have benefited professionally from such educational travel. At the present time, many universities in the United States have "adopted" universities in the Caribbean area. Sometimes this results in the financing of special activities in the Latin American institutions, but in most cases it includes the exchange of students and teachers for special professional purposes. All signs point to the future growth of this important activity in the improvement of inter-American understanding.

IV

Closely connected with educational problems are those relating to health. Here again the environment is all important, with meteorological factors often being crucial and critical in various regions of individual countries. Everyone who has gone to the Caribbean has experienced adverse effects from food and water, despite the fact that many natives seem to have become immune to both. Pollution of water is much worse than pollution of air in the Caribbean countries. The problem of sewage disposal is important in every country of the Caribbean, including Puerto Rico, although it is possible to drink water out of any spigot in any locality without serious effects.

In all of the Caribbean countries, diseases are related to the environment. Some of these are endemic and some are epidemic. Diseases causing high mortality in the Caribbean are gastritis, enteritis, and related infections. Malaria, yellow fever, smallpox, tuberculosis, and diarrheal diseases are endemic in some areas. The death rate varies in different countries in the Caribbean, but Guatemala, for example, has 233.2 deaths per 100,000 as compared with the death rate of the United States of 4.4 per 100,000. Life expectancy varies from 42 years in Haiti and 43.6 years in Guatemala to 65.8 years in Venezuela and 66 in Mexico, with 70.2 the figure for the United States. Everywhere in the Caribbean the current population explosion appears to be continuing.

An increasing proportion of government income must be devoted to solving health problems in the different republics than is now available. Fortunately, these countries have assistance from the Pan American Health Organization which is a subdivision for the Western Hemisphere of the World Health Organization. In many instances, health problems have been difficult to solve because of a lack of health experts and administrators within each government. In all countries hospitals are not numerous enough, and doctors and nurses, tending to go to urban areas, have left vast regions in the rural communities understaffed. Moreover, good medical schools are not available to adequately provide instruction of a specialized nature for persons wishing to become physicians and surgeons. In recent years some of the governments have been complaining of the "brain drain" in which their most promising young men go to regions outside the area for further training and practice. The United States has attracted many of these, and since Castro took over Cuba, large numbers of physicians and surgeons from that island have come to the United States where they eventually engage in medical practice. There appears to be no reason why these trends should not continue, at least for a few years.

V

No discussion of present and future conditions in the Caribbean is complete without looking at the many varieties of culture which exist there, including the culture of poverty and the culture of frustration. Culture provides the backbone for Caribbean society even though the social order is progressively plagued by political practices, the frequent disruption of economic life, and the rapid rise of an ambitious middle class.

Religion as an aspect of culture plays a vital part in the lives of the people of the Caribbean. At one time most persons were considered Catholic, having been born into the church or baptized by it. But the Caribbean area is one of immigration, and religions were brought in from Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world; some remained and grew and some lost their influence. Religion everywhere, even atheism, has affected the thoughts and actions of the people of the Caribbean and consequently has had immense repercussions on Caribbean culture. Many aspects of art, for example, have been influenced by religious ideas and practices. Even superstition has had a wide influence, especially on painting in Haiti. From earliest days, painting and sculpture have been

handmaidens of the church in the Caribbean area. But the exercise of artistic individualism and the example set by foreign artists have also been influential in the development of distinctive paintings and sculpture, especially in Mexico. Throughout the Caribbean, various schools of painting have been founded, while many individual artists have gone off on individual tangents, frequently producing remarkable and surprising results. Sculpture in the Caribbean has never developed to the extent that painting has, although busts and statues of heroes abound in all of the countries.

In music and the drama, religion and especially the Catholic Church has played an important part. However, because of foreign influence, music has gotten out of hand, so to speak, and all of the modern characteristics of the United States dances and popular themes have been adopted and sometimes modified in the countries of the Caribbean. Because of Negro and Asiatic influences, music in several of the countries has assumed special erotic characteristics. In the Indian countries of Mexico and Central America, the themes and characteristics of the music are largely native. However, the Spanish influence has found its way into all parts of the Caribbean and can easily be recognized wherever it is heard.

Drama has often been connected with church activities. But, in recent years Latin American dramatists have branched out into individual fields of experimentation, resulting in forms sometimes entirely dissimilar from those found in other parts of the world.

In literature, the essay has long been of importance in Latin America, treating themes of every type. Especially since the Second World War, novelists in all Latin American countries have been writing feverishly, each trying to outdo the other in modern-type literature. The new freedom in morals and sex attitudes has spread throughout Latin America as it has in other parts of the world. This has given rise to a new literature not only in novels but in candid biographies and autobiographies. Poetry also has been affected by this erotic tendency and along with novels and essays has been increasingly translated into English and other languages. In connection with these types of literature, the writing of history and special scholarly studies is being pursued more frequently in the Caribbean area. Technical works and scientific treatises are also growing in importance, and a number of these have been translated into other languages.

Perhaps through its culture the Caribbean area will exercise its greatest influence on the future of Latin America. Its art and its

literature are being exported in all directions. Art exhibits, musical concerts, and translated literature are spreading over the hemisphere. It is conceivable that in the near future this cultural influence may also have an observable effect on the culture of the United States, and as more and more of these artists and musicians are invited to world university centers, frequently to teach courses, their individual and collective influence may have far-reaching results.

One of these results undoubtedly will be that more people from the United States will visit the Caribbean as tourists or as research scholars or simply as observers. Increasing numbers are attending schools as students or visiting universities as temporary lecturers. Men, women, and children of the United States are finally getting to know better the peoples and cultures of the Caribbean and the future of tourism is brighter than in the past.

VI

In the international field, the Caribbean area is playing a more important part than ever before. It was once said in the United States that the Caribbean was at our back door. Now we say that it is on our front doorstep. The Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico constitute, indeed, an "American Mediterranean," a great hemisphere lake. The whole region, once looking exclusively toward Europe, is now oriented toward the United States. Hence, our relations with the Caribbean are crucial and paramount.

The United States' concern over Cuba has given rise in some areas of the Caribbean to suspicions regarding our national motives both political and economic. Our Alliance for Progress has been called by some in the Caribbean the new "Dollar Diplomacy." But fortunately, a majority of these governments do not feel this way about the United States. They all, however, seem to have decided that they will not remain exclusively under the thumb of their big neighbor but will widen their world horizons politically, economically, and diplomatically. They are aided in this objective because international communications have brought all of these countries closer to other parts of the world with the result that these areas are more interested now in the Caribbean than ever before.

The diplomatic relations of the Caribbean area have been remarkably varied. In the last few years, communism as a doctrine and as a political force has been introduced into the region. Russian communism, and more recently Chinese communism, have

been factors to be reckoned with in several of the Caribbean countries. Cuba has tried to promote its own brand of communism in several of the Latin American countries but with little success. Foreign ideologies undoubtedly have affected the practices of diplomacy throughout the Caribbean. Generally, the relations of these countries with each other have become closer and more friendly, and with their rising aspirations (a better term than rising expectations) have been drawn closer into the sphere of United States influence.

The British, French, and Dutch have modified to a varying extent their relationships with their territories and former colonies in the Caribbean. Changing relations between Britain and her former colonies have brought about some interesting results and no doubt will present some critical problems in the future. Generally the Dutch and the French have liberalized their associations with their Caribbean possessions, and these peoples will probably be drawn more and more into the orbit of the United States, especially through the Alliance for Progress and other economic projects; their needs are becoming more American than European in the broader sense. Now that the Caribbean Organization, formerly called the Caribbean Commission, has ceased to exist, these governments have increasing incentives to join the American system, or at least to be associated with it.

Diplomatic relations between the United States and the Caribbean area have come a long way in the past century. Manifest Destiny, which dominated our relationships from 1846 to about 1870, and the practice of Dollar Diplomacy and the Big Stick policy under Theodore Roosevelt gave way to a friendly Pan Americanism and finally to the Good Neighbor Policy. Because the United States has not always appeared sincere and honest in its dealings with the Caribbean countries, suspicions still remain in some areas today. But two world wars and the need for each other through mutual hemispheric assistance have brought us all closer together.

Although many of the people of the Caribbean have never heard of the Alliance for Progress, or even of some of the other policies which the United States has practiced in the past, the general suspicion toward the United States which long existed seems to be gradually subsiding. Government leaders, through enlightened and friendly policies, have taken it upon themselves to promote closer inter-American cooperation in the broad sense. And by cooperating more closely with each other, they feel that they are taking the edge off some of the detrimental influences which the United

States has exercised in the past. By practicing more self-assurance, by putting their political-economic houses in order, and by maintaining friendly cooperation with the United States, the Caribbean people should move into the future with greater confidence and self-respect, swept along on the wave of history.

A. CURTIS WILGUS, *Director*
Caribbean Conferences

Note: No specific references have been used in preparing the above observations, but the reader is referred to particular chapters in the previous volumes of proceedings of the Caribbean Conferences for the elaboration of all the topics so briefly mentioned here.

Part I

POLITICAL CAPACITY

John Edwin Fagg: HANDICAPS AND LIABILITIES
OF THE CARIBBEAN

IN OPENING the first of these Caribbean Conferences in 1950, Professor A. Curtis Wilgus observed that "in no other portion of the globe are there at present more numerous or more interesting problems than in this area."^{*1} His statement is as valid today as it was sixteen years ago. Probably nothing has done more to produce information and penetrating analysis of these problems than these annual Caribbean Conferences. Since most of us are committed to the belief out of knowledge come progress and hope, we can only hail the previous participants in these gatherings and those who sponsored them.

I

A historian who treats the subject of handicaps and liabilities that bear upon the political capacity of the Caribbean people to play a worthy role in this hemisphere can find a significant theme going all the way back to Columbus: the often unfortunate and tragic effect of the activities of outsiders on this beautiful part of the world that might support a paradise. Of course, many of these influences have also been constructive and benevolent. For nearly half a millenium, however, intrusion by foreigners has been random and exploitative, so much so that much of this area offers a shocking contrast between nature's bounty and the "wickedness of society," of the splendor of landscapes and the destitution of human beings.²

^{*}Notes to this chapter begin on p. 11

Columbus himself initiated this theme, when he seized interpreters during his first voyage and carried them away, when he clashed with Caribs on the second expedition, and in his pathetic efforts in Hispaniola to adapt the natives to Spain's purposes through the tribute and *encomienda*. The conquest of Puerto Rico by Ponce de León, of Jamaica by Esquivel, and of Cuba by Velázquez, together with the activities of assorted slave-catchers and such enterprisers as Ojeda and Nicuesa on the mainland brought ruin to the primitive societies of the Caribbean. Montejó in Yucatán, Pedrarias, Cortés, and Alvarado in Central America, and the numerous Spanish and even German conquistadors who overran present-day Colombia and Venezuela continued the work of disorganization that European expansion signified. What the military conquest and forced labor did not accomplish in the way of depopulation, germs brought by the Europeans did. Within a generation after the Discovery, the Indian element had been reduced in most localities to demographic insignificance.

Sadly enough, this devastation did not clear the way for a wholesome reconstruction of any kind of society for ages. The more energetic Spaniards moved on into Mexico and Peru, or into the present-day United States and lower South America. The path of empire passed quickly through the Caribbean, accomplishing little but destruction. It was at least a century before any of the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean enjoyed an orderly and civilized pace of life. And the function of some Caribbean settlements as forts and sites for fairs implanted a tradition of vice, crime, and brutality that has long degraded Havana and other cities. The deep roots of Caribbean corruption that Ronald Hilton once noted also trace to the intrusion of Spain's rivals.³ Except for John Hawkins in his first voyages, the foreign adventurers who came into the area, however much they have been glamorized by their respective nationals in Europe, were likely to be thieves, murderers, kidnappers, and swindlers. The Caribbean's role as a center for piracy intensified an already powerful tendency toward violence and inhumanity. Occasional efforts at European settlement introduced fewer sturdy builders than lawless characters unwanted at home. Furthermore, the vast forcible importation of Africans brought the curse of slavery to nearly every section, as well as disoriented, embittered individuals. In times when plain outlawry gave way to the more dignified practice of declared international wars, the Caribbean was the scene of battles, sieges, occupations, and almost continuous fear.

By 1700 Spain had acknowledged the loss of Jamaica, Haiti,

Curaçao, and most of the Lesser Antilles. Her own Caribbean provinces, conditioned for two centuries by disorders and cruelty, endured a political system that later generations would regard as handicapping them for modern progress. These liabilities would include autocracy, with a minimum of participation of the ruled in the processes of law-making and government; a rigid caste system based largely on race; a dilapidated commercial establishment that encouraged corruption, extortion, and hypocrisy; privilege and intolerance. To be sure, conditions were scarcely better in the eighteenth-century colonies of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, even if they were usually administered more efficiently, for slavery and the degradation that goes with it were more deeply rooted. And the frequent wars among European powers caused terror and destruction in most of the Caribbean area.

Not even the Age of Revolution brought unmixed benefits to Caribbean society. Haiti, the first to become free, expelled or killed the Europeans, only to wallow in poverty for long periods, and to drag Santo Domingo down with her. Yucatán probably endured more depression and oppression in the nineteenth-century Mexican nation than it had under Spain. The Central American nations gyrated wildly between tyranny and anarchy. These were also buffeted by self-seeking foreigners and repeatedly failed through "adolescent political attitudes" and exaggerated nationalism to federate,⁴ setting a discouraging example of man's inability to get along with his fellows.⁵ In Colombia true issues and men of admirable idealism at times appeared, but the protracted civil wars prevented the growth of a viable republic for most of the nineteenth century. Venezuela's early promise was spoiled by the destructive wars of liberation and the long periods of strife and dictatorship that came afterward. The remaining European colonies sank into stagnation as the Caribbean sugar industry lost ground in the world economy. Not even the liberation of the slaves compensated for the dreadful social, economic, and intellectual degradation that prevailed. And the mother countries either took comparatively little interest in improving them, or achieved much when they undertook uplifting projects on occasion.

The massive intrusion of the United States into the Caribbean in 1898 and after has certainly resulted in fewer political benefits than optimists predicted. True, the Panama Canal and the mighty increase of American investment, as well as trade in sugar, oil, and fruit, energized economic life, but their long-range effects have been uneven and sometimes harmful. Puerto Rico felt compara-

tively few political benefits until World War II when spectacular progress began. The transformation of Cuba within sixty years from a United States protectorate, supposedly grateful and favored, into an outright enemy is a development too well known to need sketching. American interventions in Hispaniola and Central America may well have retarded the development of wholesome political attitudes and sound government practices. In these and in other lands, the overwhelming might of the United States, even when wielded with the best of intentions or not brandished at all, has somehow inspired only frail emulation of the political institutions of the big neighbor, and has often served as an excuse for failure. Meanwhile, the colonies of the European powers were largely neglected until the Second World War and did little on their own to prepare themselves for nationhood.

II

These burdens of history have lightened somewhat during the last generation. Handicaps and liabilities imposed by past events have not prevented a remarkable movement toward political maturity by Puerto Rico, honest elections at crucial times in Venezuela and recently in the Dominican Republic, and some improvement in democratic practices in Colombia and parts of Central America. The Netherlands and France have in recent years extended to the Caribbean many of the liberties they enjoy, and while the failure of the British West Indies to federate may be disappointing, the experiment was not altogether a loss, even if they apparently have to postpone the idea until the present generation of leaders has gone.⁶

Yet the legacy of the past still hangs heavy. It has left the Caribbean nations with no true models. The national experience of the United States seems to have little relevance to most of these countries in finding their own political style. Nor does that of the former European colonial powers, though some admirable practices have been implanted. It would appear presently that Cuba is not flourishing or even showing promise as a Communist state. The recent return to militarism by Brazil and Argentina removes what might have been two important models for orderly, representative government. Apparently some Mexican intellectuals think that Mexico has not offered sufficient guidance and has even lost the initiative even though her modern political evolution usually is admired.⁷ Perhaps models are not what the Caribbean lands need. It may well be that Latin America has

lived too long already under alien institutions.⁸ Maybe western-style democracy, or even communism, cannot and should not be imported.⁹ These countries should find their own identities and develop systems that accord with their methods and needs.

Most of them have not done so. Nearly everywhere we note a lack of strong consensus and an absence of true patriotism—not nationalistic bombast but the sober citizenship that produces sound planning, persistence, and cooperative effort. So often we discern that there is no institutional way to transform basic aspirations into realistic action, and that victims of evils cannot channel their demands effectively. So frequently we see defeatism and timidity on the part of governments. As Harry Bernstein observed, the obsession with the hero-caudillo obstructs the growth of constructive nationalism and idealism,¹⁰ as does the tendency to swing between caudillos and *pensadores*, as Russell Fitzgibbon put it.¹¹ In a previous conference of this series José Figueres bluntly asserted that those of Spanish descent have not been very successful in handling their own affairs and that they are not adept at self-government.¹² Yet the United States, which has not effectively promoted democratic governments for long, is often made the scapegoat for the shortcomings of other peoples. This has not, as J. Fred Rippy stated, kept the Caribbean lands from expecting too much from the United States,¹³ nor of remaining unaware of the serious problems, including poverty, with which Americans must contend.

The persistence of conservatism has often been identified as a force in the way of development,¹⁴ even though in most cases conservatives now have to be covert and disguise their purposes by infiltrating supposedly liberal groups.¹⁵ Seldom do we find a solid and long-lived middle way in Caribbean politics. Radicals are often inclined to make demands that are beyond realistic attainment and to deceive themselves with words. The immaturity and incapacity of so many leaders of the left, as well as their intolerance, demagoguery, and fractiousness, frequently shred their own organizations and lead to self-defeat. The Church, as Jerome Fischman has demonstrated in the case of Puerto Rico,¹⁶ has lost much of its power to constrain radicalism. But it cannot be counted inevitably as a force for conservatism.

Much has been done to improve public education. Everyone knows how frightening the rate of illiteracy in most of the Caribbean is and that it embraces perhaps half the total population. Such education as there is, as S. S. Steinberg,¹⁷ Ronald Hilton,¹⁸ and Gordon Lewis¹⁹ have brought out in a previous conference,

tends to be too theoretical or classical and to inflate raw students with the notion that they are intellectuals simply because they are enrolled in schools. While the cult of youth flourishes nearly everywhere, the very youthfulness of a high proportion of the Caribbean populations poses dangers.²⁰ Young people are a great reservoir of idealism and energy if conditions are stable, but even in the United States the youthful character of the citizenry is seen as productive of violence and agitation and must be so to a much greater degree in the Caribbean.

Here, as elsewhere in Latin America, as Daniel Cosío Villegas has stated in despondent accents, one finds true insularity and isolation.²¹ People of one community are detached from the others, and, if they are not indifferent to each other, see one another as a threat.²² A lack of human fellowship impedes advance toward political stability. And this stability—or merely good government, *any* workable system—is and has long been the fundamental need of the Caribbean area. More than a year ago, before the recent elections, Selden Rodman said: "In the longest history of any country in this hemisphere, the history of the Dominican Republic, a history stretching back almost five hundred years, there has never been a single government, competent, efficient, honest, idealistic, that represented the Dominican people."²³ His statement cannot be applied to the entire Caribbean region and may well be too inclusive for the Dominican Republic, but its fundamental implication must be acknowledged as sound.

III

The reasons for the absence of political stability lie partly in the historical experiences and psychological attitudes we have touched upon. Yet every serious student knows that economic and social conditions have decisively retarded the thrust of these lands toward effective government. Participants in earlier conferences have explored these factors in abundant detail. First of all one confronts the population explosion. Those who predict a world-wide famine by 1985 may not be altogether hysterical alarmists. Certainly, the problem of runaway human reproduction in the Caribbean is acute and threatening to an extreme degree. It is sad to note that poor health, malnutrition, and short life spans go side by side with this outburst of procreation. Poor sanitation prevails widely, almost everywhere. "Horror housing" and unstable family life have easily understood political effects.²⁴ The legacy of slavery and of monoculture in so much of the Caribbean spells

long periods of idleness for many workers, and this idleness is seldom utilized for constructive purposes.²⁵ Most workers toil for others often apathetically and inefficiently and certainly for small wages. Low production has long characterized the Caribbean economy.²⁶ There is little for the lands of this area to exchange with each other. Even if there were, transportation is notoriously awkward and expensive. The Industrial Revolution, which caught Latin America by surprise in any event,²⁷ has ameliorated economic conditions sporadically in the Caribbean but too often has resulted in artificial, rigged enterprises existing at the mercy of shocks from the outside and stimulating premature efforts at distribution. Technical backwardness on the part of the general population is matched by managerial ineptitude or indifference on the part of native elite groups.

Hence we have the prominent role of the outsider. The outsider, however, is not necessarily determined to risk his effort and capital even when he is encouraged by local authorities. Political conditions such as those that led to expropriation in Cuba brought fresh American investment in Latin America almost to zero in a few months during 1962.²⁸ The brutal fact may well be, as Peter Nehemkis stated here, that "United States investment capital does not need Latin America."²⁹ It can do better elsewhere. Thus production lags, and when it flourishes in some localities, the benefits often fail to reach the masses. The Caribbean area, along with Latin America in general, falls farther and farther behind the rest of the world, or most of it, in technology, commerce, and economic growth.³⁰

IV

What a dreary picture we have of misery and discouragement! How could one expect peoples so burdened with handicaps to exhibit political capacity? Are most of the Caribbean lands doomed to eternal punishment because of the past? Is there no way to develop good government so that these appalling problems can be dealt with, or that conditions can improve so that good government will be possible?

Certainly no formula can be offered with confidence. There is hope, however, because there is life. Further, as Wendell Gordon has written, "The world now possesses the technical knowledge necessary to provide every man, woman, and child with enough food, clothing, and shelter so that all may live in decent comfort."³¹ A distinguished Argentine recently said, "Countries

which are economically and socially underdeveloped could bridge the gap that separates them from the advanced countries within a surprisingly short time if they made use of the potentialities of modern science and technology.”³² Sudden and almost miraculous development has occurred in the course of history. One thinks of as badly endowed a land as Denmark where poor grain farmers transformed themselves into prosperous and cultured producers of butter, bacon, and eggs.³³ The Netherlands offers another example. In our own time we have witnessed the spectacular rise of Japan, the Philippines, and Germany literally from the ashes. Israel’s recent career may be the most encouraging example of all.

Undoubtedly, striking increases in agricultural production and industrialization have sometimes occurred in Latin America, including the Caribbean.³⁴ We have seen the Caribbean Commission during World War II and after kindle hope and ferment.³⁵ It is clear that the recent record of Britain, France, and the Netherlands in the Caribbean has been honorable, more so than it has usually been credited.³⁶ Puerto Rico has experienced not only an economic improvement that has amazed the world but has also exhibited a remarkable growth of political capacity.³⁷ It seems that statesmanship in Central America is producing economic union and with it, betterment. There are many signs of vigor in Colombia and Venezuela, political as well as economic.

The human race is not so helpless that it must accept perpetual frustration in the Caribbean. Populations can be stabilized through birth control, and they probably will be when the need is faced squarely. Even emigration, so often regarded as a mere palliative, could redistribute Caribbean peoples and lead to stabilization.³⁸ Ancient problems of water and soil are not hopeless.³⁹ Health can be improved. The lumber⁴⁰ and fishing⁴¹ industries could be greatly expanded. Transportation, with the development of passenger missiles and hydrofoils, may well link the Caribbean in a way impossible for present-day ships and airplanes. Above all, tourism beckons as the possibility with the most immediate and lucrative rewards. If significant economic amelioration occurred, why should we remain defeatist about ancient problems of land tenure and monoculture or of inadequate political systems?

The barriers to betterment are essentially human factors.⁴² Man can change his environment if he wants to badly enough.⁴³ In this area, technology, managerial proficiency, and favorable attitudes—a “can do” philosophy—are needed more than capital.⁴⁴ However, capital is likely to be forthcoming if there is any reason to suppose that it will help. Pride in craftsmanship and manual labor can be

inculcated.⁴⁵ Books and other communication even more vivid than the printed word have in some cases brought about a spectacular upgrading of civilization; this surely could be the case here. Educators are perhaps the most receptive of all groups to new methods and ideals, and they could exert the most influence in changing the psychological climate.⁴⁶ The problem is ultimately one of will and of spirit.

One may dwell interminably on the liabilities and handicaps of the Caribbean peoples. The burdens of history can be chronicled and lamented to the point of despair, yet a humanist must address himself to what could be done to inspire potential Caribbean leaders to conquer their problems. They will surely have help if they try.

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Joseph W. Reidy: GROWTH AND POSSIBLE
CHANGE IN CARIBBEAN AMERICA'S
POLITICAL CAPACITY

THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS of Caribbean America is both a challenging and an important subject. It is challenging because of the human environmental diversity of the region, and it is important because the future peace and security of the Americas will inevitably be affected by the course of political developments within this vital area.

Consider for a moment the vast spatial extension of Caribbean America. A line passing from the city of Tijuana in northwestern Mexico to Cayenne in French Guiana bisects the region, connects its most distant points, and covers a distance of 5,000 miles. The physical environment of Caribbean America is marked by sharp contrasts. The human mosaic of the area is characterized by diverse ethnic and cultural groups with varied traditions, attitudes, values, and institutions. The diversity of the region suggests that some introductory caveats are clearly in order.

While there are threads of unity in the political development of Caribbean America, generalizations are difficult and predictions of future trends are hazardous. Many of the comments which follow could not be qualified as much or as often—due to limitations of space—as would seem prudent in view of the diversity of the region. Furthermore, while it may suit our convenience to discuss the political, economic, social, and cultural components of Caribbean America's development separately, it is well to recognize that in so doing we are considering pieces of an integrated whole.

With these caveats in mind, the commentary which follows attempts to follow the main currents rather than the minor eddies of political change and growth in Caribbean America. The objective is one of presenting an overview in which the *ambiente* of political development is stressed rather than the details concerning leading personalities, individual political parties, or specific issues. There is an effort to glance backward briefly into the past since the region's history lends weight to the old adage that asserts "what is past is prologue." Subsequent comments are primarily concerned, however, with projecting into the future basic political trends which can now be identified.

Growth and possible change in the political capacity of Caribbean America can perhaps best be judged by assessing progress made in achieving three basic political tasks: (1) the building of nations; (2) the development of democratic institutions; and (3) the formulation of national policy regarding Caribbean integration and international alignment. It is to these three topics that we now turn.

I. The Building of Nations

The history of Caribbean America, just as that of other world areas, demonstrates that the building of nations is often an arduous and prolonged process. Today, no less than in the past, the winning of independence is but a prelude to the challenging task of forging more closely integrated societies. Even the establishment of peace and order—a prerequisite to national integration—has been a difficult task for much of Caribbean America.

A divisive physical environment often combines with the ethnocultural diversity of the Caribbean to impede the formulation of national consciousness. The cultural mosaic of Caribbean peoples is reflected in their varied—and at times conflicting—goals, values, traditions, and institutions. The weak social fabric of many Caribbean peoples does not lend itself to formation of a closely knit national community. The predominant Iberian stamp of the region has contributed as much to fragmentation as it has to unity of the area. Exaggerated Spanish pride and individualism, combined with Iberian resistance to change and mutual accommodation, lend support to Salvador de Madariaga's observation that anarchy is the natural state of the Spanish mind.*¹ In short, Iberian cultural values have exerted a centrifugal effect.

Lack of administrative talent and political experience in self-rule is a legacy of Spanish colonial rule. In all the Spanish colonies

*Notes and appendix to this chapter are on pp. 26-27.

of America, only four of 170 appointed viceroys were American-born.² The development of able leadership remains a major task in the pursuit of national unity.

The barriers to national integration are not confined to areas heavily influenced by a Spanish heritage. As a case in point, witness the present state of flux within the newly created "nations" that formerly comprised the British Caribbean. Guyana is racked by racial tension and has yet to prove that it is a viable nation. The West Indies, a confederation of widely dispersed islands given their independence by Great Britain in 1958, has since disintegrated. A number of British dependencies within the Windward and Leeward chain are soon to become "associated states" and eligible for independence; they may unite in a confederation with other areas of the British Caribbean or go their separate ways. There is a lingering sense that common interests favor the creation of an Anglo-Antillean "nation," but the eventual outcome of the current flux through which former British dependencies are passing is most uncertain. To cite another non-Iberian case, the heavy Amerindian influence in certain areas of Caribbean America can hardly be said to contribute to the building of integrated nations. In Guatemala, for example, one estimate indicates that only 125,000 of this country's three million people can be counted as "effective actors in reaching political decisions at a national level."³

It is not surprising that the consolidation of national power in many areas of the Caribbean has been achieved more often by force than by consent. Military intervention and rise of the *caudillo* could in many instances be traced to civic irresponsibility and administrative chaos. In more recent times, insurrectionary efforts inspired by Communist Cuba's open support of "wars of national liberation" have posed still another threat to national integration in certain countries. Castro's disruptive efforts have been effectively blunted to date. Rural insurgency and urban terrorism in Venezuela are now under effective control, and *la violencia* suffered by Colombia through many years appears to have been contained. Insurrectionary efforts by the radical left in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala have also been stymied. Consequently, the role of force in maintaining internal security and strengthening the control of the central government has diminished. Several military establishments have fortunately turned to more constructive tasks of "civic action" and "nation-building."

A number of changes are in process which are overcoming past obstacles to national integration within individual Caribbean states.

Technology exerts a unifying influence. Expanding air and high-way links combine with astounding advances in the field of electronic communications to facilitate the consolidation of central government control and administration. An increasingly complex economic structure and growing industrialization provide still other integrative influences. Social changes accompanying the modernization process have increased the number of politically aware and their participation in national affairs. The growth and improvement of educational institutions have expanded the horizons of millions and served as vehicles for introducing the dynamic values of the modern West. Nationalism provides an emotional bond to overcome parochial political allegiances. Except for newly emerging nations whose boundaries are in dispute, and the continuing state of flux in the British Caribbean with regard to national amalgamation, the nation-state structure of Caribbean America has become relatively firmly established.

Looking toward the future, the prospects of individual Caribbean countries becoming more closely integrated political units are decidedly favorable. Unifying trends of modernization are well established. Separatist tendencies of the past seem to have lost appeal. To the degree that the present and emerging nation-state structure of Caribbean America is altered, it is most likely to change in favor of confederate movements which join existing political units in a broader association. But of more immediate concern is Caribbean America's progress in creating democratic institutions which, in themselves, serve an integrative function in the process of building nations. It is to this subject which we now turn.

II. Development of Democratic Institutions

Authoritarian past.—A Latin American writer once commented that independence from Spain was achieved on "the last day of despotism and the first day of the same thing."⁴ Power was transferred to new hands but an authoritarian heritage hampered for many decades the development of democratic institutions. While there is something essentially democratic in Spanish individualism, it produced men who were more inclined to govern than to be governed. The attitude of *personalismo* has been well expressed by the Ecuadorian writer, Alfredo Pérez Guerrero who described it as "an exaltation of the I, which does not perceive itself as a unit in the group, but as the whole group itself. Pride and *dignidad* are exaggerated, and the group serves as a pedestal for the self."⁵ Other Iberian attitudes and traditions combined with

environmental obstacles and ethnocultural diversity to complicate the transplanting of democratic institutions to Spanish America. Simón Bolívar, with great insight and realism, was reported to have said that the "new states of America, once Spanish, need kings with the title of President."⁶

Despite the unfavorable soil for democratic institutions, Creole political leaders borrowed heavily from the political theory of the French *philosophes* and from the constitutional pattern adopted by the United States. As might have been expected, political theory and constitutional law gave way to governments of men. It could hardly have been otherwise. Strong rulers were needed to bring peace and order. The political history of Caribbean America has been marked by numerous *golpes* and caudillos. Democratic rule has more often been the ideal than the practice. Constitutional forms ill-suited to the realities of Caribbean politics have more often served as useful statements of democratic intent rather than rigid strictures governing political conduct in the here and now. Over 200 constitutions have been adopted throughout Spanish America's history—many of them having their origin in Caribbean America. For example, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti have had at least 24, 22, and 18 constitutions respectively.⁷ Chronic political instability in many areas of Caribbean America has given rise to doubts as to the region's political capacity, and to pessimism concerning the future of democratic institutions in the region. Before passing judgment on the future of democracy in Caribbean America, it would be well to muster as much empathy as possible and view political realities within the region as they are rather than as one might wish them to be.

The current reality.—Strong Latin American rulers who bring peace, prosperity, and efficient administration to their country will receive general support—as long as they do not deny unduly basic human freedoms. While the tyrant is despised, the firm and efficient political leader is admired even if he operates with fewer executive restraints than the North American concept of "checks and balances" would permit. Latin American presidents must *rule* if they are to be effective administrators and avoid devoting most of their time to a struggle simply to remain in power. Even the strong executive must answer ultimately to the people. Democracy cannot be equated with exercise of the ballot. Military *golpes*, with the passage of time, have been less power-motivated and more designed to end the abuse of power or other instances of misrule. Moreover, even popularly elected presidents have been ousted frequently for good reasons and with public approval. In

increasingly complex societies in which power is ever more widely distributed among a growing number of interest groups, the days of the old-style caudillo are over. It would be rash, however, to predict the early end of dictatorships in Caribbean America. Nevertheless, it seems certain they will be fewer and shorter in duration. The modernization of the region—through education, improvements in transportation and communications, the impact of new ideas from abroad, political and economic pressures from within the Organization of American States (OAS)—favors an evolutionary trend toward greater democracy.

In one way or another, Latin Americans have been exposed in increasing numbers for over two centuries to the ideals and merits of democracy. They do not require further lectures on the subject, and they have accepted democratic institutions as their goal. What is required is patient cultivation of the soil in which democracy can grow. This will take time. Revolutionary changes—in the sense of fundamental changes, whether political or otherwise—have been rare in Latin America. Democracy, involving as it does acceptance of social values foreign to most of Caribbean America, cannot be imposed; a product of human development, it can only come about slowly. Advocates of “instant democracy” would do well to be content in the knowledge that the pace of change is quickening through Latin America, and popular participation in political decisions—whether by exercise of the rights of suffrage or otherwise—has grown at a rapid rate.

Quest for indigenous solutions.—One of the criticisms most often levied against Latin American democracy is that foreign models have been copied too slavishly, with few indigenous contributions to political philosophy and few creative solutions to problems peculiar to the local *ambiente*. The criticism is sound, but it applies more to the past than to the present. Unfortunately, Latin American political innovations have not been recognized as such because they have been regarded as “distortions” of North American or European “models.” Foreign critics cannot expect to have it both ways. They should examine what they have labelled as “distortions” to see if they are not, in fact, practical adaptations suited to Latin America’s environment and intended to provide creative solutions to real problems which the foreign critic has neither experienced nor adequately understood. For example, these are Latin American constitutional provisions which frequently draw criticism: (1) suspension of individual guarantees during times of national emergency; (2) exceptional federal powers to intervene in state affairs; (3) rights of presidential initia-

tive and decree-making power (which, it is asserted, grant the executive quasi-legislative functions), usually providing for subsequent congressional ratification; (4) assigning the military a role of "guaranteeing constitutional powers" (which, say the critics, invites military intervention in political matters).⁸

There is little question that provisions such as these *can* lead to "constitutional dictatorships" within the terms, if not the spirit, of the constitution. Examined with more empathy, however, there is also little question that they provide the Latin American executive with powers needed to deal with separatism, insurrection, or chaos caused by irresponsible political opponents. How to grant the president the powers he requires, yet prevent his abuse of provisions intended for true emergencies? There are, of course, many ways of measuring public opinion other than submitting issues to one or another form of popular vote. Therein lies the basis for the assertion made previously that even the strong executive must answer ultimately to the people. Professor William S. Stokes has posed a key question: "Is it possible that Latin American political culture has developed procedures for measuring and representing opinion different from but as valid as the techniques of election, initiative, referendum, and plebiscite of the Anglo-American and Western European states?"⁹ This question suggests others. How can the Latin American executive who has assumed emergency powers demonstrate convincingly that his actions enjoy popular consent? Times of crisis do not normally permit the exercise of popular suffrage. Can the absence of public resistance and a return to "normalcy" be interpreted as "popular consent"? Can new techniques—perhaps a combination of modern communications, scientific polling methods, and automated tabulation—provide still other evidence of popular consent without the formality of voting? These questions suggest a new area in which innovations might be devised so as to demonstrate that Latin Americans can develop not only the substance of democratic government but also unique procedures well-suited to their environment for measuring popular will. A challenging field for research is clearly open for the student of Latin American political dynamics.

Area contrasts.—As might be expected in an area of great diversity, the progress of democracy has been, and is likely to remain, very uneven. To bring general commentary down to concrete cases, a brief look at individual situations is in order.

Respect for parliamentary government has taken root in those countries (or countries-to-be) which compose what was formerly the British Caribbean. But it is difficult to predict how firmly the

roots have been planted. Independence has been a brief experience and within former British areas the prospects of democratic government differ greatly. Jamaica would appear to have a better chance for internal stability and gaining experience with the functions of a loyal opposition than, for example, would Guyana. Troubled as it is by racial strife which takes on political lines, Guyana must give priority to the task of achieving national survival in an environment which may curtail full exercise of democratic freedoms.

French and Dutch areas of the Caribbean have achieved greater autonomy but not independence. French Guiana is without a doubt the most dependent of European-administered areas in the Caribbean. Established as a department in 1947, it is legally a part of metropolitan France. Its prospects for the future are dim on all counts—especially with respect to developing self-reliance and indigenous democratic institutions. French-administered islands of the Antilles, principally Martinique and Guadeloupe, have the same legal status as French Guiana but a better prospect of exercising real autonomy and developing democratic institutions. The Netherlands Antilles and Surinam present a brighter picture than French-administered areas since they possess good physical and human resources and a populace fast becoming equipped for self-government and eventual independence, should this eventually be their wish.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a Latin American community of United States citizens, enjoys complete local autonomy and has had ample experience with democratic institutions and processes. While it favors its present association with the United States over complete independence, Puerto Rico appears well equipped to govern itself democratically in the future, whether as a commonwealth or a sovereign state.

Haiti is the land of the classic tyrant—gripped by terror and handicapped by poverty, ignorance, and political apathy. There is no political dialogue in Haiti and little likelihood that one will soon develop. Opposition elements in exile are divided and, in the event they were to come to power, do not offer much promise of developing democratic institutions.

Spanish Caribbean states occupy positions throughout the spectrum of democratic development. Efforts at a systematic ranking of nations according to their democratic progress inevitably produce highly perishable listings subject to much debate. Nonetheless, in a separate appendix, the eleven countries of the Spanish Caribbean have been placed in one or another of six categories

with the principal objective of conveying graphically varying rates of democratic progress and different institutional patterns. The essential observation which emerges from this categorization is that the governments of the Spanish Caribbean range from established democracies to outright dictatorships with intermediate types which can be described as "functioning democracies," governments with "fragile democratic institutions," "guided democracies" featuring one-party rule, and "limited democracies," which present essentially a single option to the popular electorate. Once again, to repeat a familiar theme, the diversity of Spanish America is apparent. The conclusions to be drawn are: Future rates of progress in achieving advanced norms of political democracy are certain to be unequal; and, the institutions established to carry out the functions of democratic government will differ considerably from country to country in their effectiveness as well as their form.

Current trends.—Discernible trends in the development of political parties in Caribbean America can only be generalized. Few political parties of Caribbean America possess either the ideological drive or the broad popular base to exercise an integrative function although many have gained in strength and maturity. The function of a loyal opposition is better understood and increasingly adopted. Broader popular participation has definitely restrained the force of *personalismo* in party affairs. Traditional conservative parties are fighting a rear-guard and losing action. Centrist parties are growing most rapidly of all, including in their ranks many who have recently become active participants in the political process. Leftist groups have had ups and downs and now stand essentially at dead center despite their dramatic take-over in Cuba. Ideological drive has appeared only in the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) of Mexico (where it is more of an historic than a living force), the Christian Democratic groups of Venezuela and Central America (where it is a developing and important phenomenon), and among the Communists of Cuba (where it has been the source of truly revolutionary change and catastrophic errors).

Political leadership will be drawn increasingly from an emerging group which may be called Caribbean America's "new elite." The Church, military, intellectual and student groups, labor unionists, businessmen, and/or miscellaneous professionals have all failed—considering each individually as a special interest group—to provide effective national leadership. But among their members are found intelligent men of vision who are willing to work

for constructive change to speed Caribbean America's modernization. They are prepared to place national interests above narrow group concerns. Unfortunately, the "new elite" remains diffused and has not yet created a sufficient number of associations capable of exercising effective leadership. This lack defines the principal task of democratic political action in Caribbean America.

It is useful to distinguish between the *substance* of democratic government and the *procedures* by which popular will can be expressed. Substantive democracy as a concept has long taken root in Caribbean America. With some obvious exceptions, basic human rights are generally upheld. The will of the majority prevails in the long run. Rights of the opposing minority are by and large protected. Procedural democracy in Caribbean America would be found wanting if judged by the standards of democratic systems of the modern West. Judged within the *ambiente* of Caribbean America, however, procedural "shortcomings" in the practice of democracy appear more as realistic adaptations than perverse distortions of democratic ways as they are generally understood in the United States and most of Western Europe.

In summary, Latin America is wedded to democratic ideals but is still in pursuit of workable procedures which can reconcile the need for a strong executive with the goal of subjecting such political leadership to a test of popular will. Measured by Anglo-American and most Western European standards, Latin American democracy has fallen short and faces an up-hill struggle. Measured against the physical and human obstacles to democracy which Latin Americans confront, however, progress has been encouraging. In balance, it is safe to say that in the decades ahead democracy in Caribbean America will flourish in a few countries, continue to evolve slowly in most, and languish in some backward and unstable areas. The hard truth is that the road to democracy for all peoples throughout history has been a long and a difficult one, and it is unlikely that Latin Americans will find shortcuts.

III. The Formulation of National Policy Regarding Caribbean Integration and International Alignment

The building of integrated nations and democratic institutions has posed enormous challenges to the people of Caribbean America. Confronted by such tasks, they—not surprisingly—have devoted little thought and less action to more ambitious goals such as that of creating a Pan Caribbean Federation. The idea of a region-wide political union has never been taken seriously by

practical politicians. *Homo caribiensis* remains an abstraction. Diversity defeats idyllic notions of Caribbean unity. Technological breakthroughs which vault physical obstacles have much less impact on overcoming human differences, the emotional appeal of nationalism, trade competition, and other sources of conflict.

While the region-wide political integration of Caribbean America is generally regarded as impractical, sub-regional political integration may in a few cases prove feasible. The three most frequently discussed sub-regional groupings are, in a decreasing order of probability: (1) A federation comprising some of the currently fragmented segments of what was formerly the British Caribbean; (2) A Central American Confederation composed of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica; (3) A resurrection of Gran Colombia (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama), or at least integration of some portion of that historic grouping.

With the guidance and encouragement of the British, the West Indies, a federation of former Caribbean dependencies, was established in January, 1958. (Guyana and British Honduras were not incorporated.) The experiment was unsuccessful and the federation disbanded a few years later. However, the federate idea persists. Economic self-interest may discourage Jamaica's re-entry but favor Guyana's adhesion to a new effort at federation. British Honduras, when it becomes the independent state of Belize, is likely to go it alone for geographic and other reasons. In short, some form of federation centered in the Antilles (possibly in Trinidad) may evolve if for no other reasons than common language (English), the logic of economic union, common experience with parliamentary government, and realization that separate existence offers no attraction except the dubious one of absorption by aggressive neighbors or extra-Caribbean powers. Straws in the wind are Guyanan President Burnham's advocacy of his country's federation with Trinidad—Tobago and Barbados, and his success in forming the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) now linking Guyana with Antigua and Barbados.

A confederation of Central American states is favored by geographic propinquity, common language, a history of past union, and progress in the formation of a Central American Common Market (CACM) with its demonstrated economic advantages. The Organization of Central American States (ODECA), founded in 1952, provides an existing nucleus around which closer political union may be developed. But many obstacles remain. Despite unifying factors, Central American states differ in many respects.

Divergent political traditions (contrast democratic Costa Rica, for example, with some of its neighbors who have had little experience with democratic institutions) pose a barrier to effective political union. This is one among several reasons why political unification has been greeted with differing degrees of enthusiasm among the countries of Central America. On the other hand, the unifying effect of improved communications and transportation may well reduce existing obstacles to confederation, especially if such a union not only preserves but also increases material benefits such as those already realized through the CACM.

Turning to the prospect of a resurrected Gran Colombia, analysis quickly gives way to speculation. The rationale favoring some form of political union (i.e., the evident advantages of greater leverage in regional affairs and closer economic integration) is well known. But the disparate segments that were once united only briefly under the genius of Bolívar have developed with the passage of time great differences in their mode and rate of development. Moreover, geography still tends to fragment and to counter the unifying influences of modern technology. Closer policy coordination among the nations of the former Gran Colombia is a much more likely outcome than political integration per se.

If the prospect for region-wide integration is dim, and the likelihood of sub-regional political unions limited and heavily conditioned, what extra-regional alignments are the countries of Caribbean America likely to choose in the decades ahead? There are at least six alternative extra-regional alignments open to Caribbean America—some of them admittedly highly theoretical options.

First, the quest for broader political and economic integration of Latin American states is a major contemporary current. A lingering desire for regional unity has been described as a feeling of "emotional commonwealth" or "continental nationalism" and is sometimes expressed by Latin Americans in terms of *patria grande* and *latinamericanismo*. Environmental differences and disparate rates of progress, however, have combined over the course of time to magnify differences between individual Latin American countries. Certainly if Caribbean political unity confronts enormous obstacles, the far more ambitious goal of unifying *all* of Latin America becomes little more than a nebulous political ideal and sentimental goal—at least for this the twentieth century.

Second, gravitation toward the United States is a less-discussed but nevertheless possible alternative—particularly for some areas which formerly composed the British Caribbean. The advantages of a commonwealth association with the United States similar to

that of Puerto Rico may have appeal over the longer run, especially for fragmented remnants of the Caribbean which fail either to form individual national entities or a broader association with their neighbors. Within the Caribbean psychological barriers to closer association with the United States, combined with reluctance of the United States to assume added responsibilities in the area, may stymie the growth of commonwealth relationships.¹⁰ However, considerations of defense, trade, and investments are countervailing influences which favor closer ties between the United States and the more amorphous geographic fragments within the Caribbean.

Third, Pan Americanism will probably continue to be the prevailing international alignment of Caribbean America, for it will accommodate (even if under strain) either of the foregoing two alternatives and is the logical status quo to the extent that neither of these alternatives proves to be feasible or attractive. With the creation of new nations in Caribbean America, membership in the oas family may be expanded considerably. One obstacle to the admission of some prospective applicants is the Act of Washington (1964) which bars states having border disputes with current oas members. This proviso would deny oas membership to Guyana and the future Belize. Moreover, Venezuela may oppose Jamaica's admission because of the latter's advocacy of an English-speaking commonwealth bloc within the oas.¹¹ Despite these problems and other weaknesses of the oas system, Pan Americanism appears assured of continued life—particularly in the absence of feasible alternatives.

Fourth, continued and closer ties between Caribbean America and Western European states with the traditional interest in the area (Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands) is still another option. This orientation may continue to be the preference of Dutch and French administered areas. The likelihood of increased ties between Caribbean America and European nations in other than the political field appears favorable and inevitably carries a political connotation, since such links may be motivated, in at least some instances, by a desire to offset the overwhelming power of the United States.

Fifth, an orientation toward the Soviet Union—following the course of Castro's Cuba—is an alternative that may appeal to revolutionaries of the radical left should they succeed in toppling a Western-oriented nation of Caribbean America. But United States opposition to such an alignment would have to be reckoned with, and Cuba's experience under Castro has lessened the appeal of

"wars of national liberation" and the illusory benefits of membership in the socialist camp. The Soviet Union itself may be reluctant to encourage such a development for it would almost certainly lead to still another confrontation with the United States in an area far removed from the base of Soviet power.

Sixth, a highly theoretical alternative is that of alignment of Caribbean America (along with the remainder of Latin America) with Afro-Asian nations in a third-world bloc. This option has proven to be more of an empty notion than a practical alternative—even in the economic field not to mention the more tenuous political ties that link such diverse (and frequently competitive) world regions.

Of the six alternatives, only the first three—all of which are *hemispheric* orientations—appear to be realistic over the next few decades. Narrowing the field still further, it is the third option—Pan Americanism—which seems to "fit" Caribbean America most closely. In geopolitical terms, Caribbean America forms a "crush zone" where many political interests meet. A major challenge confronting Caribbean leaders is that of exercising wisely the options available to them so as to chart an international course which best serves the hopes and aspirations of their people.

NOTES

1. Sax Bradford, *Spain in the World* (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), p. 56.

2. Hubert Herring, *A History of Latin America* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 83.

3. Kalman H. Silvert, "A Proposed Framework for Latin American Politics," in John D. Martz (ed.), *The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 9.

4. Pío Jaramillo Alvarado, *El régimen totalitario en América* (Guayaquil: Editora Noticia, 1940), pp. 24, 71.

5. Alfredo Pérez Guerrero, *Ecuador* (Quito: Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 1948), p. 74.

6. Rosendo A. Gómez, "Latin American Executives: Essence and Variations," in Martz, p. 47.

7. J. Lloyd Meham, "Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real," in Martz, p. 35. The author's essay was originally published in May, 1959. The figures have not been up-dated since the essential point is clear, and—in any case—there is a great deal of disagreement concerning the number of Latin American constitutions, since many revised constitutions were promulgated as new instruments.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-39.

9. William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," in Martz, p. 149.

10. As an alternative, former British dependencies in the Caribbean may attempt to forge a closer political link with Canada.

11. Latin American opposition to admission into the oas of former British areas may spur the latter to develop a special relationship with Canada (see fn. 10). Alternatively, admission of former British Caribbean areas into the

OAS would tend to encourage Canada to join the Pan American family—a move long considered by Ottawa.

APPENDIX

DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN THE SPANISH CARIBBEAN

Established Democracies—Costa Rica. This country—well-integrated, highly literate, dedicated to democratic processes and possessing a non-political civil service—clearly stands in a category all its own. Yet recent tension between the administration of President Trejos and his political opponents who control the legislature points up the fact that no country of Caribbean America is immune to political upheaval.

Functioning Democracies—Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama. Venezuela, despite its authoritarian past, has made rapid progress toward becoming an established democracy. Colombia, a two-party state with each party alternating in power, is attempting to break out of a period of political stagnation. Colombian President Lleras Restrepo is seeking congressional authorization to rule by decree on issues involving economic development and administrative reorganization, but his motive is one of pushing reforms rather than seeking authoritarian power. Panama's volatile political atmosphere is such that it could, with a serious outbreak of violence, drop from the ranks of functioning democracies.

Fragile Democratic Institutions—Dominican Republic and Guatemala. The Dominican Republic has experienced four coups and seven governments since Trujillo's assassination in 1961. Democratically elected President Belaguer must steer a course between a military establishment on the right and opposition parties on the left. This is a delicate task in a country which has exhibited little tolerance for debate and has had practically no experience with democratic processes. Guatemalan President Méndez Montenegro is confined by tacit understanding to a centrist position which avoids radical changes but simultaneously advocates reforms. Méndez Montenegro's assumption of office in July, 1966, was in itself an advance for democracy since the military did not favor him. His basic problem is clearly one of survival.

Guided Democracy: One-Party Rule—Mexico. Mexico's PRI since 1929 has always been assured of victory in a system of "guided democracy" in which presidential elections are a formality. Political opposition is nominal. The President, with concurrence of the PRI-controlled Senate, can replace any elected official. Hand-picked party favorites are frequently appointed to high government posts without benefit of popular election. PRI deliberations are essentially democratic, however, and the President is expected to follow party policies. More designed for carrying out the Revolution—which ended over two decades ago—than for reconciling the divergent interests evident in the increasing complex society of a rapidly modernizing Mexico, PRI is showing serious strains.

Limited Democracies—El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. In El Salvador it is widely accepted that the PCN nominee chosen by contesting military factions will be elected in March, 1967. There is even less doubt that Anastasio Somoza Debayle will be elected Nicaragua's President in February, 1967. Honduras is ruled by General López Arellano whose successful golpe in October, 1963, was followed by his election to a six-year term as President by a constituent assembly in the spring of 1965.

Outright Dictatorship—Cuba. Cuba is still passing through the throes of a revolution headed by *el maximo lider*, Fidel Castro. During the course of 1966, the revolution experienced many setbacks: defection of long-time revolutionaries, purges of party officials considered untrustworthy or ineffective, arrest of labor leaders, student demonstrations, and continued economic woes. Such difficulties will be countered by Castro's authoritarian hand. Predictions of Castro's fall appear born more of wishful thinking than hard fact. At the moment, at least, the hope for democracy in Cuba is a forlorn one.

Thomas Mathews: PROBLEMS AND LEADERS
IN THE CARIBBEAN

FOR THE PURPOSE of this paper the Caribbean that we will be concerned with is that composed of the Antilles, both greater and lesser, and the three Guianas on the northeast coast of South America. Limited time and the lack of direct knowledge of the problems and leaders of the greater Caribbean, which includes Central America, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela, have forced me to exclude these areas from my observations.

Economic problems which plague the Caribbean have been passed over in order to give more attention to the political ones. Of course, these problems cannot be completely ignored since there is a relationship between politics and such phenomena as a growing percentage of unemployed as in Trinidad and Jamaica, the problems besetting the production of sugar as in Jamaica and Guyana, the problems brought about by an abnormal influx of foreign capital for industrial development and tourist programs as in Puerto Rico, and the adverse balance of payments which is putting strains on newly independent nations such as Trinidad.

Finally, since this is primarily a political analysis, it would be wise to state in the beginning that although I am not so blindly committed to the principles of a democratic political system that I do not comprehend the dangers which this system entails and the sometimes impressive advantages of alternative political systems, I am nevertheless willing to make my position clear as backing these principles (free speech, the right to organize politically, free elections, respect for the rights of the minority, and so forth),

and my analysis will presume their acceptance, a presumption which may not be shared by the leaders in every country in the Caribbean.

I

After the Second World War, the break-up of the colonial empires has nowhere been carried out with such a peaceful transition as in the Caribbean. The decade of the fifties saw complete or nearly complete political autonomy, but not independence, given to the Netherlands Antilles, Surinam, the French Antilles, and Puerto Rico. In the sixties the former British colonies of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, British Guiana, and Barbados achieved complete independence as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Finally, if we add the freedom found by the Dominican Republic after thirty years of terror and that new style of independence produced in Cuba by the Castro revolution, then the emerging peoples of the Caribbean present an attractive laboratory for political scientists concerned with the problems of nation building.*¹

Assuming—with the reservation indicated—that democracy is the goal of these newly independent people, what then are the political problems faced by their leaders and how are they going about solving them?²

The Caribbean, although freed from the legalistic bondage of imperial powers, has yet to free itself psychologically from the colonial past which hangs heavily over the political patterns now developing in the new countries. In some cases such as Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana, theoretically enjoying complete political freedom as integral parts of France, the control of the European power is all too real. The French Antilleans, beguiled for a few passing years by the deceiving doctrine of assimilation into the French political system, are now waking up to the fact that their status as overseas departments of France is only a euphemistic disguise which perpetuates the colonial control of previous centuries. The sentiment for autonomy (a status quite incompatible with the existing highly centralized French political system) is growing within the two islands which together have a population of over a half a million. Aimée Césaire, now serving his eighth term as the mayor of Fort-de-France, since his famous break from the French Communist Party in 1956, has defended the autonomist point of view and has more recently been joined by Dr. Henri Bangou, newly elected mayor of Pointe-à-Pitre,

*Notes to this chapter begin on p. 39.

Guadeloupe, in opposition to the existing political relationship with France.³ In spite of the fact that these two political leaders command the support of the majority of the citizens in the two largest cities of the French West Indies, the power and attraction of General deGaulle combined with the pride of being French is too strong to allow any overwhelming rejection of assimilation. The post-deGaulle period will undoubtedly produce a change in the political relationship between the Antilles and France, but probably not in French Guyana where the population is so small that economic and administrative aid from France will be necessary for several decades to come.

While the French areas may present an exceptional case, elsewhere the heritage of colonialism tends to warp the political development in a manner all out of proportion to the real or more meaningful problems being faced by the newly autonomous people. In Surinam, which is one of the three members of the tripartite Kingdom of the Netherlands (the other two being the Netherlands Antilles and Holland), Prime Minister Pengle would prefer to hide his government's inefficiency and corruption by an appeal for a revision of the Charter of the Kingdom to allow Surinam to apply to other nations for financial support for her development program.⁴ Holland, which has underwritten the impressive economic development of this small country, has been increasingly reluctant to close her eyes to the extravagance and waste which has come to characterize the government in power. By raising the comparatively irrelevant issue of colonialism, Pengle smothers the cries for reform and carries on a nationalistic political campaign which will undoubtedly see him returned to office as the outspoken defender of Surinamese interests. Thus disguised by means of a political subterfuge, the economic situation in Surinam will continue to deteriorate while the blame is erroneously placed on nonexistent interference from Holland. Unfortunately the only opposition party which could serve to clarify the issue is so strongly committed to independence that it is reluctant to emphasize its agreement with charges made by the Dutch government.

Although less autonomous than Surinam, Puerto Rico's political picture is beclouded by the same problem. In spite of the success of the Popular Democratic Party in almost all phases of public life in Puerto Rico, except perhaps that particular way of life studied by Oscar Lewis,⁵ the political debate on the island has never been weaned away from the seemingly unending discussion of status. Certainly for the nationalistic elements of the political spectrum, Puerto Rico's limited autonomy leaves much to

be desired. Puerto Ricans are dying in Viet Nam in a war which even if it were subjected to a vote in Congress could not be voted on by representatives of the Puerto Rican people.⁶ Other sources of irritation include the inability to vote for the president,⁷ the restrictive shipping laws which hamper a freer participation in Caribbean trade by Puerto Rican producers, and the lack of representation in international organizations even though some of its smaller and less fortunate neighbors are full fledged members of the Organization of American States and the United Nations. These are only a few of the more frequently mentioned areas of possible change in the relationship with the United States.

The question of status looms large in the political drama of the island. All issues from education to social welfare to industrial development are seen not in the light of their relationship to the welfare of the Puerto Rican but rather how they will further this or that particular status. Luis Muñoz Marín, the founder of the Popular Democratic Party and the architect of the present commonwealth status, has achieved great success in devising a political relationship which allows a maximum degree of local political autonomy combined with a permanent and integrated economic relationship with the United States. He has failed, however, to lay to rest the ghost of colonialism, but more damaging is the fact that he has failed to secure any significant ardent defenders among the population for the *Estado Libre Asociado*. Too often it is looked upon as a half-way station which allows the island to prosper without the need for any final decision as to independence or statehood. As such it does not alienate either group and even the majority party itself is split into two recognizable factions each backing the commonwealth status but each reserving its final preference, be it independence or statehood.

The coming year (1967) will see a plebiscite in Puerto Rico in which well over 50 per cent of the participants will vote for the commonwealth status. The remaining votes will be divided between independence and statehood, whose advocates have affirmed their intentions of boycotting the plebiscite. This plebiscite, far from settling the issue of status, will only serve to add fuel to the already hot fire of debate which keeps the island's political pot boiling.

In these two cases, Surinam and Puerto Rico, the minor ties to greater powers are real but are exaggerated beyond the actual significance of their political importance. One final example of the heritage of colonialism might be drawn from one of the newly independent countries such as Trinidad or Guyana where the

political dialogue has yet to develop into the post-colonial stage. The issue of independence is still being debated in the legislature, or the party in power is being accused in the press of selling out to this or that foreign interest. The hard task of day-to-day governing, the solving of insatiable demand for employment, the raising of capital for the exploitation of natural resources, all of these responsibilities are somewhat less satisfying than the exciting and rewarding activity of teasing the imperial lion. Criticism tends to be personal rather than policy based, destructive rather than positive or constructive, chauvinistic or narrowly nationalistic rather than statesmanlike. For example, Guyana's free trade arrangement with Barbados and Antigua is more an anti-Trinidad maneuver than a positive effort for Caribbean cooperation. Trinidad in turn flirts with the Windward Islands more to irritate Barbados or Guyana than to seek ways of mutual support and closer cooperation.⁸

The pangs of birth of a new nation evolving out of a colonial past are still being felt in some of the Caribbean countries and this has determined the tone and direction of the political debate to an abnormal degree thus delaying the identification of pressing issues around which normal political discussion would revolve.

II

The most potentially explosive problem which three of the new nations of the Caribbean face is the racial problem. The comparative racial homogeneity of the Antilles contrasts markedly with the multi-racial heterogeneity of Trinidad and the Guianas, particularly Surinam and Guyana. The East Indians are in the majority in Guyana, which has been torn by racial violence in previous years, but in Trinidad the Negro has a tenuous hold on the majority position. In Surinam a third group, the Javanese, holds an enviable position of balance between the plurality of the Negro and a rapidly increasing East Indian minority.

In the three countries the major political parties are divided along racial lines. This has not always been so. In Surinam, for example, there existed both a Catholic and a conservative party which were able to appeal for support from all racial blocs, although the Hindus and Moslems were naturally reluctant to vote for leaders of another religion. These two parties still exist and, although it is highly unlikely, could possibly recover their former positions of power. One small party, which has been referred to above as being in favor of immediate independence, does make

an intense effort to appeal to all racial groups in the name of Surinam nationalism. The radical posture of its founder and leader, the brilliant lawyer Edward Bruma, unfortunately prevents any considerable support from the more conservative East Indians and Javanese, but he does receive some votes from the Bush Negroes, the more sophisticated Creoles, and the young East Indian intellectuals who refuse to follow the dictates of their pandits.

Racially divided Guyana would probably prefer to return to the early years of the decade of the fifties when its two outstanding political leaders, Mr. Forbes Burnham and Dr. Cheddi Jagan, were working together in a rather uneasy harmony. Too much violence and racial hatred has been experienced by the people of Guyana to allow this to come about even if the leaders were willing to sacrifice their own ambitions. After about ten years of chaos under Dr. Cheddi Jagan, who was prevented from ruling by racial disturbances mostly stimulated by outside influences,⁹ by resulting intervention by British authorities, and by the lack of financial support necessary to carry out the most elementary responsibilities, the opposition coalition formed by Forbes Burnham and the reactionary Peter d'Aguiar came into power. Racial disturbances have ceased, Great Britain has granted independence, and the United States which had allowed a mere \$6 million dollars in loans over a ten-year period has now flooded the country with \$225 million in authorized grants and loans in scarcely two and a half years.¹⁰ With all of this, Forbes Burnham has failed to crack the East Indian solidarity behind Dr. Cheddi Jagan. Dr. Jagan and his East Indian followers know that time is on their side. The East Indian majority, if free elections are to be held in 1967 or 1968, cannot be blocked from taking over the government no matter how much manipulation there is of the so-called proportional representation voting system implanted by the British before their withdrawal. In an effort to bolster his dwindling support Burnham has decreed that all Guyanese, whether residents or not, are eligible to vote in elections. Also the next two years will see efforts to secure immigrants spilling out of the overpopulated islands of Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and perhaps even Jamaica. There are those pessimists who argue that even these methods are not enough and the only thing which will prevent Dr. Jagan from taking over will be the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and the indefinite postponement of elections.

Trinidad's East Indians, who expect to be in the majority by 1970, have failed to produce a leader who could compete success-

fully with the erudite and dynamic Dr. Eric Williams. As the results of the recent elections clearly show,¹¹ Dr. Williams and his People's National Movement have failed to win the support of the East Indian of the rural areas. As in Guyana the two races are gravitating into two political blocs. Splinter parties or small political groups formed around the personality of an important community leader all fared badly in the election, leaving the reins of government in the hands of the Negro majority and the opposition in the hands of the leaders of the dominant East Indian party. Time and the natural increase of the East Indian over the Negro will eventually reverse the existing power structure. As yet Trinidad has not seen the violence of Guyana but the slums of Port of Spain, while not as bad as West Kingston in Jamaica, are worse than any slum area in Guyana and will produce serious problems for a racially divided nation.

The problem of a racially divided society can be aggravated by pressures caused by a growing population inadequately absorbed by slow economic growth. The solution to the problem lies in the creation of a feeling of nationhood which transcends racial or religious loyalties or at least which manipulates such loyalties for the benefit of the country as a whole. When the Surinamese thinks of himself as a Surinamese and not Javanese, then these young nations will have solved one of their most pressing problems. Unfortunately, the politicians at this point seem to be more concerned with building up a racial base for their political power than with creating a united nation.

III

The problem of the passing of political power from one generation to the next is being faced in Jamaica and Puerto Rico. The old leaders who battled the colonial system, whether British or American, in the decade of the thirties are being hard pressed by an impatient and younger group of politicians anxious to take over the party and government leadership. The Prime Minister of Jamaica, Sir Alexander Bustamante, is over 83 years of age, partially blind, and disabled by a stroke about two years ago. Mr. Norman Manley is a decade younger but still well beyond the normal retirement age. A number of able cabinet members of the present government in Jamaica are willing to take over the leadership of the Bustamante political machine, but as yet the struggle for power has not occurred because the "old man," as he is affectionately called, refuses to retire and because the opposi-

tion would strive to take advantage of any potential split in the Jamaica Labour Party. As yet there is no clear-cut heir to the power of Bustamante who undoubtedly will endeavor to select his own successor. The People's National Party is in a much worse position because it does not have the number of able second lieutenants in positions of responsibility gaining experience for the eventual day when the reins of government will be available to them.¹²

In Puerto Rico Luis Muñoz Marín has picked his successor, who has been governing the island with considerable ability since 1964. Roberto Sánchez Vilella is not a politician although he has tried very hard to secure popular support. The lesser leaders in the Popular Democratic Party have rallied behind another leader, Senator Luis Negrón López, whose experience of many years in elected office in the legislature is in contrast to the experience of Governor Sánchez in appointed positions of the executive branch of the government. The recent split (September, 1966) became so public and open that only the direct intervention of former governor, now Senator, Luis Muñoz Marín prevented the Popular Democratic Party from having a public row. The division is very real and will break out in 1968 when Governor Sánchez is expected to seek reelection. As long as Luis Muñoz Marín continues to be active in the Puerto Rican political arena the party will not divide, but this form of forced unification between the conservative and liberal factions of the party is temporary.¹³ The division indicates that the party has still to develop its program and principles beyond the dictates and influence of its founder. Until this is done, to talk of the Popular Democratic Party as an institutional party which will survive the passing of power from one generation of leaders to another is quite misleading.

The same problem is faced by the opposition party, the Statehood Republican Party, whose leaders have been active in the party since the late 1920's. In this party such a suffocating hold has been exercised over the decision-making power that there are no leaders on hand to take over from the passing generation. Those able figures who are sympathetic to the party have been forced into the background or out of the party altogether by the arbitrary action of the autocratic leader, Senator Miguel Angel García Méndez.

Only the independence movement gives evidence of strong young leaders who unfortunately show no ability to accept party discipline. In fact the aspect of an independent Puerto Rico under the guidance of the current wave of leaders in the inde-

pendence movement is almost alarming and dismal. Just recently one leader of the minor independence groups, the Nationalist Party, challenged the leader of the Pro-Independence Movement to a duel in order to settle personal and party differences.

The importance of the position of Fidel Castro in Cuba would seem to be another example of the same type of political problem. The Cuban Revolution has been defined and carried out almost single-handedly by the powerful charismatic personality of Castro.¹⁴ Still young and very much in control, only an unexpected and unfortunate event could remove Castro from his position of leadership; thus the problem of transmission of the position of power is not an urgent one in Cuba today. The Cuban revolution and all that it stands for to the thousands of enthusiastic supporters would falter and fail should the centralizing figure of the leader disappear. If Castro can outwit his adversaries for another decade or two, then the revolution will have had time to implant solidly its principles and purpose on a whole generation who may be able to carry on its effectiveness beyond the limitation of the lives of its founders and current leaders. The Mexicans were able to do precisely this, but that revolution did not have the dubious benefit of one outstanding and all-powerful leader and did have the massive support which rarely needed the intellectual orientation provided by the doctrinaire dialecticians who currently seem to be in vogue in Cuba.

Of all of the political leaders of the Caribbean the ones who are faced with the most impossible situations live on the island of Santo Domingo. Since the Haitian problem seems devoid of a possible¹⁵ solution, I will limit my observation to the Dominican Republic where President Joaquín Balaguer until recently had a degree of support for his highly untenable position in the nature of a democratically oriented and loyal opposition led by Juan Bosch. Now this is gone and Balaguer, a lonely man by choice and nature, faces an incredible set of circumstances, any one of which would be enough to defeat the most dedicated democrat. The heritage of Trujillo which can hardly be summed up in a page or paragraph¹⁶—the military machine which has no understanding of, let alone interest in, political democracy; the utter absence of any technological or bureaucratic administrative staff;¹⁷ the chaotic influence of anarchistic elements pouring out of the misery of urban and rural slums; the corruption of a whole generation of public officials; the bankruptcy of a deplorable education and public health program; the suffocating burden of almost a whole nation accustomed to living off of the benevolent hand-

outs of a paternalistic government—these are just some of the reasons why the task of governing the Dominican Republic would be next to impossible for a man dedicated to the democratic process.

Rather than pick up each of these areas for further study, one particular point upon which there seems to be general agreement by most observers of the Dominican Republic is sufficient to summarize the impossible task before Joaquín Balaguer. Robert Crassweller has expressed it in this fashion in his dramatic biography of Trujillo. In the Dominican Republic there is "the tendency to react more understandingly and tolerantly . . . to the very firm exercise of political power. During the Era of Trujillo many able men of the highest character believed simultaneously both that the regime was in many respects barbarous and that only with a strong hand could the country be governed."¹⁸ This basic lack of faith in democracy is prevalent in the minds of the most dedicated servants of the Dominican people. It may go a long way to explain why Juan Bosch felt that his continued presence in the country could only aggravate and complicate unnecessarily the task of the president, who perhaps for the good of the country should be free to act with force and decision. There are those who would applaud this as applied to the case of Balaguer in the Dominican Republic but would deplore its application to the example of Fidel Castro in Cuba which in reality is very much the same except that it is political power being exercised by the left instead of the right. To pursue this further would lead us to a more expansive topic which has been explored by more able minds elsewhere. I refer to the questions of the heritage of Hispanic culture and the role of the military in political life of the Latin American countries.¹⁹

IV

Before terminating this brief account of problems and leaders in the Caribbean, I would mention one final problem: foreign intervention. Intervention can take many different forms, the most obvious being the direct military intervention in the Dominican Republic by the United States armed forces. Similarly intervention would also be the term to be applied to the missiles supplied to the Cubans by the Soviet Union, since it could hardly be conceived that this hardware would be under complete Cuban control. Also one would be inclined to look with a questioning eye at the immodest display of United States capital in the last

year in Guyana. Concern is being expressed by non-Jaganite Guyanese²⁰ over the willingness of the Burnham government to prostitute itself and its principles for the American dollar. Not all foreign influence is from the colossus to the North. In Surinam Edward Bruma strongly feels that Dutch capital has deprived the Surinamese of complete exercise of their supposed autonomy. The weak cry of the opposition in Trinidad through the voice of C. L. R. James is against the tendency to allow the public debt to skyrocket while loans are secured—particularly in this case and that of Jamaica—from Canada.

These are scattered examples, but to sharpen the problem attention should be focused on two cases: Cuba and Guyana. Both countries are plagued by the fact that they are used as pawns in the game of cold war power politics. In each case Jagan and Castro invite this problem by their understandable refusal to relinquish their independence by getting caught up in the suffocating embrace of the American market. Certainly Guyana under Jagan and Cuba under the current economic blockade have suffered severely for their posture of defiance.

Neutrality within the Caribbean is apparently not a position allowed by the masterminds of our State and Military Departments. We seem to be unable to understand the lessons to be learned from our relations in this century with Mexico. We take the childish attitude that if you are not with us then you are obviously against us. Normal relations should be renewed with Cuba and Castro's problem would then become a much more difficult one of trying to outbid the pervading influence of American capitalism. As matters stand now we are contributing to an easing of the position of Castro, which is extremely difficult in an island unaccustomed to austerity, by providing a scapegoat and explanation for the hardships the Cuban people are experiencing.

In the case of Guyana we are even blinder still since our policy has failed up to this point to take advantage of the friendly elements within the East Indian racial groups. By punishing them for having chosen as their spokesman the charming and affable Dr. Jagan because he is an East Indian and not because he is a Marxist-Leninist, we have cut off our contact from a group whose eventual takeover of the government is inevitable. Again we have provided a political leader with a facile and for the most part false explanation for his inability to solve pressing administrative problems.

The result is a confused picture which can be clarified only when foreign intervention ceases to be used as a political tool

both by the power intervening and the leader who has invited the intervention, even though such intervention may be of a negative nature as in the case of Cuba and Guyana.

V

In summary, I have tried to pinpoint some of the more pressing political, as contrasted to economic, problems which are facing the current leaders of the island nations of the Caribbean. I have tried to use as my guideline those problems which must be solved in order to create a climate of political freedom and responsibility which will allow the development of a stable democratic political progress and tradition. The leader who successfully solves these problems will become a builder of nations.

Many decades ago a young man admiringly wrote an appreciation of the political genius of his father.²¹ He likened him to a sculptor who exercised his God-given power to mold the shapeless clay into a work of art. The leader was Luis Muñoz Rivera, one of the outstanding Puerto Rican patriots, who brought his people a long way toward nationhood. Leaders of today, including Luis Muñoz Marín, are in the process of creating new nations in the Caribbean out of personality-less colonial entities. The quality of their work of art will be judged by future generations.

NOTES

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4. *Ibid.*, section on Surinam.

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6. *San Juan Star* of October 27, 1966, carried an article by an editorial staff writer protesting this injustice.

7. *El Día*, October 26, 1966. See the statement of Luis Ferre, one of the two leaders of the Statehood Republican Party.

8. Sir Arthur Lewis, "The Agony of the Eight," *The Advocate* (Barbados: Commercial Printing, n.d. but probably 1965), pp. 36-38.

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10. T. Mathews, "The Three Guianas," *Current History* (December, 1966).

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12. *Spotlight*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (April, 1966), 11. See the report of Sir Arthur Lewis' speech at the University of the West Indies on the occasion of the granting of honorary degrees to Dr. Eric Williams and Sir Alexander Bustamante.

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14. Hugh Thomas, "Paradoxes of Castro's Cuba," *New Statesman*, LXXII, (August 26, 1966), 283-85.

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Part II

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL

Juan D. Sanchez: RESOURCES OF THE CARIBBEAN

THE CARIBBEAN AREA for the purposes of this paper has been defined to include Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia as well as Central America, Guyana, Surinam, French Guiana, and the Caribbean islands. Few generalizations can be made about so diverse a group of countries which includes Mexico and Puerto Rico, both of which are advancing rapidly into modern industrial economies, as well as tropical palm-sprinkled island paradises with natural air-conditioning provided by the trade winds. I shall confine this paper chiefly to the Spanish-speaking countries and Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guyana.

I

All the countries in the Caribbean area have certain basic resources. Perhaps the most important is manpower and youth. As we all know, this area has one of the highest birth rates in the world, and in much of the region some 60-70 per cent of the population is under 20 years of age. The Caribbean region is one of the world's great melting pots. Dutch and English, Spanish and Portuguese, Africans and Asians have all left their stamp on the native Indian way of life. The overall result is a pleasing political and cultural mixture.

Experience has shown that, given the tools and the training, workers in these countries are quick to acquire the mechanical skills needed to run modern agricultural or industrial machinery.

The experience of Mexico, for example, offers more than adequate evidence of this. In addition, as these countries approach economic maturity, the growing middle class is providing increasing numbers of management and entrepreneurial personnel. In all of these countries, United States firms have gradually and successfully been replacing United States nationals with local personnel in managerial positions.

The most recent available figures indicate that literacy rates in this area range from some 20 per cent in Haiti to about 85 per cent in Costa Rica, Guyana, and Puerto Rico. A major target of the Alliance for Progress is the improvement and expansion of educational facilities, and many of the countries with which we are concerned here today are making noteworthy strides in raising literacy rates.

Vocational and professional schools are serving more and more people. In Venezuela alone, in 1957-58, there were only 608,000 students enrolled in public primary schools, 30,000 in public secondary schools, and 17,000 in public technical schools. By 1965, these totals had increased to 1.2 million, 118,000, and 75,000 respectively.

These countries lie in an area between the equator and 28° north—roughly comparable to the situation of African countries north of the Congo, or of southeast Asia.

Middle America is a meeting ground of mountains and men. The rugged spines of the South American Andes and the North American Rockies make large sections uninhabitable. Except for Honduras and Cuba, many of these nations suffer from lack of cultivable plains. The mainland mountains lift the cities above the steamy coastal lowlands. Thus there is, for example, a year-round springlike temperature in Mexico City and San José.

Volcanic eruptions like those in El Salvador have enriched the soil, which is ideal for growing crops of bananas, sugar cane, and so forth. Corn, now a universal staple, was originally cultivated in this area by the Indians; lima beans, peppers, and many other familiar food plants also had their beginnings here.

This area is also rich in natural resources. Mexico alone, with less than 1.5 per cent of the world's population, produces 7.5 per cent of the world's antimony, over a quarter of world arsenic output, almost 15 per cent of the bismuth production, some 4.5 per cent of cotton and cottonseed, over 90 per cent of henequen, more than 15 per cent of silver, and 11 per cent of the world's sulphur output.

Jamaica, Guyana, and Surinam produce each year over 40 per

cent of the world's bauxite; Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela account for almost 15 per cent of world petroleum output; the Caribbean region accounts for over a fifth of world coffee production. In addition, it is generally agreed that untold wealth in as yet undiscovered resources lies waiting to be discovered and developed in the hinterlands of several of these countries, notably in Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, and Central America. It was only in recent years that the mineral-rich Guyana region of Venezuela was opened up; it is now believed that the iron ore reserves there are sufficient to meet Venezuela's requirements for the next century.

All of these resources are not only useful in the domestic economies of the countries in which they are located, but they also offer to each of them the means with which to trade for other commodities not available locally—in particular for the machinery and equipment needed for building industrial economies and for modernizing agriculture production techniques.

The fact that the Caribbean region contains all of these natural resources—and to those already mentioned must be added many other agricultural products, lumber, and fish—enables the countries in this area to trade needed raw materials with the United States and other industrial countries in exchange for the capital equipment required to build local industry and for many manufactures not yet produced locally.

In 1965 Mexico alone supplied a third of United States imports of graphite, three-quarters of imports of fluorspar, a quarter of imports of barium, and two-thirds of imports of sulphur. The Caribbean region as a whole supplied half of United States sodium chloride imports, 22 per cent of iron ore and concentrates, practically all bauxite imports, 27 per cent of zinc ores, 38 per cent of crude petroleum, 77 per cent of naphtha, all jet-fuel imports, 85 per cent of other fuel-oil imports, and 42 per cent of coffee imports. This is a very impressive list.

In return for these and other products from this area valued at \$3.0 billion, the United States shipped some \$2.9 billion worth of goods, chiefly machinery, transport equipment, and other manufactured products.

In addition to labor and raw materials, the third major need of any economy, whatever its stage of development, is capital. While it is generally agreed that large infusions of foreign capital have been and will be needed to accelerate the development of many of these countries, it is often forgotten that local capital is playing an increasing and in most countries a dominant role in the process.

Of total investment in Mexico, for example, at least 90 per cent has come from domestic sources. While the percentage may not be that high in some of the other countries with which we are concerned, it is clear that considerably larger amounts of domestic resources are now going into capital formation than was the case even a half decade ago. In some countries these funds are being channeled, according to plan, into the segments of the economy where they are most needed through local development banks.

In all of Central America, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela, domestic investment has far exceeded the inflow of funds from foreign private and institutional sources in recent years; indeed, while there has been a consistent, though diminishing, net outflow of foreign funds from Venezuela in the sixties owing to special circumstances, annual gross capital formation in that country has risen from \$1.3 billion in 1960 to almost \$1.5 billion at present. The figures appear to indicate that even in such relatively underdeveloped countries as Nicaragua, political and economic stability offer strong inducements to local as well as foreign investors.

The attached tables give some indication of the funds that have been committed to the Caribbean area by some of the larger international institutions and by the United States Government. These funds constitute yet another resource upon which the various countries of the region can draw for education, housing, improving agricultural techniques, road building, feasibility studies, industrial projects, and so forth. From the end of the war through June, 1965, all the countries in the area received some \$1,730 million in the form of loans and grants from international organizations. An additional \$3.4 billion has been made available by the United States through various aid programs, the Export-Import Bank, and so on. Of this, over \$1.1 billion consisted of outright grants.

II

To develop their resources with maximum benefit to themselves, many of these countries whose local markets are too small to gain the advantages that come with large-scale industrial production are joining in larger groups.

Thus Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela have joined with seven South American countries in the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), and five Central American countries have banded together in a common market. Antigua, Barbados, and Guyana signed an agreement in December, 1965 looking toward

a Caribbean free trade area, and there has been talk of a larger trading association including many of the smaller Caribbean islands and Puerto Rico.

Of these existing and projected arrangements, the Central American Common Market (CACM) has thus far been the most successful. Its members have removed tariffs on some 95 per cent of the items they trade among themselves. Indeed, although the remaining twenty-seven items include cotton, coffee, sugar, and tobacco on which it will be hardest to drop restrictions since they provide substantial revenues to the governments concerned, the substantial achievement of this group of nations is well worth noting. Intra-regional trade has increased more than fourfold since 1960. Other organs, of which the Central American Bank for Economic Integration is perhaps the most outstanding, have been established and are in business. The success of this region's integration has been largely responsible for bringing in increasing amounts of foreign investment and expediting the development of an efficient industrial base in the area. Mexico, a member of LAFTA, has expressed more than passing interest in CACM and may some day provide the bridge to unifying that group with LAFTA in an overall Latin American regional association.

In summary, the Caribbean Area has the human and economic resources for continued progress and should become increasingly important to the entire Western Hemisphere.

TABLE 1
GENERAL ECONOMIC STATISTICS
(At constant prices)

	1965 Population (thousands)	Area (thous. sq. mi.)	Arable Land & Pasture (% of total)	Gross National Product 1965 (mil. \$)	% increases* 1960-1965	Per cap. GNP (dollars)	Literacy Rate (%)
Bahamas	136	4	1			375	
Barbados	245	0.2	70	92			
Bermuda	48		10				
Bonfuda	106	9		26		250	
Colombia	17,787	455	17	5,440	4.4	306	62
Costa Rica	1,433	23	20	593	3.9	414	85
Cuba	7,631	44	52			150e	
Dominican Republic	3,619	19	26	700		200	65
El Salvador	2,929	8	58	860	7.7	295	50
French Guiana	36	35				320e	75
Guadeloupe	316	1	40			450e	
Guatemala	4,438	42	19	1,410	6.2	315	30
Guyana	647	83	10	190		259	85
Haiti	4,660	11	31			73*	20
Honduras	2,284	44	38	504	4.8	220	50
Jamaica	1,773	4	45	873	3.8	490	80
Martinique	321	0.4	47				
Mexico	42,689	758	48	19,416	5.9	455	72
Neth. Antilles	208e	0.4	6			900e	
Nicaragua	1,655	57	12	576	8.3	330	50
Panama	1,240	29	18	615	8.1	495	75
Puerto Rico	2,633	3	68	2,800		1,060	85
Surinam	330e	55				340*	
Trin. & Tob.	975	2	35		5.3	632*	80
Venezuela	8,722	352	21		5.2	833*	65
TOTAL	106,867	2,039.0					

e—estimated
*—1964
—1965

TABLE 2
PRODUCTION

Year	Commodity		World	Caribbean Region	% of World Production
1965	Antimony	m. t.	67,000	Mexico 5,000	7.5
1964	Arsenic	m. t.	58,000	Mexico 15,000	26.0
1965	Bauxite	mil. m. t.	35.75	Jamaica 8.4, Guyana 3, Surinam 4	43.1
1965	Bismuth	mil. m. t.	3.5	Mexico 0.5	14.3
1965	Coffee	mil. bags	63.4	Colombia 6.8, El Salvador 2.0, Mexico 1.9, Guatemala 1.8, Costa Rica 0.9, Venezuela 0.3	21.6
1965	Cotton	mil. bales	52.2	Mexico 2.4	4.6
1965	Cottonseed	mil. s. tons	25.2	Mexico 1.1	4.4
1964	Gold	mil. fine oz.	46.1	Colombia 0.4, Nicaragua 0.2, Mexico 0.2	1.7
1965	Henequen	mil. lbs.	362	Mexico 331, El Salvador 6	93.1
1965	Petroleum	bil. barrels	11.0	Venezuela 1.3, Mexico 0.1, Colombia .07	14.0
1964	Silver	mil. fine oz.	249.5	Mexico 41.94, Honduras 3.22	18.0
1965	Sulphur	mil. n. t.	15	Mexico 1.7	11.3

TABLE 3
TOTAL TRADE, EXCLUDING CUBA
(Millions of dollars)

Exports (<i>fob</i>)					Imports (<i>cif</i>)			
1962	1963	1964	1965		1962	1963	1964	1965
29	41	35	37	Barbados	52	58	64	67
463	446	548	539	Colombia	540	506	586	454
93	95	113	112	Costa Rica	113	124	139	178
172	174	179	123	Domin. Repub.	148	184	221	106
136	154	178	189	El Salvador	125	152	191	201
35	38	35	38	Guadeloupe	57	69	79	85
118	154	158	187	Guatemala	136	171	202	229
99	102	95	97	Guyana	74	69	87	104
42	41	40	36	Haiti	46	39	41	36
81	83	95	129	Honduras	80	95	102	122
182	202	218	213	Jamaica	223	226	282	295
34	36	29	40	Martinique	57	74	79	92
930	985	1,054	1,146	Mexico	1,143	1,240	1,493	1,560
688	658	630	603	Neth. Antilles	872	841	784	746
82	100	118	144	Nicaragua	97	111	137	161
48	59	71	78	Panama	171	192	195	219
810	855	936		Puerto Rico	1,124	1,202	1,477	
42	46	48	57	Surinam	55	58	81	96
345	374	405	404	Trin. & Tobago	353	377	426	472
2,594	2,629	2,742	2,784	Venezuela	1,096	950	1,269	1,289
115	140	140	140e	Others	340	350	380	370e
7,138	7,412	7,867		Total	6,902	7,088	8,315	

Source: International Monetary Fund, U. S. Department of Commerce.

TABLE 4
UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF SELECTED ITEMS, 1965
(Millions of dollars)

Commodity	Total	Caribbean Area	% of Total
Graphite	2.4	Mexico 0.8	33
Sodium chloride	4.0	Mexico 0.7, Bahamas 1.3	50
Fluorspar	20.0	Mexico 14.7	74
Barium	5.7	Mexico 1.5	26
Iron ore & conc.	444.0	Mexico 0.04, Colombia 0.1, Venezuela 97.9, Surinam 0.3	22
Bauxite	149.0	Jamaica 94, Surinam 29, others 25.5	99
Zinc ores	54.4	Mexico 11.6, others 2.9	27
Coffee, green	1,058.0	Mexico 64, Guatemala 50, El Salvador 40, Colombia 199, others 88	42
Crude oil	892.0	Venezuela 299, Colombia 36, Neth. Antilles 6	38
Naphtha	62.0	Trinidad 13, Neth. Antilles 17, Venezuela 18	77
Jet fuel	95.0	Trinidad 19, Neth. Antilles 47, Venezuela 28	100
Sulphur	27.0	Mexico 18	67

TABLE 5
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
(Millions of dollars)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Colombia	758	714	576	799		
Costa Rica	72	62	69	75		
Dominican Republic	67	57	71	64	80	
El Salvador	73	63	64	74		
Guatemala	103	109	108	140		
Honduras	48	44	56	64	63	
Mexico	1,856	1,928	1,984	2,240	2,928	3,048
Nicaragua	47	51	60	78	94	93
Panama	71	87	96	108	102	
TOTAL OF ABOVE	3,095	3,052	3,084	3,642		
Puerto Rico*	352	376	445	480	576	714
Venezuela	1,346	1,028	1,146	1,233	1,433	
Jamaica	138	135	130	127	153	
Trinidad	156	150	171	168		

Source: Statistical Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. III, No. 1, International Monetary Fund.

*Gross fixed domestic investment; fiscal years ending June 30.

TABLE 6
UNITED STATES LOANS AND GRANTS IN THE
CARIBBEAN AREA, EXCLUDING CUBA
1946-June 30, 1965
(Millions of dollars)

AID and predecessor agencies	\$1,077
Social Progress Trust Fund	254
Food for Peace	356
Export-Import Bank l-t loans	1,220
Other U. S. economic programs	286
TOTAL ECONOMIC	3,193
Military	231
TOTAL ECONOMIC & MILITARY	3,424
of which:	
Loans	2,316
Grants	1,108

TABLE 7
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
LOANS AND CREDITS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE
CARIBBEAN AREA May 1, 1947-June 30, 1966
(Millions of dollars)

	Loans	Credits
Colombia	\$ 430.6	\$19.5
Costa Rica	47.7	5.5
El Salvador	50.3	8.0
Guatemala	18.2	—
Guyana	0.9	—
Haiti	2.6	0.3
Honduras	25.9	12.5
Jamaica	27.5	—
Mexico	625.3	—
Nicaragua	35.7	3.0
Panama	18.0	—
Trin. & Tob.	23.5	—
Venezuela	232.3	—
Total	\$1,538.5	\$48.8

Source: IBRD Annual Report 1965-66

TABLE 8
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVE LOANS
TO THE CARIBBEAN AREA
AS OF JUNE 30, 1966
(Millions of dollars)

Colombia	\$ 309.0
Costa Rica	38.5
El Salvador	31.4
Guatemala	7.1
Haiti	1.2
Honduras	19.4
Jamaica	5.2
Mexico	503.0
Nicaragua	20.0
Panama	9.9
Venezuela	220.1
TOTAL	\$1,164.8
In addition, the following loans had been signed but were not yet effective:	
Colombia	41.7
Jamaica	22.0
Mexico	19.0
TOTAL	\$82.7

Source: IBRD Annual Report, 1965-66

Effective loans are total commitments made available through IBRD less those which have matured, been canceled, repaid, or sold off to other participants.

TABLE 9
ASSISTANCE FROM SELECTED
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
TO THE CARIBBEAN AREA,
EXCLUDING CUBA
1946-JUNE 30, 1965
(Millions of dollars)

World Bank	\$1,265
International Finance Corporation	32
International Development Association	49
Inter-American Development Bank	278
U. N. Technical Assistance Programs	39
U. N. Special Fund	51
Eur. Devel. Fund of EEC	14*
Total	1,728

*To Surinam.

TABLE 10
NON-MONETARY SECTOR FOREIGN CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
(Millions of dollars)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Colombia	26.1	-6.5	34.4	89.0	126.5	59.4
Costa Rica	5.4	3.8	24.9	31.4	16.3	70.8
Domin. Repub.	-15.9	-26.4	18.9	49.6	22.9	9.6
El Salvador	8.1	11.6	10.4	20.1	30.6	28.5
Guatemala	22.8	9.2	12.3	32.8	36.9	
Honduras	-5.6	-7.2	5.3	15.9	10.7	9.9
Mexico	120.0	243.0	253.0	287.0	552.0	156.0
Nicaragua	4.0	-2.1	18.6	15.3	15.6	2.5
Panama	22.8	31.6	28.4	31.0	7.8	7.2
TOTAL OF ABOVE	187.7	257.0	406.2	556.2	819.3	
Puerto Rico*	173.7	191.1	269.0	283.4	292.5	371.7
Venezuela	-149.5	-424.9	-541.1	-353.1	-24.7	-48.0

Note: Includes private direct investment and other long-term capital (including loans to private sector from international institutions and U. S. Government agencies); private short-term capital; local and central government bonds issued and retired; loans received by local and central governments, and subscriptions to IBRD, IDA, and IABD.

*Fiscal years end June 30.

Carlos Sanz de Santamaría: OPPORTUNITIES FOR
DEVELOPMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN

BEFORE GOING into the specifics of "Opportunities for Development," I should briefly summarize the purpose of the Alliance for Progress and of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), its central coordinating mechanism.*

I

The Alliance was proposed by the late President Kennedy and was launched by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August, 1961. The twenty nations who signed the Charter of Punta del Este committed themselves to carry out a broad range of first priority tasks in the fields of economic and social development. I will not list them all in detail, but merely point out that the Charter calls for the expansion and diversification of agricultural and industrial production; sustained economic growth along with better distribution of income; reforms in outmoded tax, social security, land tenure, and other systems; action to prevent or eliminate inflation; action to expand and diversify exports in order to earn foreign exchange needed for the importation of development goods; action to improve health, housing, and education; and action to speed up regional economic integration. The essential point to remember is that the commitments of Punta del Este were commitments by governments to their own peoples as well as commitments between governments.

*This paper was read by Paul Harrison, Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, Washington, D.C.

The Alliance was begun as a ten-year effort, estimated to require an investment in economic and human development of about \$100 billion, of which at least \$80 billion would have to come from Latin America itself. The remainder was to come from official and private outside sources—international agencies such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank; agencies of the United States government such as the Agency for International Development (AID); government institutions of other industrially advanced countries; and the private investors of the industrialized capital-exporting nations.

II

The Punta del Este conference did not attempt to provide an executive body for the Alliance, and it soon became apparent that such a body was badly needed. The United States found itself in the position of principal decision-maker and the program took on the character of a United States aid program for Latin America when, in fact, it was meant to be a Latin American self-help effort with external aid as an important and catalytic, but still a minority element.

Recognizing this problem, the IA-ECOSOC, holding its annual review of the Alliance in São Paulo, Brazil in 1963, voted to create CIAP as central executive body for hemispheric development. The Committee, which came into being in 1964, is made up of a full-time chairman who is always a Latin American and seven part-time members, one of whom is from the United States.

The Committee's principal functions are to study the development efforts of the countries, to make estimates of their needs for external financing, and to recommend the allocation of the external financial resources available. Accordingly, in a manner somewhat similar to the approach used by the European countries during the Marshall Plan, CIAP established the mechanism of an annual review of each country's development. In these reviews—we are now nearing the end of the third cycle—the international financing agencies and the chief United States government financing agencies are present as active participants and representatives of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries as observers.

This approach has enabled CIAP to bring to bear on Latin American development problems a wealth of talent in the fields of economic and social development.

The first review was based on necessarily incomplete data—the countries were simply not able to compile up-to-date and compre-

hensive data of the kind required for searching analysis. But the second cycle was much improved over the first and third much improved over the second. So, always bearing in mind that economic and social development is still far from being an exact science (even as an art it is still primitive in many aspects), CIAP reviews are beginning to give the individual countries and the external agencies a clearer panorama of opportunities for development.

III

Viewing the panorama we see that the creation of a multilateral coordinating body has helped development—so much so that in the recently approved Foreign Assistance Act the United States Congress decided that United States development loans under the Alliance should be in keeping with the findings and recommendations of CIAP in its country reviews. The Act also recognizes the value of channeling funds through multilateral financing agencies. Under the new Foreign Aid Appropriations Act, up to 10 per cent of the funds for development loans under the Alliance may be channeled through the Inter-American Development Bank or the World Bank.

But multilateralizing action from the outside is not the only desirable thing we notice as we scan this panorama of development opportunities. One thing in particular has become clear: The most challenging and promising opportunity for development lies in strengthening and speeding up regional economic integration—multilateralizing on the inside. Individual Latin American countries have made progress under the Alliance as a result of national efforts in many fields—development planning, tax reform, infrastructural investment to name only a few—but they should be able to make more and speedier progress if, together, they take bolder action toward the creation of a common market.

IV

We already have rather impressive evidence in support of this thesis in the achievements of the Central American integration movement. But the opportunities for future development are at least as exciting as the achievements of the past few years.

The OAS Panel of Experts recently completed an evaluation of the development plans of the Central American countries and made a synthesis of the individual evaluations in a single volume, which is available from the OAS secretariat in Washington. The

document, in Spanish, is entitled, "Informe sobre los Planes Nacionales de Desarrollo y el Progreso de Integración Económica en Centroamérica." I will not attempt in this brief exposition to summarize the development opportunities that can be inferred from this report. Let me merely say that there are some that depend to a certain extent on speeding the course of integration in the next few years and others that seem to offer good possibilities with the present stage of integration arrangements.

Of the first type—those that depend on further steps toward integration—there are the opportunities in infrastructural development, especially in construction of the regional network of primary highways which is bound to lead to further development of a secondary network. There are also the plans for industrial development on a regional scale. The implementation of these plans still requires political decisions, however.

Of the second type—those that offer good possibilities not so dependent on further steps in integration—there are promising opportunities for production and processing of livestock, poultry, and certain types of fruits and vegetables, both for internal consumption and for export. Looking at the Central American region as a whole, the Panel of Experts said that the individual national plans seem to underestimate the potential for export of livestock, fruits, and vegetables and concluded that the production and export of meat could well be the objective of a special program either on a regional basis or on a national basis in Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

Tourism is another industry that has a potential, not only in Central America and mainland areas bordering on the Caribbean, but also in some of the islands of the Caribbean that have limited land and natural resources for major agricultural and industrial development.

Although CIAP is responsible only for studies of countries that are signatories to the Alliance Charter, we note the attainment of independence by Barbados and salute the people of this new nation. We also note with interest the decision of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain to establish a Regional Development Committee for the Eastern Caribbean.

V

The basic trend in the Inter-American System is toward regional economic integration, although there are some OAS members—for example, the Dominican Republic in the Caribbean area—who

have not yet joined either the Central American Common Market or the Latin American Free Trade Association. However, CIAP is already working to establish links between the regional entities and the non-member countries. And I believe that countries not now members of the Inter-American System, such as Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago, may find it possible to cooperate more closely, if they wish, with the integration movements, whether or not they are members of the OAS. For example, Canada, while not a member of the OAS, is participating in the Alliance for Progress through the Inter-American Development Bank.

The other countries of the Caribbean—Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico—are large countries with great development efforts already under way and still greater development opportunities before them. From CIAP's studies of Venezuela, it appears that this country has an opportunity to do what few developing countries can do, that is, adopt an industrial development strategy that bypasses the conventional import substitution phase and goes directly to the development of internationally competitive, capital intensive enterprises in such fields as petrochemicals, metallurgy, machinery, and metalworking. Mexico has already developed a wide range of products for the export market and is intensifying its export efforts.

Wherever you look in the Caribbean there are opportunities for development. The question is, which are the most needed from the point of view of the peoples of these countries? What opportunities can best serve human freedom and welfare? For let us not forget, the Alliance for Progress is for man. Its aim is not just development but democratic development and the building of freer and greater civilizations.



Matio Mory: EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT
PLANNING IN THE CARIBBEAN

A FEW YEARS AGO, when the Central American Common Market was starting to show very promising results, the Committee for Economic Development (CED) decided to sponsor a study of the region's economic potential. For this purpose members of the staff made an extensive survey and collected information dealing primarily with industrial and financial problems of Central America.* The findings were included in a basic document with some tentative proposals intended to accelerate the economic development of the area. To consider these recommendations, several meetings were held over a period of two years with the participation of high-ranking United States businessmen and their Central American counterparts—an assemblage of practical men, with one group genuinely interested in developing new investment opportunities and the other eager to attract foreign capital to bolster the incipient development of their countries.

High hopes soon gave way to frustration as the participants seemed unable to come up with satisfactory solutions. Finally they realized that the area's inadequate supply of entrepreneurs, competent managers, and skilled workmen would defeat any attempt toward accelerated development. As a consequence, the problem of education which originally had been neglected became a pervasive subject throughout the concluding stages of the discussion.

*For additional information regarding references, see p. 69.

I. The Role of Education in Development

When the final statement was published late in 1964, education was given first billing, and the basic recommendation urged "educational improvements that will promote growth and enable more people to participate in the growth process."

John Kenneth Galbraith, who has been deeply involved with development economics, had reached a similar conclusion and ably expounded it in a series of lectures that were later compiled in book form under the title *Economic Development*. Here, and also in an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, he again makes the point that education abetted by orderly government is the basic element in economic development, and hence must be given priority over railways, dams, machine tools, or other tangible goods.

Another example of the greater importance that is being awarded to education may be found in the Charter of Punta del Este. In this document, which represents the consensus of Latin American economic and political leaders, development of human resources is given a conspicuous place among the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

This increasing regard for education grew out of the European economic recovery postwar experience. When hostilities ended in 1945 it seemed that rebuilding Europe to its prewar capacity would be a matter of many decades. To everyone's amazement an industrial Phoenix literally rose from its ashes, proving beyond a doubt that tangible goods constitute just the trappings, while skills and know-how are the very sinews of a country's economic framework. Without this extraordinary opportunity to study development in a veritable economic laboratory, we might still be groping for an answer to the development riddle.

Now all the pieces seem to have fallen into place. For instance, the outstanding growth of a country such as the United States can be traced back to an early fulfillment of the educational requirements. The bulk of its population is directly descendent from Europeans who crossed the Atlantic in search of new opportunities and a better way of life. Those immigrants generally had a high regard for education as well as liberty and were invariably possessed with the spirit of adventure and the will to conquer the unknown. In escaping from a wretched existence in a semifeudal environment, they always risked a perilous passage, an uncertain future, or both. Every new settler coming into the country was a proven entrepreneur, which accounts for the highly selective makeup of today's American society.

There is one prominent case in economic history where the educational requirements were satisfied not by a sequence of fortuitous events but rather as a result of deliberate action. This is precisely how Japan, a nation without any natural resources to speak of, in less than 50 years moved spectacularly from a poor and backward condition into an enviable place among the great industrial powers of the world. Here again the postwar experience has shown that once people are in possession of skills and know-how, full industrial power may be attained in a relatively short period of time.

As the evidence is re-examined in the light of new experiences, the trend in the literature is to favor education as the basic tool of development. In practice, however, this holds true to a lesser degree. There is an understandable tendency among economic planners to favor programs concerned with the accumulation of tangible goods because these are more easily subject to measurement and may be neatly fitted into complicated mathematical formulas. Harassed government officials also lean heavily on the tangible-goods approach as an expedient to quell the clamor for government leadership in development.

Even when governments are honest enough to resist this kind of political pressure and approach the problem of allocating funds from a viewpoint other than personal aggrandizement, one question still looms formidably: What kind of educational programs should be chosen from the myriad alternatives available to a national planning board?

II. Education as a Factor of Production

In a broad sense, education is the acquisition of knowledge not only by formal means but also through experience. When the effort of transmitting knowledge is unsuccessful because the recipient is incapable or unwilling to absorb new concepts, the process could hardly be called education; in fact, under these circumstances, the net result will be a waste of resources. Therefore, the amount of funds spent under the label of education is not necessarily a measure of the changes that are taking place in the cultural level of a given nation. These efforts must be effective and produce the desired results—acquisition and retention of knowledge—in order to qualify as an educational process.

When viewed from a strictly economic standpoint, education is regarded either as a capital investment, a consumer service, or a combination of both. It is considered a capital investment when

it develops skills and know-how, thereby contributing as a factor of production; conversely, it takes on the nature of a consumer service when the purpose is mere enjoyment or cultural refinement. Knowledge itself is not subject to this classification because its final usefulness is not dictated by content alone but in conjunction with the circumstances under which it is absorbed. While the study of history may help a highly placed government official to guide the destinies of his country, time spent on the same subject by a punch press operator will not have any bearing whatsoever on his productive occupation. The relationship of content and circumstance in regard to the end purpose of education is perhaps the crux of the economic development question.

There is no disputing the advantages of a liberal education insofar as it develops reason and judgment. Indeed, diffusion of general knowledge provides an ideal climate for freedom and democracy. However, as long as the great majority of the population lives in abject poverty and is unable to perceive abstract concepts, the choice must be narrowed down to education as a factor of production. This was the consensus among the participants of the Fourth International Manpower Seminar held in 1964 who felt that "in developing countries, education should be regarded more as an element of production than as a product for consumption."

If public funds earmarked for education are used effectively with a view to increasing the national wealth of useful skills and know-how, the productive capacity of a country will automatically increase, and self-sustaining growth will be reached sooner than if a different criterion were to be applied.

A primary education in itself is worthless to the typical child in the rural area of a developing country. The knowledge at his disposal will be forgotten a few years after leaving school, either by the action or inaction of his environment; yet the records will show that the funds spent on such programs have gone for education. At the other end of the spectrum there is, for example, the building of a modest country road that will bring small villages in contact with civilization. The extension agent, the fertilizer salesman, the public health worker and the political candidate—all very enterprising or dedicated people—will balk at the prospect of an eight-hour horseback ride. But with reasonable communications their useful messages will not miss reaching the isolated villages allowing the peasants an insight into a new way of life. In other words, a project which is not generally thought of as related to education may significantly enrich the country's aggregate wealth

of knowledge and thus contribute to raising its national economic potential.

Unhappily, governments are prone to evaluate programs purely from a tangible-goods standpoint, completely disregarding the human element involved. For instance, the effectiveness of a new highway will be established in terms of the estimated marketable production as computed from the area of the heretofore inaccessible region. Roads into arid, heavily populated but forgotten areas are left unbuilt in favor of imposing highways leading into potentially rich, unexploited territory. But as a result of fear and ignorance, people will not migrate as expected from the poor congested lands into the new havens. More often than not, when choosing from several alternatives, the educational content of a program is not taken into account as a criterion for selection.

All government programs, in greater or lesser degree, have an inherent educational content. Legislation designed to protect infant industry or subsidy programs promoting crop diversification are obvious examples. Though sometimes criticized for stimulating the inefficient use of capital, the fact is that these programs with built-in incentives promote *new* economic activity by infusing the meek and timid with daring entrepreneurial spirit, thus creating new opportunities for development of skills and know-how. This type of knowledge, as the European economic recovery has shown, is priceless. And how else are people in the emerging countries to acquire these skills and know-how unless they learn by doing? People must be confronted with service and production problems if they are ever to master the new technology. If this means stimulating and protecting what may initially appear as inefficient enterprises, the price must be paid. It should be remembered that the most important element in development is the acquisition of useful knowledge: in possession of this tool, tangible goods are expendable.

Funds spent in education-oriented programs are to be considered investments not in a metaphorical sense but rather on an equivalent plane with tangible capital goods. Skills and know-how constitute wealth that may be resorted to, as with machinery, in order to produce goods and services more efficiently. Naturally, to justify the label of education-oriented, programs must meet the requirement that knowledge is not only acquired but also retained and available for repeated use. An educational program is not a good investment when the knowledge that is transmitted becomes lost through disuse. Indeed, one does not install an expensive lathe without regard to its ultimate purpose; yet this is often the

case with poorly designed educational programs. Utopian visions of a cultured society where everyone has the opportunity to enjoy a liberal education have induced leaders in underdeveloped countries to devise wholly ineffective curricula in detriment of a more practical utilization of traditionally scarce resources. Instead of approaching the ideal society, this policy only contributes to retarding its evolution.

III. Toward Education-oriented Planning

Because education taken in the sense of a production factor constitutes a veritable investment, programs that effectively promote it must be studied and selected accordingly. The same criteria used by planners in passing judgement on the intrinsic value of tangible goods must be applied to the educational content of a given program.

Planning is a tool used by business as well as government in trying to maximize the return on capital investment. In business the theoretical optimum is determined by comparing the present value of future profits expected from alternative expenditures, while in government the maximization attempt is focused on the expected increase in national income. Previous discussion has shown that national income is directly proportional to the aggregate wealth of useful skills and know-how possessed by the bulk of the population; hence the criteria that planners must use in selecting from the available alternatives should be based principally on the educational content of every program under consideration. In other words, the long-term objective of government planning should be to maximize the growth of useful knowledge at the disposal of the population in order to obtain a concomitant increase of economic potential.

To be education-conscious in planning does not mean that all efforts should be directed towards building schools and training teachers. Many programs seemingly unrelated to education contribute more to this end than attempts to give backward people a liberal education. In this light, planning provides an exciting opportunity to match mutually supporting programs that properly coordinated will bring about the maximum educational yield possible for a given investment.

When an industrial plant is to be erected, the investor must make sure that raw materials are either available in the vicinity or may be brought in at reasonable cost; that managers and laborers are found willing to work on the site; that the cost of

shipping finished products to the marketplace leaves margin for a competitive selling price; and that working capital is available to provide interim financing for the production process. When these four basic conditions are satisfied, other minor obstacles are usually surmounted and in all probability such an investment will produce reasonable returns. But when any one of these conditions is partially unfulfilled, the yield on the investment will surely be less than optimal. Moreover, if one of the conditions is sufficiently unsatisfied, the plant will grind to a halt and the result of the investment will be a net loss. Similarly, when any one of the necessary supporting elements in a development plan is missing, the investment represented by the programs that are put into effect will not be fully effective.

Consider, for instance, a government program designed to provide credit for the small farmer in the hope of thus helping to increase his production and therefore his income. Left unsupported such a program will founder, and the funds used in the process will not only fail to produce the desired increase in national income, but in all probability will be totally lost. Instead of increasing the assets of a country the net result, then, will be a negative entry in the national accounts. To succeed, a credit program for the small farmer must be accompanied, in the first place, by an adequate extension service meant to improve the skills and know-how at his disposal. Second, communications and storage facilities must be improved—and subsidies provided when deemed necessary—so that crops may be marketed advantageously. Further, to insure against breakdown of these basic investments, additional programs must be implemented covering adult literacy and health. It should become self-evident that as each complementary program is added, the value of the other programs is more and more enhanced, and their collective chances for success increasingly assured.

Interestingly enough, under such circumstances a development plan will also indirectly boost the value of strictly educational programs, since children in the area will be able to retain a greater portion of primary education than is usual. They now return to an environment charged with motivation where their newly acquired knowledge is bound to be of some use.

The total educational content of an *integral* development plan is always greater than the aggregate educational value of the individual programs composing it. As the environment is changed by inducement and design providing added opportunities for the profitable use of knowledge, the retention process will be more

pronounced and the wealth of skills and know-how will be shown to have increased accordingly.

IV. Advantages of Regional Development Plans

Regrettably, emerging countries lack the necessary resources to promote development integrally in one great effort. A widespread plan of integrated programs would require more financing than the borrowing capacity of a country in these circumstances will permit; and even if foreign resources were unlimitedly available, there would not be enough qualified government officials to implement such a plan satisfactorily. Surprisingly enough, as a rule, governments attempt precisely such an impossible objective causing public funds to be spread thinly and ineffectively across the country.

A farmer who has a large plot and only a small amount of seed will be able to produce more efficiently if he concentrates all his planting to one single patch of land—where the soil is richest—than by scattering his limited resources all about the property. By taking advantage of the most logical alternative he will be able to maximize his production and improve his chances of increasing the cultivated area in subsequent seasons. This simple, basic technique is the underlying principle in regional development.

Development plans, to be helpful, should be circumscribed to a limited area that will allow execution of adequately integrated programs comfortably within the bounds of the nation's financial capacity.

Such a course is not always an easy one to follow. Governments have political commitments to uphold and feel compelled to distribute expenditures piecemeal as pressure from different areas is felt. Consequently, programs are forever being launched but seldom carried through successfully for lack of sustained financing or adequate supporting programs. Credit to the small farmer is given in one area; literacy is intensified in another; communications are improved in still another; and thus the favorable, complementary action of mutually supporting programs is pitifully lost.

Regional development takes its lead from the currently accepted economic development theory, with the difference that take-off is viewed from the standpoint of a circumscribed region instead of the country as a whole. Concentrating a great portion of the public expenditure in the selected area provides a good substitute for one of the important pre-conditions in take-off—namely, a sud-

den surge in available resources historically derived from the discovery of minerals, the increase in the price of an important export commodity, or as in more recent cases, by the intelligent promotion of tourism.

The area subject to this concentrated governmental investment is bound to prosper and eventually achieve self-sustained growth. When this objective is reached, the plan should be shifted to a new region until, by repeated use of the process, the whole population has crossed the threshold of prosperity and is able to enjoy an era of gradual but ever increasing improvement.

Undoubtedly this is a painstaking process that requires time, patience, and perseverance. But this should not be a deterrent. The last few decades have shown that there is no shortcut leading to development; rather, dramatic schemes that are periodically brought forth with the purpose of achieving instant, widespread development have only resulted in the chronic loss of scarce investment capital. It seems more sensible to draw up a ten-year regional plan that practically insures development in a fraction of the territory, than to try unrealistically to achieve widespread improvement by means of a broad development plan.

At least this would be the case with the rural primary education program in Guatemala. Schools have been built sparsely throughout the country, all being subject to control by the Ministry of Education through zonal supervisors. By means of this network the Guatemalan children are expected to learn how to read and write, but, lamentably, this is not the case. Take the example of a small village located on an all-weather road only two hours away from Guatemala City: the teacher of a one-classroom school makes an appearance only two or three days a week and sometimes is absent for a month at a time; supervision by the Ministry has been rare and ineffectual; consequently, in the eight years since the school has been operating not one single child has learned how to read or write, in spite of the fact that the villagers are truly desirous for their children to acquire a basic education. Unquestionably the Guatemalan government will be able to combat ignorance more effectively by regrouping its efforts and circumscribing the attack to a more limited area.

Special care must be exercised in choosing the region that will benefit from this concentrated investment. The less backward areas should be given preference simply because they will be able to attain sustained growth sooner than the more backward regions. However crude it may sound, the more undeveloped a region, the less likely it is to regress upon being forsaken. On the con-

trary, as the economic and cultural levels rise in the selected regions, the outlying areas will benefit from spillover effects. Obviously the process will be less strenuous if managed in this fashion rather than by attempting to develop first the more backward areas.

In other words, when applying the regional development technique, the selected area receiving the benefit of concentrated investment will necessarily represent a relatively small part of the nation. Since this is unavoidable, the other regions in the country will simply have to wait their turn. However, the damage inflicted is insignificant since the programs to be de-emphasized in these forsaken regions are usually unsupported and therefore worthless for all practical purposes. There is very little difference between a weak development plan and no plan at all. On the other hand, the regions subjected to intensive investment will thrive and become, in time, stepping-stones in the development of the remaining territory.

The vicious cycle of poverty and ignorance cannot be broken by half measures. Instead, vigorous action is required in attempting to establish a self-sustained development process. Only when a sufficiently large amount of resources is coordinately channeled into a circumscribed region will economic activity be stimulated enough to provide opportunities for private investment, thereby creating a propitious climate for the development of skills and know-how.

V. Conclusions

Education is being recognized more and more as the crucial factor in the economic development of emerging nations. To avoid paying lip service alone to this concept, the educational contents of all government programs must serve as criteria in assigning priorities in the process of preparing a national development plan. This educational content must be measured against the amount of useful knowledge that may be acquired and retained by the population for repeated use in the efficient production of goods and services.

When mutually complementing programs are simultaneously put into effect, their educational contents are considerably boosted. The collective benefits obtained in this manner far exceed the results that could be derived from an equivalent investment through isolated, unsupported programs. However, an integral development plan can only be applied on a modest scale within a

given region because, for lack of resources, a developing nation is unable to use such a technique throughout the country.

By discriminating in favor of the selected region, little or no damage is inflicted upon other areas since unsupported, haphazard programs thinly spread across the country have little or no educational value from a long-run point of view. On the other hand, the concentrated effort in a given region is bound to bring about, within a reasonable time, self-sustained development; when this occurs, resources will be released for application in subsequent regions until this priming effect is achieved throughout the country.

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Rafael A. Zúñiga: INTEGRATION, THE
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK, AND THE CARIBBEAN

THE CONCEPT of integration is not new, although in recent years it has taken on economic connotations which it formerly lacked. As feudalism collapsed, the formation of the European states on the basis of geographic, ethnic, or religious criteria (Spain, Germany, England, France) was the result of integration movements. The ideals of Bolívar in South America and the establishment of the Union in North America were also manifestations of integration. Perhaps the first attempt to find a multilateral solution to development problems could be traced to the first Economic Conference of the Río de la Plata countries in 1941 and to the Charter of Quito of 1948 which aimed at the integration of the former members of Greater Colombia (Colombia, Ecuador, Panamá, and Venezuela) into a customs union.

1. Integration and the Inter-American Development Bank

In a recent speech the President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Dr. Felipe Herrera, said, "It is well to keep in mind that the United States was the first integrated geo-economic area in the world." The tremendous strength of the United States at the present time is undoubtedly attributable in part to the country's unity, which is simply *integration*. In the Caribbean area, Central America is a special case. After attaining its independence as a united Country (the Central American Federation), it was unable at first to resist the tendencies toward separation

and was divided into five small republics, as proud of their individuality as they were poor in their economy and weak in development. Fortunately, now that this narrowly nationalistic phase has been left behind, Central America offers a model of integration for the Americas and perhaps for the entire world.

Integration, increasingly based on economic criteria transcending mere geographic considerations, is a dynamic process which assumes diverse forms and proceeds through different stages. Beginning with bilateral or multilateral agreements to lower and eventually eliminate customs barriers, it proceeds to the establishment of free trade associations or customs unions within the Caribbean area. Central America has completed this stage by creating a common market, and is advancing rapidly toward an economic union and the final goal of complete economic integration. In doing so, it progresses from the purely economic fields of activity to those of a political nature.

The Americas witnessed a far-reaching development when four of the most outstanding leaders of the Pan American System proposed the establishment of a "Latin American Common Market," defined by the authors of the proposal as "a form of association in which a group of countries join together to take concerted action toward common objectives of economic development and social welfare." This common objective implies unanimously accepted lines of action in matters of commercial policy, orientation of investment policy, coordination of monetary, fiscal and social policies, and in the fields of transportation and agriculture.

II. Regional Integration Associations

The Latin American Free Trade Association.—In 1961, with the signing of the Treaty of Montevideo, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was brought into being. The goal of LAFTA is to gradually eliminate, beginning on June 1, 1961 and over a period of not more than 12 years, the duties and restrictions on the importation of products from the member countries, eventually achieving an area of completely free trade.

LAFTA has ten member countries at the present time: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela which became the most recent member in September, 1966. Bolivia, which has yet to join any system, can probably be expected to become a member of LAFTA eventually. The Treaty of Montevideo does not make specific provision for the establishment of a common external tariff, but neither does it

prohibit such action. It establishes a Secretariat and a Permanent Committee, but it provides no regional financial organization.

LAFTA's ten member countries account for 88 per cent of Latin America's population and over 90 per cent of its gross product. Intra-zonal trade has made substantial progress, having increased almost two-fold in absolute terms in five years. From 7 per cent of the total external trade of the region in 1961, it rose to more than 11 per cent in 1965 (over \$1.4 billion, United States). Actions taken by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the member countries at the end of 1965 warrant the expectation of substantial policy commitments and new institutional arrangements in the near future.

The Central American Common Market.—As mentioned before, Central America, which emerged as a federation of five states upon achieving its independence from Spain in 1821, turned to political individualism fifteen years later; the passage of approximately 115 years was required for the area to awake from its separatist lethargy and recognize the benefits of integration. After a long history of efforts it was not until 1950 that Central American integration began to take shape.

The Central American School of Public Administration (ESAPAC) established in Costa Rica in 1954, the Central American Institute of Industrial Research and Technology (ICAITI) founded in Guatemala in 1955, and the Central American University Council (CSUCA) inaugurated in 1948, were practical steps toward regional integration in special fields and helped to spread the doctrine of integration throughout the Isthmus. While the decisions establishing these institutions were highly important, they lacked the general scope that was finally achieved in the multilateral Treaty of Free Trade signed in 1958, and the General Treaty of Economic Integration signed in 1960, with Costa Rica adhering two years later. Under the latter treaty, the signatory countries agreed to establish a free trade area and, within five years at most, a common external tariff.

The members of the Central American Common Market are the five republics that formed the original federation: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Panama has not joined the Common Market, but there are indications that it may do so in the near future. In June of this year, Panama became a member of several subsidiary agencies of the Organization of Central American States. One of the paragraphs in the preamble to the Membership Protocol establishes that "for geographic, historical and political reasons, the Republic of Panama should be part of

the Central American community." The Central American integration treaties provide for a common external tariff and for various institutions to carry out their provisions, including the Central American Economic Council and the Permanent Secretariat of the Treaty of Integration (SIECA). There has been remarkable progress in freeing intra-regional trade for nearly 98 per cent of the items listed in the Central American Uniform Customs Nomenclature and in adopting a common external tariff, which also covers 98 per cent of these items.

Extraordinary progress has been made in the industrial field. Five instruments have been created: (1) the system of integrated industries; (2) the Central American agreement on fiscal incentives to industrial development; (3) the protocol on assembly industries; (4) the special system for the promotion of productive activities; and (5) the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). This Bank, created in 1961, has done commendable work, and with the establishment last year of the Central American Fund for Economic Integration under its administration, is now able to make a further contribution toward building the necessary infrastructure to accelerate the integration of the five countries.

As a result of efforts to coordinate public investment, there are now a regional road plan, a program for telecommunications, and several electrical interconnection projects under consideration.

III. The Inter-American Development Bank

The Inter-American Development Bank was established in 1959 and began its operations in February, 1961. This was the culmination of a long-felt Pan American aspiration. Under its charter agreement, the principal function of the Bank is to provide technical and financial assistance to its member countries in their efforts to achieve economic and social development. The Inter-American Development Bank emerged to foster the individual and collective growth of the independent Latin American countries and became the chief multilateral instrument for channeling financial and technical resources for this purpose. The Alliance for Progress, whose basic principles were set forth in the Charter of Punta del Este, defined the multilateral responsibility of national and regional development on the hemispheric level, emphasizing the need for accelerated social change. The Charter of Alta Gracia defined the bases on which Latin America was willing to cooperate in the achievement of a more harmonious world trade system.

Development is a lengthy process involving interdependent relationships between the participating countries, which makes it essential to organize those relations in such a way as to obtain the greatest benefits for all concerned. This process leads inexorably to integration, and thus it was that the Inter-American Development Bank inevitably became the "Bank for Integration." Within the general context of promoting development, the Bank has encouraged those projects which favor integration, providing technical and financial assistance to institutions that study this movement and devoting special interest to projects with integrational characteristics. In this connection, special mention should be made of the assistance furnished to the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the establishment of the Institute for Latin American Integration, and the Fund for Latin American Integration. As of October 31 of this year the Bank has granted 368 loans totaling \$1,753,398,000 to its Latin American member countries, of which the Caribbean area, as conceived by this conference, had received 164 loans for a total of \$888 thousand millions United States, representing more than one half of the total. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the loans according to fields of activity financed. The percentage of total operations granted by the Bank to the Caribbean Area evidences the importance of this region within the hemisphere.

TABLE 1
(In thousands of dollars)

	Total		Caribbean Area	
	No.	Amount	No.	Amount
Agriculture	74	387,682	38	189,214
Industry and Mining	86	384,309	33	112,439
Electric Power	20	153,981	7	28,633
Transportation	14	151,120	8	96,380
Water and Sewerage	58	301,354	28	112,346
Housing	37	261,878	20	127,750
Education	32	54,890	11	16,925
Financing of Exports	6	15,770	2	6,202
Preinvestment	41	42,414	16	18,490
Total	368	1,753,398	164	888,379

IV. Aspects of Integration

Despite the fact that integration is a single movement, in its practical application it involves a number of specific activities with distinctive characteristics.

In the financial aspect, it was precisely in a Caribbean country, Jamaica, that a highly important event occurred in April of this year: the governors of the Latin American central banks signed the Declaration of Jamaica, which refers to a reform of the international monetary system. Far-reaching in scope, and symbolic because of the place where it was signed, the Declaration of Jamaica is a new and important instrument for monetary understanding among the people of the Americas. The process of financial integration must be parallel with integration in other fields, seeking an adequate balance among its many manifestations. In this meeting, to the great satisfaction of the central banks, a study was begun to analyze the international monetary system. Progress was made in the aspects of international liquidity, and recommendations were approved for better coordination between the International Monetary Fund and the agencies responsible for financing regional integration and cooperation.

Specific resolutions were taken to establish a practical system for the exchange of IDB bonds among the central banks whenever it is necessary to reduce their investments, and for the establishment of a common fund to provide greater liquidity in international payments "as one more step in the program of successive advances toward the system of Latin American financial integration" approved at the previous meeting in Mexico. The Declaration of Jamaica, with its implications for the future, can be regarded as a forerunner to the establishment of a Latin American monetary unit, which would be an essential part of general integration.

With regard to an integration policy for Latin America, two meetings of special significance were held this year in July and August, in San Andrés and in Bogotá. The first recommended the adoption of viable and dynamic formulas for integration and complementary economic development in the hemisphere. For the Caribbean area it was agreed to establish a study group to seek ways and means of increasing trade, technical, and financial cooperation. The Bogotá meeting approved the Declaration of Bogotá which contains, in addition to important statements on a common international economic policy, several recommendations on Latin American economic integration, such as those to improve the institutional machinery of LAFTA, increase relations between LAFTA and the Central American Common Market, and move toward a unification of the two systems.

V. Instruments of Integration

Institute for Latin American Integration.—Aware of its historic mission and convinced that the integration of the Americas is primarily an educational process, the Inter-American Development Bank showed great foresight in establishing the Institute for Latin American Integration (INTAL). Late in 1964 the Bank authorized the creation of the Institute with the following purposes:

1. To increase the technical knowledge of officials and specialists in the public and private sectors of the member countries of the Bank with respect to problems of Latin American integration by means of training courses, seminars, and round-table discussions;

2. To conduct the theoretical studies necessary for the process of Latin American integration in the institutional, juridical, social, and economic fields;

3. To advise the Bank in matters of integration;

4. To collect information on integration movements in other parts of the world and to analyze these experiences in terms of their value for Latin American integration;

5. To render advisory services to the member countries of the IDB in the conduct of courses or seminars on the process of Latin American integration;

6. To disseminate studies on integration in its various aspects and to publish the results of research in the Institute;

7. To serve as a clearing house for documents and technical studies on Latin American integration;

8. To conduct periodic seminars for Latin American leaders, for the purpose of analyzing the problems relating to Latin American integration; and

9. To cooperate in matters of economic integration with international organizations, world-wide or regional, governmental or non-governmental, with national universities and with other teaching and research institutions, in order to determine the assistance and cooperation needed for the fulfillment of the purposes of the Institute and to avoid duplication of effort.

Central America's position of leadership in the integration movement, as well as the interest repeatedly shown by outstanding representatives of the Central American area, have led the Bank to study the possibility of establishing a regional office of INTAL in one of the Central American countries. The Institute itself has declared "that the progress of the integration movement in Cen-

tral America can offer valuable experience for the rest of Latin America" and that "the Central American Common Market can be used as an integration laboratory where formulas could be developed for later application throughout Latin America."

It should be noted that in the documents referring to the establishment of INTAL, it is provided that "special attention will be given to studies aimed at relating the Central American countries to the rest of Latin America. . . . These studies would also be aimed at evaluating the integration experience of Central America in terms of possible application to the rest of Latin America." The approval of this program would represent a new milestone in the development of integration institutions.

Preinvestment Fund.—Considering favorable comments in many international meetings, including its own Annual Meetings, the Inter-American Development Bank, in July of this year, established the Preinvestment Fund for Latin American Integration. As an initial allotment, \$15 million (United States) were assigned from the Bank's Fund for Special Operations to the newly established Fund. For its part, the United States Government agreed to allocate the equivalent of \$1.5 million United States from the \$525 million United States Social Progress Trust Fund which the Bank administers for the United States within the framework of the Alliance for Progress. The resources of the new Fund will be used to finance studies in the following fields:

1. Multinational infrastructure works including highways, air, ocean and river transportation, regional communications systems, and related services;
2. The integrated development of geo-economic regions embracing areas in two or more countries, such as international river basins, including their power resources, inland navigation, irrigation, rural colonization, and forest resources;
3. Basic industries of regional scope operating within a market embracing several countries; and
4. Other integration activities, including studies and programs for joint exploitation of natural resources or any others that will strengthen the principle or execution of American integration.

The Bank's loans and technical assistance operations, reimbursable and non-reimbursable, financed with the resources of the Fund, as well as the studies it makes with its own resources, will be negotiated with governments and their agencies, development corporations, multinational organizations, institutions responsible for integration activities, and private companies.

In order to coordinate this activity, the Bank will prepare

annual working programs for regional preinvestment, taking into consideration the proposed studies that the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) may have under consideration. These programs will be prepared in consultation with the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), which will evaluate them with the assistance of LAFTA and SIECA.

In a study made by the Bank prior to the establishment of the Fund, it was pointed out that the principal role to be assigned by the IDB to the Fund would be to ensure a rapid and appropriate preinvestment study of all programs and projects for regional investment that go beyond the initial planning stage.

VI. Integration in the Caribbean, a Region of Contrasts

More than any other part of the Americas, the Caribbean is a region of contrasts where cultures have come together, races have blended, and varying ideologies have resulted in bloody conflicts. In the period of discovery and conquest, the European powers made the Caribbean their battlefield and even the victim of picturesque but highly unjust acts of piracy. They left behind them the seeds of profound discord which even today bear fruit in absurd antagonisms between neighboring countries, such as those sharing the island of Hispaniola, and in the existence of characteristic political systems still linked to the Old World which are not to be found in other regions of the Americas. In the Caribbean area, the Anglo-Saxon, Latin, and African cultures were thrown together with the force of a tropical storm.

In the Isthmus of Central America, the Caribbean area has witnessed substantial strides in the field of integration, creating an example for the rest of the continent. However, the same Caribbean area, particularly the islands, is the site of isolated countries which would seem to suggest that their nature as an archipelago had prevailed over other historical and social considerations of greater validity and importance. The Caribbean islands, which were the gateway through which European civilization first entered Hispanic America, are today, paradoxically, in the rear guard of the most promising movement in the continent. Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, as well as Panama on the mainland, have yet to join any of the systems of integration previously mentioned. Cuba, for well-known reasons, is temporarily outside the inter-American system. Panama, while showing an inclination to join the Central American Common Market as a

vital link between North and South America and between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, continues to be uncertain of its relationship to the rest of the hemisphere. The Dominican Republic and Haiti, strongly linked by historic origin and sharing the same beautiful island in the Caribbean, are a clear expression of isolation: the factors of geography and relative size, so important in other integration movements, have had no effect in this case, and the flow of trade between the two countries is practically negligible. The future of these countries depends largely on their capacity to surmount existing problems and decide on one of the integration alternatives.

After discarding the possibility of remaining indefinitely isolated, an attitude which would appear suicidal under the present circumstances, the following alternatives would seem to remain: (1) joining the Central American Common Market; (2) joining LAFTA; or (3) establishing a third area, a specifically Caribbean area, independent of either of these other two movements.

Union with the Central American movement would be difficult because of the substantial progress that has been made in MERCOMUN; the belated inclusion of new elements would create important problems of adaptation, since the Central American countries have already legally established a number of instruments and have made important advances, quite apart from the fact that they have a common federalist tradition. However, the relative similarity of size and markets would seem to be an advantage.

The association of the Caribbean countries with LAFTA would seem to offer even greater advantages, pragmatically and because at least some of these countries have closer traditional ties with South America. Communications throughout the Caribbean are satisfactory in a northerly and southerly direction but not from east to west.

The formation of an independent integration area with the participation of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba (if its political situation permits), and probably some of the Lesser Antilles and the Guayanias as well could also be considered a possibility. However, the fact that some of the Caribbean islands have a direct and quasi-dependent relationship with various European countries and, therefore, enjoy special trade privileges, makes this alternative somewhat difficult.

The movement for integration of the Americas has acquired a definite momentum of its own, and the only question would seem to lie in determining its timetable. Whatever alternative is finally adopted, jointly or separately by the American countries currently

outside the movement, the process is bound to continue, and the indecisive are bound to be left behind. The more their decision is delayed, the greater will be the problems in arriving at a final solution.

America is to the world what the Caribbean is to America. If America wishes to play an important role in the world of nations, it must integrate and re-establish what has been termed a "Great Disintegrated Nation." Sometime ago Dr. Felipe Herrera said: "If Latin America is to recover the time it has lost and is not to remain in the backwash of history it must accelerate the pace of its economic integration." Turning to the Caribbean and to today's topic we can truthfully say: "If the Caribbean is to play an outstanding role in America and is not to be left behind in the American community, it must unite regionally, concentrate its efforts, surmount its differences, and seek economic integration."

Part III

SOCIAL PATTERNS

David D. Burks: STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE
IN THE CARIBBEAN

TODAY IN THE HEMISPHERE we are witnessing vigorous competition between two strategies for social change: One is that grand design of President Kennedy known as the Alliance for Progress, and the other is Castro's doctrine of social revolution. The argument is over the proper methods to achieve directed social reform and planned economic development. The Alliance calls for such changes in a democratic framework, while Castroism calls for the authoritarian approach. Castro is openly sensitive on the subject of which method is producing the most for the people. And we are, too! Early United States fears that Cuba would become a showcase of Communism have faded, though doubtless we exaggerate today the depth of Castro's problem. Castroism has been in power for about eight years, and the Alliance is halfway through its first decade of life. Sufficient time has passed to allow a judicious look at their successes and failures.

I

This competition on a large scale has recently been underlined in statements by two well-known public figures on opposite sides—Robert Kennedy and Fidel Castro. Senator Kennedy, speaking on the floor of the United States Senate on May 9, 1966, warned against overemphasis on economic development, already progressing under the Alliance, to the detriment of social progress. Indeed, he said that the Alliance is based upon the belief that "It would matter little that a nation's economy grew by some millions of

dollars, if those dollars were not used to improve the lot of the dispossessed and the hungry poor." Kennedy, in effect, denied the practicality of pure economic development in Latin America and called for a renewed dedication by the United States and Latin America to the spirit of reform.^{*1} On July 26, 1966, the thirteenth anniversary of the attack upon Cuartel Moncada, Premier Castro said, "But there are some elements in Latin America, including leftists, who say: 'We have heard that Cuba has accomplished a great deal in education and public health, but we still haven't heard much news about her economic victories.'" He commented further, "they believe that one can pull solutions for economic problems . . . out of a hat like Mandrake the Magician" and went on to chide those leftist Latin American critics who see economic development only in terms of "lesser or greater tonnages." (One supposes that he was referring to tons of sugar.)²

Kennedy worries about the social accomplishments of the Alliance, Castro about the economic achievements of his revolution. One is tempted to suggest facetiously that we swap advisers. But further consideration makes it perfectly evident that the balance between social reforms and economic development is a hard one to strike. The dilemma here confronting the Alliance is the same in essence as the one confronting Castro.

Castro, in this same July 26 speech, points the finger of scorn at the "showcase government" of Eduardo Frei in Chile as conducting a revolution by "halves" rather than "wholes." Castro has, indeed, worked a revolution of "wholes" on Cuban society. The upper and middle classes have been eliminated, in one way or another, and their wealth redistributed. Education, public health services, and recreational facilities have been extended to cover a large portion of the population. However, economic decline and dislocation have robbed these changes of much of their real economic value. Moreover, the rapid, often unplanned, and sometimes brutally direct methods made the economic cost of these reforms inordinately high. Unrealistic planners did not consider the marginal return from some of the programs. The Cuban experience offers an object lesson in the risks inherent in social investments made at the expense of the economy or unsupported by its growth. In 1964 Castro was forced to recognize economic setbacks by setting in motion substantial reorganization of economic administration and reducing both economic and social goals to more realistic levels. The currently low labor productivity cannot long support Castro's massive educational and social programs.

^{*}Notes to this chapter are on p. 93.

Actually the Prime Minister of Cuba could have made a more convincing case for the social advances of his revolution if he had compared conditions in Cuba with conditions in certain neighboring countries that share more characteristics with Cuba than does Chile. Therefore, a fair analysis of Alliance achievements as an alternative to Castroism should concentrate on countries that are roughly comparable to Cuba in the breadth and depth of their problems. Emphasis should obviously be placed also upon countries that are effectively guided by the Alliance philosophy and United States funds. The Alliance's goal of a more equitable economic and social system is set forth in the Charter of Punta del Este, drafted in 1962.³ The Charter does not now furnish the model for, nor does the Alliance include, the political units of French (except, of course, Haiti), Dutch, or English political origin. Nor does the Charter set the pattern for Venezuela and Mexico, both of which have effective strategies of social change antedating the Alliance and carried on, in great part, independently of it. The remaining Caribbean countries that are both under the Alliance and roughly similar to Cuba are the five Central American States, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. Unless otherwise indicated, the following discussion will be confined to these eight.

II

Many of the economic programs of the Alliance are roughly on schedule in all of the eight but Haiti; national planning boards exist, diversification has begun, and in several countries the increase in gross domestic product has maintained a 2.5 per cent or more margin over the rate of population growth. These gains have been hard-won and will be difficult to sustain. Nonetheless, the economic pie is slowly getting larger.⁴

Have social reforms moved ahead in step with the economy? An assessment of this can be assayed with some degree of confidence because the Alliance has led to the collection and evaluation of the most complete information ever available on social trends. Available data reveal that social reform has moved forward at a snail's pace in the eight countries. To present supporting evidence for this thesis, the author has posed three questions. How has the Alliance affected the rigid two- and three-class systems? To what degree have rural-urban cultural and economic differences persisted? What progress has been made toward mass education and universal literacy?⁵

To the first query, the answer is that Alliance-stimulated programs have had an insignificant impact in the direction of making the social class system more fluid and open. The new income and inheritance taxes are too recent to have changed income distribution, and in the long run their real effect depends upon improved enforcement and the reform of various defects in exemptions and other aspects. Income inequities have remained substantially unchanged or have even increased in some countries. For the most part, the upper class has benefited more rapidly and in greater degree from economic development than the lower class. The relative income position of the lower class would appear to have worsened in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.⁶ In some cases there has also been an absolute decline in real income for those supported by subsistence agriculture. The highland Indians in Guatemala, for example, support more mouths on the same amount of land.

Government measures to raise lower-class living standards have had only a limited, uneven, ameliorative effect. Among these measures are occupationally restricted minimum wage laws, narrowly defined social security laws, and trifling programs of agrarian reform and colonization. The best record in land reform was in the Dominican Republic where land was distributed to 3,219 families from 1962 to 1965, the worst in Panama with distribution to 288 farmers in 1965.⁷ (Haiti is not included here because its agrarian problems are not amenable to solution by land distribution.) Community development through self-help and mutual aid is almost non-existent. Low-cost housing construction is of such small dimension that the quantitative deficit has increased each year from population expansion. Costa Rica, for example, with a housing institute established in the 1950's, has constructed since 1962 at an annual average rate of 1,200 units, a figure well below the annual increase in needs.⁸

Low-class underemployment and unemployment are persistently high. The high productivity of newly created, capital-intensive business may be adversely affecting the handicraft industries without providing employment to an equal number of workers. This extends even to the retail trade, as in Guatemala where the central market is facing stiff competition from supermarkets.

The promise in Title One of the Charter "to make the benefits of economic progress available to all citizens . . . through a more equitable distribution of national income. . . ." is yet unfulfilled. Costa Rica is the only country with a relatively satisfactory income distribution. At a minimum, Alliance programs should sub-

stantially better lower-class living conditions and, at best, produce basic changes in class structure.

The second question poses the problem of rural-urban differentials. These are economic and social. To some degree they are co-terminus with class structure in that the upper and middle classes are substantially urban in residence and culture, while the most economically depressed sector of the lower class is rural. The only conclusion to be derived from statistical data on social services is that rural inhabitants have, at most, maintained the same relative disadvantaged position as before. However, the condition of families supported by subsistence farming has probably become more precarious. Another way of saying the same thing is that social investment deficits remain high and in some cases are increasing. The social integration of peasants, including Indians, has not and cannot proceed apace, because changes in rural society are closely linked to changes in land tenure.

As before 1961, too large a share of government social investment currently goes to the few large cities and most notably to the capital. Almost all the indices support this statement. Life expectancy remains much higher, and doctors and hospitals are substantially more plentiful in the urban environment. Social security systems apply primarily to the urban worker in the industrial and public sectors. Low-cost housing is found in the city, not the country. A case in point is Panama where until this year the public housing program was almost exclusively confined to the city.⁹ The same order of quantitative and qualitative disparities holds for literacy and education. In Nicaragua about 70 per cent of the urban population is literate, but only 20 per cent of the rural.¹⁰ Similar figures can be adduced for the other seven countries.

Major rural improvements since 1961 have been in economic infrastructure, particularly in road building and in commercial agriculture, although some small progress has been made in supplying the first three grades of primary education and in environmental sanitation.

In theory, urban prosperity indirectly benefits rural areas by draining away some of the excess population. In reality, urban growth is the result more of the propelling force of unemployment and lack of land in the countryside than actual opportunity in the city. In the case of San José, Costa Rica, growth has occurred more because of the natural increase in that city's population than because of rural urban migration.¹¹ A draining of rural unemployment is not a positive factor in any case because of the

unbalanced pattern of urban growth concentrated in the capital city. That is, such draining away creates more problems than it solves.

The tendency to emphasize urban social investment is a natural response to the magnitude of urban needs. A more basic reason lies in leadership attitudes. Tradition-minded political leaders and business entrepreneurs seem not to have come fully to understand the importance of rural social problems nor even their deadening impact upon economic development. Also, they are probably overwhelmed by the magnitude of rural developmental problems. In the short run, the Central American Common Market may tend to obscure the significance of rural problems and thus delay the attack on these problems. The Market has extended demand horizontally by giving access to upper- and middle-class consumers in other countries, whereas rural development would extend the Market vertically.

The third question raised earlier in this paper concerns education which is particularly important because it contributes both directly and indirectly to the solution of so many other social problems. Mass education lessens ascriptive determination of personal status. Primary education of the appropriate kind upgrades the employable skills of lower-class individuals, while secondary schooling stimulates vertical social mobility. In Costa Rica there has long been a positive correlation between the increase in high schools and the growth of the middle class.

Education alone, among the social reforms, seems to have received real impetus from the Alliance. In fairness, one must add that through their own efforts Costa Rica and Panama had reached by the 1960's the happy condition of a more than 75 per cent literacy rate. For gains since 1961, Nicaragua is a case in point. In 1950 only 25 per cent of children 6-14 years old attended school, but by 1963, 45 per cent were doing so.¹² However, roughly one-half of all pupils were enrolled in the first grade, an indication of the high drop-out rate. Despite the growth in percentage of attendance, the absolute number of illiterates in Nicaragua has grown, as has the number of non-attenders at the intermediate (high school) level. In general, literacy rates are slowly climbing, with the exception of Haiti; and now all but Haiti, Guatemala, and El Salvador have literacy rates of 50 per cent or more.

III

In examining the eight countries for signs of social reform, a ranking by degree of achievement is useful for the perspective it

gives. A rating system of this sort, however, is admittedly impressionistic because there is no single index which plots social progress. In both quantitative and qualitative social reforms this author would rank Venezuela and Mexico first—countries already described as only partially within the Alliance. They are followed in the first rank by Costa Rica and Panama. Significantly, the first two countries have achieved high levels of economic development, and the second two rank high in per capita domestic product. In the in-between range of social accomplishment are El Salvador, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, although not necessarily in that order. Lagging behind are two countries with special problems, Haiti and Guatemala.

Haiti's¹³ Creole-speaking peasant society has problems currently unique in the Caribbean, if not in the Western Hemisphere. They are, however, a foretaste of what will appear elsewhere in the Caribbean, in Jamaica for example, if appropriate measures are not taken. Economic and social trends add up to a considerable deterioration of Haitian society. A population estimated to reach five million by 1970 is supported in good years by a stagnating economy and in poor years by a declining one. Real per capita domestic product decline was an estimated 10 to 15 per cent between 1962-65. Growth of the farm population continues to produce ever more division of the minifundia. The typical Haitian peasant farm is truly a dwarfholding, averaging less than one hectare. The illiteracy rate, functionally defined, is an estimated 90 per cent; unemployment has been estimated as high as 50 per cent; and the estimated infant mortality rate has increased since the early 1960's to more than 200 per 1,000 live births.

Haiti is afflicted with a serious brain-drain. A large portion of Haitian professionals have migrated to other countries. Among them are hundreds of teachers employed in other underdeveloped countries—five hundred in the Congo in the last few years. It has been said that there are more Haitian doctors practicing in the United States than in Haiti.

In the short run, much has to be done immediately to slow these trends. Lasting social improvement depends upon resolution of profound economic and political problems. The prognostication is gloomy because there are so few resources and institutional levers available in Haiti.

The Guatemalan¹⁴ government's inability since 1961 to move ahead in social reform can be attributed to a number of factors of which three seem most important. One is the existence of the social Indian who is culturally distinctive and isolated and resides

mainly in the countryside. According to the 1964 census the Indians constituted 43.3 per cent of the population, a figure representing only a drop of 10 per cent in the fourteen years since the 1950 census. The percentages are not entirely accurate because of the absence of agreed upon criteria for determining who is an Indian. But in any case, little has been done to accelerate the painfully slow process of ladinoization. A complex of denigrating attitudes toward the social Indian has blocked Ladino consideration of the real obstacle his condition poses to social change. The Indian, after all, constitutes well over 50 per cent of the lower class.

A second problem has been the inability of politically active Guatemalans to arrive at a national consensus on the need and direction of social reform. Reform efforts in the 1940's played into the hands of the Communists, and naturally there is concern that this may happen again. Political and economic leaders often voice today the belief that such Alliance reforms as redistribution of wealth are communistic. Lack of agreement on reform has meant that any government seeking to implement a program may well endanger its existence.

Agrarian reform is the single most sensitive of reform issues, though sometimes taxes seem to run a close second. The submission to Congress in October, 1966 by the Méndez Montenegro administration of a tax on real estate led to charges of communism and thinly veiled threats of support for a coup from business interests in the capital. The Méndez Montenegro government has begun the distribution of the national farms to those cultivating them, but it has approached with timidity the distribution of other lands and assistance for minifundia. Although there are idle lands in developed regions which could be taken by the National Institute of Agrarian Transformation under the 1962 Agrarian Reform Law, the government is channeling its investments to the Fydep (Fomento y Desarrollo del Petén) to develop the Petén. Investment in the Petén is extremely costly because the region lacks even a minimal infrastructure (for example, a basic system of roads). Work in the Petén, however, is politically safer than in the regions where the *fincas* of the powerful landowners are located.

A third problem is the absence of dynamic reform-inclined intellectual and political leadership. The present administration is the first since the 1960's to be truly dedicated to social change, but for that very reason its political future appears very uncertain at this time.

Persistent slowness in reform is one reason a few of the younger

army officers and many of the San Carlos University students have turned their faces away from peaceful solutions. These alienated groups, plus the old-line Communists, furnish the principal actors in the guerrilla movement. The guerrillas have not been successful in choosing tactics that will mobilize peasant unrest, but Guatemalans cannot count on their continued failure. Extensive rural social investment would seem to be indicated. The Guatemalan army's civic action program is excellent but is so small that it does not reach many Guatemalans.

Guatemalan planning for solution of social problems has been good, but implementation has been very slow. In 1965 the central government's total expenditures increased by more than 11 per cent, but those for social and cultural services grew only 2.7 per cent. The government has been slow to use \$8.3 million in international assistance granted between 1962 and 1964 for housing, potable water, and sewers. The 14 per cent of government revenues devoted to education in 1965 was the lowest such expenditure of the five Central American states and just half of the Costa Rican figure. In 1964, only 47 per cent of children (7-14 years of age) had matriculated in primary schools, and only 1 per cent in rural regions and 30.3 per cent in the cities reach sixth grade. The illiteracy rate has dropped slowly from about 72 per cent in 1950 to around 63 per cent in 1964 for a decrease of 8 per cent in fourteen years.

Extremes of wealth and poverty are increasing, according to the figures of the national bank. The subsistence agricultural sector experienced a drop in per capita income between 1950 and 1962 but may or may not have improved its position slightly since then. Middle- and especially upper-class per capita income has risen very substantially.

Haiti and Guatemala are making so little progress for structural reasons that differ in degree and kind. It is not suggested that the same measures are called for in both countries, for Guatemala's needs are more readily susceptible to solution than those of Haiti.

IV

What are the conclusions to be drawn from this analysis of the impact of the Alliance upon social trends in the Caribbean? Five points need to be made:

1. The Alliance has accomplished much more in the economic than in the social sphere. Its social accomplishments are clearly less impressive than those of Castroism in the 1959-62 period.

Much of the planning and advising of the Alliance is in the hands of professional economists who, good men though they may be, tend as Castro says to measure in "tonnages." Preoccupied as they are with economic development, they have approached social reform only as a stimulus to economic growth rather than as a socially just end in itself and as a political necessity to break the power of small elite ruling classes. A shift in emphasis should now take place. More reliance should be placed upon the advice of applied anthropologists, social workers, political scientists, and others to implement this change in emphasis.

2. Caribbean and United States resources for social and economic investments are finite. Given a better balance between economic and social programs the United States should then obligate itself to larger financial assistance to social programs perhaps through the Social Progress Trust Fund. Especially would bold, imaginative, educational programs, matching those of Cuba in size and uniqueness, seem to be needed. Investment in economic programs may have to be reduced.

3. If social programs do not expand rapidly, economic progress may worsen the condition of the hungry and the poor, while weakening traditional values and institutions which give the lower class some sense of security. The opportunities for extremists would then grow. There are some indications of such a development already. Although continued economic development is a vital necessity, some types of economic growth will have to be temporarily forgone in order to give the lower class some improvement in the level of living. Agrarian reform, for example, may prevent an increase in agricultural production. The important thing is to keep improvement in social services, lower-class income, and other social changes abreast of economic progress.

4. Even if social development is speeded up, many of the gains will be canceled by the unusually high rate of population increase in the Caribbean region. Serious consideration must be given by the governments to birth control measures.

5. Political leaders in some countries have not fully accepted the need for social reforms, nor are they willing to live with the political changes that will result. The Alliance should follow the advice of President Johnson who said in Mexico City last April, "We will not be deterred by those who tenaciously or selfishly cling to special privileges of the past. . . .

"We are engaged," Johnson also said, "in a vast social revolution."¹⁵ This is not yet true in most of the Caribbean. But let us hope it will soon be true. If the necessary and morally just steps

are taken, the Alliance will clearly prove its superiority to Castro's and will have done so while better perfecting political democracy.

NOTES

1. United States, *Congressional Record*, 89th Cong., Second Sess., 1966, CXII, 9610 and CXII, 9715.

2. *Granma Weekly Review*, Havana, I (July 31, 1966), II.

3. "The Charter of Punta del Este," *Department of State Bulletin* (September 11, 1961), pp. 463-69.

4. *Social Progress Trust Fund—Fifth Annual Report—1965*. (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1966), pp. 256, 275, 276-95, 326-46, 347-67, 368-85, 386-411, 437-65, 466-89.

5. My conclusions are based upon careful reading of the reports of the Comité Inter-Americano de la Alianza para el Progreso (CIAP) for the eight countries, but do not necessarily coincide with views of CIAP.

6. *El esfuerzo interno y las necesidades de financiamiento externo para el desarrollo de Guatemala* (November 1-4, 1966), p. 66; *Informe final del sub-comité del CIAP sobre El Salvador* (September 16-21, 1966), p. 9; *Domestic Efforts and the Needs for External Financing for the Development of Honduras* (November 14-16, 1966), pp. 34, 29, 51. All published by the Pan American Union, Washington, D. C., 1966.

7. *Domestic Efforts and the Needs for External Financing for the Development of Haiti* (Washington, D. C.: Pan American Union, 1966), (August 15-18, 1966), pp. 3, 50.

8. *Social Progress Trust Fund—Fifth Annual Report—1965*, p. 258.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 469.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 441.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 256-58.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 444.

13. *Domestic Efforts and the Needs for External Financing for the Development of Haiti*.

14. *El esfuerzo interno y las necesidades financiamiento externo para el desarrollo de Guatemala*.

15. Speech made by Lyndon B. Johnson in Mexico City, April 15, 1966, at the dedication of a statue of Abraham Lincoln. *The Washington Post* (April 16, 1967), p. A12.

Ofelia Mendoza: CHANGING FORCES IN THE
CARIBBEAN

IN THE FACE of the historical background of the area under discussion, it is essential to review, although briefly, the amalgamation of peoples and cultures that has taken place from the colonial and post-colonial periods to the present before full appreciation can be gained of the sociological, economical, cultural, and political factors existing in this widely diverse area.

I

As a potential source of economic power and as a breadbasket for Europe, the region experienced several broad migrations. In the quest for riches came the Europeans who superimposed their culture on the native population or eliminated it.

As agricultural possibilities developed, the hacienda, encomienda, and plantation systems evolved. In instances where the Indians were either resistive or unsuited to the labor required, Africans were imported to do the work. In Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, Tobago, Belize, Haiti, Cuba, Guadaloupe, Martinique, and the Netherlands Antilles, the Indians were eliminated and replaced with the African slaves. After the abolition of slavery, Asian labor, especially Chinese and Hindu, was imported. The amalgamation of all these ethnic groups—or the resistance of some of them to mix with the others—has created the conflicting and diverse cultural patterns that exist in these regions.

The Latin American countries are characterized by their desire

and love for freedom. Under the influence of the French and American revolutions the Latin American countries began a hard struggle lasting from 1804 when Haiti won its independence to 1824 when the South American countries gained full possession of their sovereignty. From their birth as independent nations to the present there has been a continuous historical movement marked by civil wars, instability of the democratic institutions they tried to establish, and insufficient utilization and waste of their human and natural resources. The main inheritance from the colonial powers in the Latin American countries may be summarized as follows:

1. A feudal system of land ownership, transplanted from Europe, with the resultant monopolization of the best farm lands in a few hands.
2. A single-crop system in agriculture and mining derived from the mercantile concepts which prevailed in the colonial nations.
3. The tradition of the *pronunciamiento*, that is, the violent intrusion of military groups into the political life of the Iberian nations.

These elements have been powerful deterrents to the full development of the economy of the area and of a normal cultural, social, and political life.

II

Although seeds of discontent developed in the European and American colonies of the Caribbean, generally the areas under British, French, and Dutch domination enjoyed political stability, even during the full colonial period which did not end until quite recently. Thus these areas such as Jamaica, Belize, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Guianas did not experience the political and social upheavals that were and are characteristic of most of the Spanish-speaking countries and Haiti.

The British islands have many British characteristics. They have evolved more slowly, it is true, along the same line of parliamentary democracy, and while there are still rich and poor classes as there are in Britain, there is nothing that can be called feudalism. They have after all been British for over 300 years. They have excellent local civil services. The French islands have followed France and are in fact politically part of France with their own representation in the French parliament. The Dutch islands are more like traditional colonies with a very small edu-

cated and professional element drawn from the islands themselves. Jamaica, Barbados, and the Leeward Islands are 80 per cent Protestant.

In the Caribbean Latin American countries, political institutions are still unstable and coups d'état are frequent, most of the time installing de facto military juntas in government. The arable land is in the hands of a small class of large landholders. The industrialization process is very slow; most of the commodities are exported as raw materials and are not processed in the countries that produce them. More than one-half of the population is illiterate and there is an acute shortage of health facilities, hospital beds, drinking water, and sewage systems. Moreover more than one-half of the population has an inadequate diet, very low in animal protein. In Central America the death rate is 50 per 1,000 and most of the deaths, especially in children, are caused by undernourishment.

The inequitable distribution of national income and the insufficient use of modern techniques to increase productivity have widened the sharp two-class system made up of small minorities who monopolize the wealth and income, and the huge mass of underprivileged women, men, and children who live in subhuman conditions.

The feudal agrarian socio-economic structure of the two-class system still resists change. The slow and interrupted disintegration of the old systems erects strong barriers that resist the emergence of critical attitudes consistent with organizational models that permit the restructuring of institutions and social systems.

Social change is continuously weakened or modified not only because of pressure from the conservative or reactionary classes, but also because of the complexity of the organization of the social environment which favors inertia that moderates political, cultural, and economic changes. This last factor has been the main source of power of the influential classes that have kept the status quo.

The application of some of the scientific and technological advances that have originated the world revolution that is now taking place is also making changes in the Caribbean area in the economic, social, political, cultural, and above all demographic fields. United States influence is very strong, particularly in the creation of a desire for a United States style of life as seen in movies and magazines. This is a major cause of dissatisfaction with the present levels of living. In the face of economic and social changes, people's rising aspirations are demanding better

economic opportunities, education, health facilities, recreation, housing, employment, and political participation in the administration of their countries. The opening of modern media of mass communication, the radio especially, has permitted the semi-rural and rural population to realize that in the large cities, principally the capitals of their own countries, the workers and the low-income middle classes enjoy many facilities and advantages which they lack.

III

Under the growing economic pressures of the rural and semi-rural areas millions of people are migrating to the cities. Most of these people are at the lowest economic and cultural levels, unfitted to adjust themselves to the urban life. Usually they are large families crowded together in the worst slums of the cities to be contaminated by the physical, spiritual, and intellectual infections of such places.

Improved health and sanitary conditions during the past years have caused a sharp decline in the mortality rate, especially the infant mortality rate, and at the same time have increased the life expectancy, while the birthrate has continued at its natural pace. These are the main factors at the root of the sharply rising national population growth in the Caribbean, one of the fastest growing population regions in the world. More than half of the total population of the Caribbean Islands is under twenty years of age, 41 per cent under fifteen years, and 5 per cent is sixty-five years or older.

The total population of the Caribbean Islands is twenty million, dispersed unevenly in the total area of all the islands (86,000 square miles), with an average population density of 235 persons per square mile, almost five times the density of the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii. The population density varies among the different islands; for example, Cuba has 130 persons per square mile; the Netherlands Antilles, 507; St. Vincent, 568; Martinique, 706; Grenada, 672; Puerto Rico, 740; and Barbados, 1,416. The high density of population presents the most vital problem of the islands because it is impossible to expand their territories or their natural resources, qualified human resources, and capital. It is estimated that in less than thirty years the actual population of 20 million inhabitants of these islands will multiply two and one-half times, reaching 50 million.

British islanders have been great migrators. Jamaicans were the basic labor force in the early days of the Cuban sugar industry;

they provided the labor for the Panama Canal. In the first quarter of the century a great many West Indians came to New York under the unlimited United Kingdom quota, and since World War II nearly 200,000 have gone to the United Kingdom. One by one each of these outlets was closed, although many Jamaicans remained in each country. Barbadians were also great migrators, and they and the Cayman Islanders are good seamen. The cutting off of all outlets for migration has been the biggest single factor creating population pressure in the British Caribbean islands. The French islanders can still go freely to France.

In the Continental Caribbean countries (Mexico, Central America, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela) the population problem is not due to population density but to the accelerated speed of its growth. These countries have a total territorial extension of 1,746,625 square miles with a total population of about 79.6 million inhabitants. It is estimated that the present population will double in less than twenty years, reaching a total of 159.2 million. Their present population, like that of the Caribbean Islands, has already not only surpassed their economic capacity to provide basic services such as health, education, housing, employment, recreation, and food supplies, but has made more acute the severe shortage of needed investment capital to finance the urgent needs of economic development as well as the services required.

It is calculated that for each 1 per cent of demographic growth an economic growth of 3 per cent is necessary in order to maintain the standard of living as it prevails without improvement or deterioration. Since the average annual demographic growth at present in the Caribbean is between 3 and 3.5 per cent, an annual economic increase of 10.5 per cent would be required to maintain static the present conditions.

Puerto Rico is the only country that has achieved reasonable economic growth which permitted general improvement and higher industrialization, but this was possible because mass migration to the United States relieved population pressures and was accompanied by United States markets and capital investments, plus good administration and political stability.

IV

One of the principal reasons that the potential wealth of the Caribbean region has not been fully developed has been insufficient capital. National savings have been much reduced by the

flight of capital to foreign banks. Foreign investment comes from the parent countries to the islands tied to European powers and from the United States to the other countries; but it is concentrated chiefly in the extractive industries—petroleum, iron, copper, silver, agriculture, and military equipment. Efforts are made in practically all of these countries to develop economic independence and to develop industries to produce some of the articles that have been previously imported. To protect these new industries, importation has been reduced by high import duties. However, among the greatest economic difficulties of these countries, as well as other Latin American countries, are their continued losses suffered as a consequence of the disparity between the prices at which they sell their agricultural and mineral products and the prices at which they buy machinery, manufactured goods, and raw materials imported from the United States and Europe. A further problem related to the “deterioration of terms of trade” is the decline of their exports to the six nations which compose the European Common Market which are importing less from these countries and more from the African countries which produce coffee and tropical fruits.

The Caribbean region, partly because of historical reasons and partly because of the different stages of development, is characterized by striking inequalities in personal income distribution, with very high percentages received by very rich minorities and very low percentages by the great majority of the population. Studies by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) indicate that the poorest 50 per cent of the population receives about 17 per cent of the total income and that the richest 5 per cent receives 34 per cent. In Mexico, one of the countries that has achieved a 6 per cent rate of economic growth, 16 per cent of the higher income brackets receives 56.5 per cent of the total gross income. In Venezuela 12 per cent of the total population receives 49 per cent of the total national income. This expanding gap between the extremely wealthy and extremely poor is one of the main reasons for the political unrest and economic instability of these countries. However, in spite of the strong resistance to change in the old traditional economic, social, cultural, and political patterns, this is slowly but surely breaking down through the growing influence of the new middle class, composed of businessmen, professionals, industrial and white- and blue-collar workers. Planning for industrialization and modernization is the main objective of most people in high enough a position to set policy.

V

The traditional, unchallenged power of the Catholic Church in the Latin American countries has not disappeared, but it no longer completely dominates public opinion and action in most of these countries. The Catholic Church itself never has been as divided as it is today. There is a tremendous struggle between the very conservative groups that wish to keep medieval practices and the very progressive ones trying to implement Pope John's social philosophy. The second group is working toward the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the poor. On the other hand, the Catholic Church is building high schools and universities in most of these countries to attract the social elite. Special religious courses are also given for the most influential policy-making groups. At the same time, Protestant sects are opening new paths.

Even in countries where the State and the Church are united, in Colombia and the Dominican Republic, "taboo" subjects such as sex and birth control are publicly discussed, in light of the actions of the Ecumenical Councils.

The population pressures in the Caribbean Islands have compelled them to start birth control early, through private efforts. Puerto Rico and Jamaica were the first islands to start family planning activities on a small scale as early as 1925, but it was not until 1937 that the laws against birth control were repealed in Puerto Rico. It was the first country in the world to establish an official birth control program as part of the public health service in 1940, although for political and religious reasons it was not properly implemented by the government. The private Puerto Rican Family Planning Association assumed the responsibilities of providing contraceptive services and developing a public consciousness regarding Puerto Rico's population problems.

Jamaica has had scattered family planning activity since about 1940 when Miss Farquharson started the Family Planning League in Kingston and 1948 when the Jacobs started the St. Ann's Bay work. In 1956 they all amalgamated in the J.F.P.A. Barbados has had an organization since 1945 with government grants since 1955.*

The continental Caribbean countries did not start their family planning movements until the end of 1961, but their motivation has been to prevent illegal abortions and to protect maternal and child health. The movement has developed rapidly to the point

*The Jamaica private program has developed to the extent that the government is already sponsoring educational and contraceptive service in close co-operation with the private association.

that in Honduras family planning is part of the health program of preventive medicine in the National Public Health Ministry. Venezuela has had an official Department of Population in the Ministry of Public Health since 1964. The government of Colombia has made a grant of five million pesos (\$300,000 dollars) to the Association of Medical Faculties of Colombia to train 1,200 public health doctors in family planning techniques. The Ministry of Public Health of Costa Rica has just established a Population Department in its Ministry. All the other countries, with the exception of Nicaragua and Bolivia, have private associations doing the ground work until such time as governments are ready to assume this responsibility. Although the stimulus to the organization of these indigenous associations has been provided by an international private voluntary group, the International Planned Parenthood Federation, most of the work is done on a voluntary basis with some funds from the Federation.

In spite of the wide diversity in the geographic, political, and cultural conditions of all the Caribbean countries, there is one common element among them: their societies are in a state of flux and of rapid change, of re-orientation with a threefold ideal—an urge for freedom, progress, and social justice. These are the basic aspirations and motivations of the people. Although family planning is not a panacea, it is necessarily an important element in total economic, social, cultural, and health planning in every Caribbean country.

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Margarita Macaya: WOMEN—THEIR ROLE, PRESENT
AND POTENTIAL, IN THE CARIBBEAN

I PROPOSE to explore the dilemma of one large segment of the Caribbean which may carry within itself its own solutions and even help compose the hemispheric disarray that so preoccupies this Conference. I refer to the thirty million women of the Caribbean countries. We speak now not of a minority, but the *majority* of the population of all Latin America.*¹

Why does this terrific potential lie largely idle, unmotivated, untrained, uninspired? Is it that not enough people care, or the women themselves don't care enough, or some combination of both? We are met here to assess the hemispheric picture. Let us see how women fit into it.

I

The Inter-American Commission of Women has worked for thirty-eight years to help secure for Latin American women their political, civil, social, cultural, and economic rights. This specialized organization of the OAS has, in late years, joined with women's organizations of the United States and Latin America in an effort to train women in the proper use of the rights they have attained and how to exert democratic leadership in the community. Why? Not to supply women with weapons, but only with the same safeguards to which any citizen is entitled; not to conquer the world, but to help make it a better place.

Let us see how far we have come in thirty-eight years, and

*Notes to this chapter are on p. 113.

where we are today. But before I go further, let me define my frame of reference. In speaking of the Caribbean, I intend to confine myself to the member states of the OAS of somewhere near comparable size and population: Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Haiti, of course, is something of a special case, and Cuba, for the time, is outside comparison.

When the Inter-American Commission of Women was created at the Sixth International Conference of American States in 1928, only the women of the United States had the vote. The first Latin American country to extend the franchise to women was Ecuador in 1929; the last, Paraguay, as late as 1961. Today, women have access to the polls in every country of the hemisphere.

The decades of the forties and fifties were periods of the greatest activity in the granting of political rights to women. The Regional Seminar on the Rights of Women, held in El Salvador in 1951 under the sponsorship of the Inter-American Commission of Women, may be considered an important factor in persuading Honduras and Nicaragua to concede the vote to their female citizens, thus, in 1955, completing the roster for the Caribbean States.

The achievement of voting rights is, however, a long way from full participation in the political life of a country and intelligent exercise of the ballot. For this reason, in 1959, under the leadership of the Chairman of the Commission, the Commission of Women, while retaining contact with governments on a diplomatic level, began to focus primarily on working with women themselves.

II

The Long Range Work Plan of the Commission, adopted by the thirteenth Assembly of 1959, set new guidelines for the organization which called for a continuing educational program that would enable women of the Americas not only to understand the meaning of their newly won rights but their corresponding responsibilities.

However, implementation of this idea required competent people to carry out an extensive program of civic orientation. There proved such a scarcity of women so trained that the Commission placed top priority on the search for and formation of women displaying basic leadership qualities in their communities but lacking the know-how and direction to put them to effective use. Thus was born the Inter-American Program for the Training of

Women Leaders, which was approved in the Third Special Assembly of the Commission in 1963.

The goal of the Inter-American Program for the Training of Women Leaders is to inculcate an understanding of citizen responsibility, the functioning of political and social structures, and the role and dynamics of voluntary groups. The courses are designed to reach potential leaders who may have limited opportunities for formal education. Experience has demonstrated among women's voluntary organizations in both the United States and Latin America that extensive academic training is not essential to active, intelligent participation in community affairs. For this same reason it was decided to base the program in Spanish-speaking areas in order to avoid the language problem.

The University of Puerto Rico offered to be host for the first group and to provide assistance in course-planning, professional staff, and other facilities. Even so, because of continuing financial problems, the course was not activated until 1966, and then on a regional rather than inter-American basis. That it "got off the ground" at all is due to the voluntary contributions of women's organizations of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and the United States, and to the generous donations of the governments of the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. These contributions were added to the sum allocated by the OAS to the project, and on January 31, 1966, the First Regional Leadership Course for women of the Caribbean area opened at the University of Puerto Rico.

For six weeks, sixteen women between the ages of 25 and 47 studied sociology and civic affairs at the University. Part of their time was spent in field work for the purpose of observation. The last three weeks of the course were held in the United States under the auspices of the Overseas Education Fund (OEF) of the League of Women Voters.

We consider the First Regional Pilot Course an outstanding success. Upon return to their countries, we heard from almost every graduate. From reports we know that these women returned not only to share what they learned, but to *act*. Already, one has helped found a library for workers and townspeople; another has taken part in the building of a school which will offer a course in home economics; and one organized a mothers' school-lunch program. Two of the graduates organized women's leadership courses based on the Puerto Rican program in their respective countries. One of these was offered to women trade union members.

After a period of silence, we heard from one graduate who apologized for not writing because, she said, she was hard-pressed to keep up with her job and the demands of a community that is, in her words, "starved for education."

The Government of Chile has invited the Commission to hold a second leadership course for women at the University in Santiago. This will include the women of the ten countries of South America not attending the Caribbean course. The Commission is pleased at this vote of confidence and anxious to create a truly inter-American program on a continuing basis. Only in this way can we insure permanent progress. We are thankful for the help we have had, but we are going to need more and a stable source of income if this project is to have meaningful and lasting impact.

As support for our leadership program indicates, of recent years in almost every country of the Caribbean, women's civic organizations have sprung up, and the Inter-American Commission of Women maintains several active National Committees of Cooperation there. These extensions of the organization help carry out the plans of the Commission on a local level.

The OEF of the United States League of Women Voters has held numerous courses and regional workshops on civic education in the Caribbean area. Many of these have been under the tutelage of our former Chairman who conceived the idea of the Commission's leadership course. The OEF, and many volunteer groups, also cooperated with my predecessor and with me in development of the United States phase of the Program.

III

In spite of their emergent status and the aura of tradition and prejudice that lingers over the lands of Latin America, a surprising number of women have overcome all handicaps to hold positions of consequence in public life. Costa Rica has a woman ambassador to the OAS Commission on Human Rights; three distinct administrations in my country have appointed women ambassadors to the Court of St. James. For eleven years I have held the post of Consul General in Boston. A woman has headed one of the great political parties of Costa Rica. In the Dominican Republic, President Balaguer has just appointed twenty-six women to the governorships of the provinces of the country, and a Dominican woman is Minister of Labor. In Guatemala, several women have been ambassadors to various countries, and at this time there is a woman cabinet member who is Secretary of Social

Welfare. Five women serve in the House of Deputies of Honduras; a woman is a Magistrate of the Supreme Court of Labor Affairs. The Nicaraguan Delegate to the Inter-American Commission of Women is a Deputy and in 1963 was First Vice-Presidential Designate. A Panamanian, who was for sixteen years Executive Secretary of the Commission, is now Ambassador, Alternate Representative of Panama to the Organization of American States. Panama also boasts a woman who is Assistant Director of the OAS Statistical Institute, and another who is Permanent Representative to UNESCO, as well as several ambassadors.

As with political rights—and as a result of their recognition—the civil rights of women in the countries of the Caribbean and throughout Latin America are broadly protected by constitutional guarantees. Many inequities in the internal civil codes of the various countries have been allowed to fall into disuse or have been formally amended. It is interesting to note that some of the most advanced civil legislation is to be found in the Caribbean countries.

However, these reforms, as admirable as they appear on the surface, often fail to match reality. Although twenty American nations have signed the Convention on the Granting of Civil Rights to Women, embedded deep in the psychology and interpretation of Latin America, family law remains a residue of concepts dating from the old Napoleonic Code.

In its study on the Civil and Political Rights of Women in the Latin American Republics, prepared for the Eleventh Inter-American Conference, the Commission of Women examined and compared the civil codes of the various nations. It found many outmoded and conflicting laws which create jurisdictional problems and are open to ambiguous interpretations. Laws governing matters fundamental to family welfare—marriage, separation, divorce, remarriage, and paternity—differ widely throughout Latin America. All too often it is women and children who pay the price for these discrepancies which provide loopholes for the irresponsible. The social effects of desertion, non-support, illegitimacy, and bigamy gravely endanger that most important cornerstone of society, the family.

IV

In 1960 the Inter-American Commission of Women held an Inter-American Seminar in Caracas, Venezuela on the Strengthening of the Family Institution. This meeting emphasized a point which was to be reiterated later in a hemispheric conclave or-

ganized by the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women: the urgency of insuring that women are familiar with laws already in effect for their protection. Again, this is a matter of education. Needless suffering and injustices stem from women's ignorance of their legal rights and the means of enforcing them.

In 1963 a Regional Seminar on the Status of Women in the Western Hemisphere, sponsored by the United Nations, was held in Bogotá, Colombia. An important working document on the status of women in the family law of Latin America² was prepared for the Seminar by the delegate of Mexico to the Inter-American Commission of Women, a woman lawyer, member of the Mexican Senate, and former Chairman of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. From conclusions of this meeting, and the regional seminar conducted by the Commission of Women, one cannot help but realize that the juridical problems of women and the family are as much social, educational, and cultural as they are legal. All are inextricably linked to economic freedom and opportunity.

The free labor movement is recognized by the OAS and the Alliance for Progress as a potent force for the propagation of democracy, independence, and economic integration. This proposition has been formally recognized through the Declaration of Cundinamarca³ stressing the need for greater participation of labor and consultation with labor in the tasks of economic development.

Seven of the nine Caribbean states, members of the OAS, have subscribed to International Convention 100 on Equal Pay for Equal Work.⁴ Six of the nine have either women's bureaus, sections, or offices in their Ministries of Labor.⁵

Within the labor movement there is growing appreciation of the contribution women can make in realizing hemispheric goals and the need to direct constructively the growing strength of women in the work force. Of late years, ORIT,⁶ the inter-American affiliate of the AFL-CIO, has held numerous seminars and leadership courses on a regional and national level to aid women in becoming more effective union members.

V

Yet, because of many blemishes, the picture is far from rosy. In spite of the progress cited, probably the most under-utilized human resource in Latin America is womanpower. When we again consider that over half the population of the area is female, it is dismaying to learn that, according to statistics of the OAS and

ILO, there are fewer economically active women in Latin America than in any other region of the world. On the average, the percentage of women in the working force hovers around 15 per cent of the number presumably available; while, elsewhere, an average of 30 per cent or more is common. Although statistics in this instance are sometimes vague and conflicting, the ratios are essentially accurate.

It is safe to state that in Latin America only about one-fifth of one-half of the population is making an economic contribution. Why? The reasons can be found in attitudes and traditions that create women unmotivated to work outside the home and deprive those who want or need to do so of needed opportunities and skills. It is suggestive that the only other culturally developed region which compares in the economic inactivity of its female contingent lies in the Moslem zones of North Africa. Thus, historical influences leave their mark like a brand on whole peoples!

In a recent speech before the Hebrew University of Israel, the Secretary General of the OAS said: "Latin America's economic growth rate has barely reached the two and a half per cent per capita minimum goal set forth in the Alliance for Progress, despite a fivefold increase in the volume of external aid over the past ten years.

"One of the chief reasons for this state of affairs is the in part underdeveloped, in part wrongly developed, human resource. . . .

"It is essential that human resources planning be looked upon as a new science, which goes hand-in-hand with planning for the utilization of all resources."

The Secretary-General also points out that aggravating the desperate shortage of trained professional and technical personnel is the flight of trained manpower to better-paying jobs outside Latin America. In view of these facts, can we afford to neglect a potential human resource pool of something like 112 million? Would it not be wise to develop a reserve of qualified women who are quite as capable as men in most fields and less prone to migrate to foreign shores?

Yet inquiry has failed to turn up any Latin American women playing important roles in plans for the Alliance for Progress, although in several countries of the Caribbean, they have been among its warmest advocates and propagandists. Few, if any, women have been incorporated into the process of Central American economic integration. If there be no women worthy to be included, what a terrible commentary! If they do exist and have been left on the periphery, what a sad commentary!

VI

Underlying all, sapping the strength of all—perhaps women more than men—are the debilitating social ills of disease, illiteracy, delinquency, desertion, which grow as fast as mushrooms in the towering shadow of one awesome fact: a population growth rate between 2.8 and 3.8 per cent in the Caribbean and Middle America⁷—the greatest in the entire world. It has become axiomatic to say we must run ever faster to stay in the same place. Strange to say, in Latin America and other lesser developed areas, it seems to be women who are doing much of the running and carrying a good bit of responsibility. Certain segments of certain advanced societies have lately been labelled, rather negatively, “matriarchal.” If we did not have these disesteemed “matriarchs” it is entirely possible that any semblance of family life would disappear in some sectors.

With all the miracles of modern medicine, modern technology, and modern concern for the masses it is hard to imagine the meaning, in terms of human misery, of the projection that in the year 2,000 the population of Latin America will approach 400 million. It seems somehow callous to deplore the fact that so many millions represented by this figure will be under fifteen years of age, as an excessive number are right now. Today our youngest population is found in Nicaragua, with 57.8 per cent under twenty years of age; the oldest at last report, was in Cuba, with 46 per cent under this figure. The serious import of this situation is that so high a percentage of the inhabitants are dependent consumers, rather than skilled producers, including the millions of untrained, inactive women previously cited.

Since human nature is as it is, perhaps it is not strange that the small percentage of the most educated and most capable flee the problem. The few are carrying an uncommonly heavy load, which shows no prospects of becoming lighter. Yet the problem cannot be met by running away. None of us can run far enough, fast enough.

VII

Suggestions for dealing with the population problem are many and complex—all of them highly charged, controversial, and late in coming. We are here to consider what may reasonably be done, and the discussion of social problems is of paramount importance. Social, political, economic, cultural—all these factors

interact. Yet, if there is one mighty key to the multiple ills that beset the Western Hemisphere, it is education. Still, even this is not the ultimate key, for that key resides in the hearts and will of men.

The extreme youth of the Latin American population intensifies a problem which is again compounded by the high rate of adult illiteracy. Certainly up to a point it is the job of older people to teach the young, to provide them with the cultural background that will enable them to learn. Yet, approximately one-half the adult population of Latin America is illiterate.

Of the tiny minority of normal school and university graduates, only a fraction will go into the teaching profession. The bulk of these are women. Yet, while women are legally entitled to enter any institution of learning in Latin America, the way is infinitely difficult in most cases. As many, or more, girls as boys enter primary grades; at the secondary level enrollment drops steeply, particularly among females, and only around one-fourth of *all* students graduate. Although the number of girls entering normal and business school is quite high, again there is a considerable drop-out rate. Of the 1 per cent of the Latin American population who enroll in universities, and the fraction of that 1 per cent who graduate, the number of women is miniscule.

Where then are the teachers coming from? In Latin America, as elsewhere, women traditionally have guided the young at hearth-side and in the schoolroom. However, the situation is not one of unrelieved gloom. Several countries are approaching the problem with perserverance and imagination.

There are prominent specialists in the educational field at this Conference who can tell you more than I of the tremendous efforts being made in many progressive nations to bring the educational problem under control. Still, I believe a recent study by the Commission might shed light on some limited and novel aspects of the situation.

In preparation for the Fourteenth Assembly of the Inter-American Commission of Women to be held in the near future, a questionnaire was circulated among the ministries of education asking for a report on the status of education in the rural areas of their countries, particularly with regard to the access of women to education. I will give you a few highlights of their replies which demonstrate some ingenious approaches to the problem:

1. Girls, especially those in lower economic brackets, are under great pressures to drop out of school as soon as they learn to read and write. Because of parental necessity or ignorance, they are

withdrawn at the earliest possible moment to help in the home or to seek employment. In the Caribbean, and other areas as well, the governments are trying to offset this practice by establishment of night schools offering subjects of vocational or immediately practical value, as well as the opportunity to work for an academic diploma. The disadvantageous position of isolated communities is being mitigated by the use of radio schools which audit and guide the progress of radio-school pupils.

2. Almost unanimously ministries of education reported an acute shortage of classrooms and qualified teachers. A start has been made in rectifying this situation by setting up mobile educational units which travel from place to place offering instruction in home economics, handicrafts, farm-related activities, and courses of a more cultural nature. Appropriate instruction is available to males. Small communities are encouraged through partial government loans to build primary and secondary schools by contributing matching funds and volunteer labor.

3. Other solutions are being tried alone and in combination. One of the women from El Salvador in our First Regional Leadership Course—a grade-school teacher, married and a mother—had for many months been commuting several miles each night to teach adult illiterates. Her fee was \$10 a month. Attempts are being made almost everywhere to upgrade teachers' regular salaries and professional prestige. Young women are encouraged through government scholarships and subsidies to complete secondary school and obtain teaching certificates. Of interest is the growing tendency to reorganize school systems to emphasize normal school and professional-vocational training in preference to classic secondary school curricula.

4. It is not only worthy of note but also highly significant that almost every country responding to the Commission's inquiry lauded the work of volunteers (mostly women) and volunteer agencies.

More imagination, more training, more patience, more dedication are attributes that women either possess in abundance, or can acquire.

VIII

Earlier in this paper I described and gave examples of the way the Inter-American Commission of Women and women's organizations of the hemisphere are cooperating in efforts to educate and train cadres in Latin America in turn to train other women

to take a more active role in the economic and social development of their communities and nations. But this is a lonely and monumental task, sometimes depreciated, always haunted by the question: aside from exceptional cases, will women, no matter how well-trained, be *allowed* to participate in the development process? This is a question every man here and his counterpart throughout the Hemisphere must answer. If we are honest—we women who have fought so hard for our human rights and the right to help shape this world—we must admit that little can be accomplished without the encouragement, cooperation, and acceptance of men. For no woman—if she could—wants to create *another* separate world. There's been enough of that. Men of wisdom and foresight recognize that it is no longer possible nor desirable to isolate women from participation in life in all its variety. To do so would be sinfully wasteful of human resources at a time they are desperately needed. Some of these men of vision are in this very room tonight. Although the Commission of Women has not accomplished all it might, without the men to whom I refer, we could have accomplished nothing. For make no mistake, it is still "a man's world"—all propaganda to the contrary. We don't mind. But, won't you join us, gentlemen, and allow us to join *you* in building a more stable hemisphere and the better, brighter world we all hope to leave to posterity? In this matter we must never be divided, for we cannot succeed with half-measures or half-strength.

NOTES

1. Unless otherwise specified, statistics cited are taken from figures compiled by the Department of Statistics of the Organization of American States.

2. M. Lavalle Urbina, *Situación de la mujer en el derecho de familia latino americano*, Documento de Trabajo B/P/B and Add. 1., Seminario de 1963 sobre la Condición de la Mujer en el Derecho de Familia, Bogotá, Colombia (New York: United Nations, 1964).

3. First Inter-American conference of Ministers of Labor, Bogotá, 1963.

4. Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, and Panama.

5. Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

6. The Inter-American Regional Organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

7. Projection for the decade 1960-70 at current rate of growth. Data supplied by the Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.

Margot Boulton de Bottome: VENEZUELA
AND THE CARIBBEAN

WILL THE CARIBBEAN, like the Mediterranean, some day be the seedbed, cradle, and summit of many civilizations, a sea of culture, progress, and coexistence? This is what we all hope. We are here to attempt to measure its influence and its projection into the future.

I was born in Venezuela, the "Great Entrance" to our South America because of its location and the expanse of its coast. Its history and its men have delineated routes of progress. It therefore seems appropriate to present a brief analysis of the evolution of its traditions over the past thirty years.

My information has developed from direct contact with people and in particular with the women who have participated in the different aspects of life in Venezuela. I have tried to be objective and pragmatic.

I

In 1936 Venezuela was a country emerging from a long illness, in some ways from a total paralysis. Although he established financial solvency, her ruler for twenty-seven years, Juan Vicente Gómez, upon his death at the end of 1935, left the country with neither political leaders nor freedom of expression and with many decades of retardation in technology, the system of government, and the pace of life and customs.

There was no other road to follow than to try to "modernize" the country as rapidly as possible. This transformation could only

be accomplished under conditions of order. We were fortunate that Eleázar López Contreras, who had been Minister of Defense under Gómez and probably influenced by him, accomplished this transition in record time, avoiding social commotions and loss of lives.

What occurred in Venezuela during the second decade of the twentieth century? From a poor country whose sparse income derived from cocoa, coffee, and cattle exports and from its customs, Venezuela was converted into an exporter of petroleum. In eight years, from 1917 to 1925, it was proven that Venezuela contained in its subsoil one of the most fabulous resources of "black gold" then known. Our country changed from an insignificant spot on the map of South America, due to its small population (hardly three and a half million inhabitants), its unhealthy and inaccessible territory, and its low level of education, into a powerful beacon within the geographical expanse of the world. From then on, a drilling well would be its symbol. What repercussions did this deep change have on its people? Paradoxically, there were very few until the death of Juan Vicente Gómez in 1935.

Venezuela, since the third voyage of Christopher Columbus in 1498, had awakened the greed of European merchants for the abundance of fine pearls discovered in the islands of Cubagua and Margarita, and near the Peninsula of Paria, the possible seat of the Earthly Paradise according to the letters of the Great Admiral.

Fabulous accounts by travelers inflamed the imagination of a then expanding Europe and came to assure belief in the existence of a city over the sleeping waters of the enormous Lake Parima made of solid gold, brilliant, and known by the name of Manoa—all myth, but it appeared, nevertheless, on all of the maps of the New World for about two centuries.

The search for this city of gold, Manoa or El Dorado, brought to our coasts hundreds of explorers, merchants, adventurers, and fugitives from justice. The myth was costly in human lives, and it came to be an obsession of the civilized world.

When at last, after the jungle and the Orinoco had been tenaciously searched and, by the end of the eighteenth century, El Dorado and the Parima Lake had been proved non-existent, there only remained the Capuchin missions, engaged in the evangelization of the Maquiritar, Piaroa, and Guaica Indians, and the ruins of the Castles of Guayana near the place where Walter Raleigh's son was assassinated—all silent witnesses to human empiricism.

By the end of the eighteenth century, possibly because of the

frustration and the misery in which we were engulfed, there began the process of taking stock of the conscience of our people, of our nationality, and of our political entity. This process started as isolated episodes, sometimes contradictory, but one man seemed to possess a clear concept of that which was about to transpire in his country. Paradoxically, he did not reside in Venezuela. Even though he was born in Caracas, he had moved to Spain when he was twenty years old. This man, Francisco de Miranda, was the inventor of a free Venezuela. It is possible that the geographical distance may have helped him visualize the "Venezuelan case" with clear objectivity; but certainly, to use a modern journalistic expression, Miranda "sold" super-civilized eighteenth-century Europe and the receptive new nation of North America on the idea of a Spanish America, sovereign, homogeneous, and progressive. He was an exceptional expert on public relations as well as a great patriot.

Miranda failed in his two attempts in the year 1806, but in the heart of Venezuela the seed of independence was gaining strength in an organism weakened by destitution and want of intelligent political leadership. In 1810, the revolution began in Caracas and in 1811 an Act of Independence from Spain was signed. The Precursor, Miranda, affixed his signature to this document. This solemn event was only the beginning of a long period of political and economic instability, of numerous constitutional revisions, and of a tragic number of lives lost in micro-revolutions. Solely spared from this holocaust for posterity were the presence, the word, and the eminently civilizing action of another son of Caracas, Simón Bolívar.

From the Liberator of five nations to the epoch of Juan Vicente Gómez, that is from 1830 to 1935, a space of more than a century, Venezuela changed very little. It could be said that instead of advancing, it retrogressed in its evolutionary process. By the time of the death of Gómez, it was a stagnated, underdeveloped, and unwholesome country in spite of its enormous wealth. During the following ten years, it would undergo an impressive transformation in its political structure as well as in its laws and customs. That decade has been the most important in our history from the standpoint of change in our traditions.

Spain has been a state of rigid norms. It has lacked the flexibility of other European states such as France or England. It imposed a "code of ethics" upon tropical Spanish America which was like the armor of a European knight of the Middle Ages. Government and clergy exercised absolute control over the life

and occupations of the population. Amusements were regulated by a calendar in which religious festivities were preponderant. Education, only accessible to a minute percentage of the inhabitants, totally excluded the women, who only discharged household duties. Even those who belonged to the higher class, such as Bolívar's sisters, wrote clumsily and read with great difficulty. By the death of Gómez, not one woman had graduated from the University. This fact provides a measure for the anguished underdevelopment of Venezuela when the dictator disappeared.

Customs had remained anachronistic if compared to those that were accepted in the United States and in some European countries. Nevertheless, one element of pressure and spiritual control had almost totally lost its influence in the Venezuela of 1935. The Catholic Church, divested of its wealth in 1784, no longer had a direct hand in politics, and civil marriage as well as divorce had been legalized in 1783 and 1904, respectively. All of this was underscored by the circumstance that the private life of Gómez gave a privileged status to his illegitimate children who numbered, it is suspected, about seventy.

This situation sharply contrasted with that which existed in the rest of the Bolivarian countries. In Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, the binomial government-clergy prevailed tightly joined, and this union has continued to the present.

Beginning in 1925, industrial penetration into Venezuela became a fact in the west as well as in the east of the country. The exploiting companies, mainly North American, proceeded to install their offices and employees in fenced camps. These were areas that contrasted sharply with the small villages of rural Venezuela. The building of wooden homes, modern schools, Catholic and Protestant churches, and the abundant provision of water, electricity, and the telephone produced a favorable effect on the peasants. The "drillers" were strong, chewed gum, and spoke English. They were workers but they lived almost like lords. This had never been witnessed in the Venezuela of Gómez.

The intellectual elite of Caracas—some of whom still had bad memories of Theodore Roosevelt and his disparaging policy of the "Big Stick"—regarded the oil men with animosity. The great writer, Rómulo Gallegos, labeled one of his characters, Mr. Danger, who personified the petroleum magnate, the powerful intruder who came to exploit our wealth and for whom it was normal to feel hatred. The peasant of the oil zones, however, witnessed with great pleasure the construction of new roads, the sanitation of unhealthy areas, and, most important, the perspective of securing

well-paid jobs; traditionally, he had always been exploited by the "latifundista." He had not been mistreated or whipped, but he, as well as his family, were predestined never to own the land they worked or the cattle they raised. Their lives were miserable and they possessed no education.

The penetration of the petroleum industry into the Venezuelan countryside was civilizing in many ways and we must recognize this. The oil men, by drilling our subsoil, inevitably breached as well the feeble structures of a stagnant Venezuela, a true island of political and social underdevelopment in the midst of a powerful continent.

The governments of Eleázar López Contreras and of Isaias Medina Angarita knew how to take intelligent and honest advantage of that astonishing prosperity. During the decade from 1935 to 1945, more schools were built in Venezuela than in all of its previous history, and fumigations with DDT terminated the threat of malaria in areas abandoned by its inhabitants for more than a century. A law on hydrocarbides favorably regulated the exploitation of petroleum, and the government of Venezuela, in friendly accord with the great societies, acquired the status of a favored partner. In 1943, Venezuela was a sovereign country, economically powerful, and in the process of reaching the educational level not only of her neighbors but also of Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil.

This favorable development was interrupted at the end of the year 1945 by an illogical military coup supported by a new political party headed by the writer Rómulo Gallegos, the creator of *Mr. Danger*. The progressive leader, Medina Angarita, was overthrown, and a *de facto* government headed by Rómulo Betancourt began to rule the Country. The coup d'état against the constitutional regime produced the rapid elimination of a somewhat anachronistic military hierarchy. From the army, supporting friend or traditional enemy of the Venezuelan government since the War of Independence, all officers above the rank of captain were expelled. It was a drastic as well as a negative decapitation in many respects. Empty prisons were filled with prisoners; the President, his Ministers, and his closest collaborators were exiled; and Venezuela, which had enjoyed for the first time in its history a democratic regime, was politically divided.

Now, more than twenty years after this occurrence, it must be noted that the new regime did not decree the fundamental legislation which had already been approved by the congresses of the decade 1935-45, and among which must be mentioned, besides

the Law on Hydrocarbides, the agrarian reform, laws on labor, on social assistance, on immigration, on the Banco Central, and on the feminine vote at the municipal level.

In the sphere of elections, however, the *de facto* government not only accelerated the incorporation of women into politics, but it also decreed universal and secret suffrage for future balloting. In the same manner it undertook an extensive campaign against illiteracy.

Rómulo Gallegos, raised to First Magistrate in 1947, did not achieve major transformations during his short term in power. By the end of the following year a new military coup, the result of unleashed resentment against the overthrow of Medina Angarita in 1945, returned the country to another dictatorship.

The customs of Venezuela had modernized with the passing of time, in spite of the administrative inability of "Acción Democrática," the party commanded by Rómulo Betancourt. Radio rapidly expanded to all the national territory. In slums that surrounded the urban centers as well as in the countryside radios were found bringing news and music from other countries, especially from the United States.

The number of women registered in the universities increased substantially. Internal commercial aviation opened remote regions of our territory. The Venezuelan people began to travel and to become acquainted. We visited the oil areas and we could comprehend the noteworthy civilizing and sanitizing work that the exploiting enterprises had accomplished.

The dictatorial government of Marcos Pérez Jiménez realized important public works in the capital as well as in the provinces. It built the first metallurgical plant, initiated work on hydraulic dams, eliminated slums from the hills of Caracas, and constructed apartment buildings. It was not a reactionary dictatorship and, therefore, it did not inhibit the progressive evolution of customs and traditions.

Immigration increased during his regime. Workers trained in Spain, Italy, and Portugal raised the construction industry to unprecedented levels. Skyscrapers were built not only in Caracas but also in the outlying cities.

In less than twenty-five years, rural Venezuela of pastoral customs and colonial Caracas with its homes of Spanish-Moorish patios had undergone a deep transformation. The country had to face the problems of distance, transportation, and space that every country in our century faces. Its men and women adapted themselves with surprising agility to these changes in life and customs.

II

The era commencing with the overthrow of the dictatorial regime of Marcos Pérez Jiménez on January 23, 1958, has a predominant characteristic: that of demographic explosion, a term that cannot be called a cliché, but a reference of global character.

From 1959 to 1966, our population has been growing at the disquieting rate of 3.4 per cent annually, and as if this were not enough, the percentage of illegitimate children has regretfully remained at a very high level. The regimes which have followed Pérez Jiménez are the *de facto* one of a year which supervised the 1958 elections, then the period of Rómulo Betancourt, followed by that of present President Leoni of the same political party, now of three years' duration. These have all suffered the same grave failure of not having an urban housing program proportionate to the size and to the increase of population in our capital. From 1958 to the present, the hills that surround the beautiful but narrow valley of Caracas have again been covered with slums. It is estimated that 400,000 people live in deplorable hygienic conditions, and in a promiscuity which foment illegitimate procreation and a high level of delinquency.

Neither does the city of Caracas, whose present population (metropolitan area) surpasses a million and a half inhabitants, possess adequate means of transportation. In order to go from one end to the other, a distance of only eleven kilometers, it takes between thirty and ninety minutes because no underground means of transportation exists. Neither has this problem been realistically approached by the present government.

Caracas is an open city where neither ghettos nor exclusive zones exist. It has neighborhoods of predominantly Italian immigrants, workers mainly, exuberant and healthy. There are also quite dense concentrations of industrious Portuguese and of peaceful natives from Central Europe, whose children, mainly blond, present a contrast to ours.

Immigrant families have also settled together in middle-class urban districts. The Jewish colony of Venezuela has notably become integrated into the commercial and industrial sectors of the country and has shown a great social sensitivity.

There is no racial discrimination in Venezuela. Hence Caracas, in spite of its great social failures, its being surrounded by a belt of farms, its deficient transportation system, and the lack of efficiency in the present government, is a city where life is easy, thanks to its unequalled climate and to the tolerant spirit of its

people. A factor of a spiritual and patriotic character has aided, more than could be expected, the peaceful incorporation of the nuclei of immigrants in Venezuela. These feel the spirit of one man: Simón Bolívar. Before his mortal remains or before his statue in the plaza that bears his name in the center of Caracas, diplomatic dignitaries who arrive in my country place floral tributes. The national holiday of the colonies which have formed this land always begins, without exception, with a visit either to the tomb of the Liberator or to the plaza where his statue is located. Even the Spaniards—close to 400,000 in number—who are settled there, many of them naturalized citizens, have set aside the old grudges of the painful war of emancipation and pay tribute to the man who not only fought for the freedom of his own country, but who also freed half of South America.

Venezuelan folklore has been respected, and immigrants not only abide by it but make it their own. National and religious festivities are celebrated by all. In our schools, the children sing verses about our plains and mountains. Venezuelans and nationalized citizens marry and live harmoniously.

Since 1959 the social status of the Venezuelan woman has improved. Each year women citizens emerge from our universities with a very clear concept of their rights. We owe part of this positive evolution to the United States. Twenty-five years ago, when the praiseworthy Good Neighbor Policy induced me to found the first *Centro de Enseñanza del Idioma Inglés* for adults in Venezuela, I knew that in order to play a part not only in this policy, but also to improve the contacts which it implied in the Caribbean, we should try to cast aside one of the most negative barriers: that of language. My fellow-countrymen were receptive to our objectives, and I am pleased to state that over 40,000 people have learned English in the *Centro Venezolano-Americano*, technically assisted for many years by the United States Information Agency (USIA).

III

Venezuela constitutes in the Caribbean today one of the pillars of the democratic system. We have neutralized the threat that a few years ago was presented by Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba. The experiments tried by that island have failed in almost all aspects, especially the economic. We have been fortunate in having been able to offer our people a more favorable alternative, and they have identified with it and have defended it.

I do not possess the erudition to make a detailed and documented analysis of the evolution of traditions in the "Caribbean" region, a designation that has always seemed arbitrary to me for it constitutes an artificial geographical dimension—somewhat similar to the famous Lake Parima to which I made reference at the beginning of this paper—which is anachronistic in our atomic and space age. Where does the Caribbean begin and end in 1966?

I grant, of course, that this term has facilitated the study of this multi-faceted piece of the "puzzle" that is our hemisphere. The countries in the Caribbean Sea or those that border it are exposed to economic, cultural, and ideological currents which are predominantly North American; but in no case can this section of our hemisphere be considered as having been influenced by the United States alone. The Alliance for Progress program, corollary to the Good Neighbor Policy without which it could never have the favorable reception that it has had, is still in the experimental stages. It takes time, maybe generations, as well as the overcoming of many kinds of resistance, to reshape the economic structures of countries whose traditions have been Hispanic into systems of modern functionalism North American style. On the other hand, when the thirteen English colonies acquired their independence, they too suffered what we can call normal traumas of adaptation from which they could not free themselves overnight.

Puerto Rico, being a country associated with the United States, constitutes a special case. The other countries that compose the "Caribbean region" have distinct origins, varied idiosyncrasies, and dissimilar racial and psychological makeups. In the case of Venezuela, one more factor of dissimilarity has to be added: its economy. Due to its increased petroleum exports, it is a country with one of the most solid of monetary units.

The ancient island of Hispaniola, discovered by Columbus on his first voyage, is divided into two sovereign countries which at present enjoy a restive peace, if not total normality. It is undeniable that the dispatching of North American troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to suppress what the government of the United States indicated as a Communist menace awakened old suspicions. The selection of a president by free elections has calmed this uneasiness to a certain extent. But we should not deceive ourselves: the repetition of similar events would have very grave consequences. Nonintervention is for the nations of Hispanic origin one of the most deeply rooted of our principles. This is why our attitude has been intensely expressed on every occasion in which a threat against that principle has arisen. Emo-

tion, whether eulogized or criticized, is a factor that cannot be ignored in the relationship between the United States and the countries of the Caribbean. Every policy, in order to be beneficial and successful, must be based on a realistic evaluation of not only economic factors but psychological and traditional ones as well.

We admire in North America its extraordinary economic prosperity, its scientific advances, and its educational level. It has utilized time more wisely than the countries of the Caribbean. Not to realize this would be petty and foolish, but it is also necessary that we clearly understand that the difference in development has created unevenness of many shades which can be overcome only with patience and study. The question, of course, is not to raise in ten years our standard of living to that of the United States. It is to seek points of concurrence, to find them or to create them. I firmly believe that with the Good Neighbor Policy this nation has achieved through respectful treatment what insults and disrespect to our sovereignty could have never attained. North America won the appreciation of the Caribbean nations with the Good Neighbor Policy; it has still not lost it. There is only one exception, and we are all acquainted with it, but I ask myself, if he had had more time and experience in his high post, would not President Kennedy have halted the pathetic and absurd invasion of Playa Girón, which has been responsible to a great extent for the probably irreversible deterioration of the relationship with the United States and with the rest of the nations of our continent. I believe that an attempt should have been made to reach the bounds of understanding and patience in order to prevent a missile base assembled and operated by the Soviet Union from threatening the physical existence of so many small and helpless countries, all friends of the United States.

The secret of all effective policy rests on two irreplaceable elements: the knowledge of the land and of the people where the policy is to be applied. In the Cuban case, I fear that there was a lack of reliable information and also too great haste. From now on the policy of the United States in the Caribbean region must be eminently enlightened.

In my capacity as a faithful friend of this great country, I dare give this advice which is the product of my anguish in observing the signs of deterioration in our relations. Twenty-five years ago, when those who believed that the United States was going to change its attitude toward us were few, I had faith in the word of a man, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who said he was disposed to be our "good neighbor." I was right. Today, five years after the

Charter of Punta del Este, we should all, large and small, men and women, Indians, Negroes, and whites, make an honest effort, a common pact, so that the Alliance for Progress will not fail. The very lives of our nations are at stake. Let us watch our step and our deeds. We do not have the right to be imprudent or ignorant.

Part IV

CULTURAL INFLUENCES

Alfonso Ocampo-Londoño: EDUCATION—A LOOK
AHEAD IN THE CARIBBEAN

AS WE BEGIN our analysis, we have a natural tendency to speculate on the new methodological tendencies of education and to enter into the realm of future technological progress which for the first time seems to exceed even the wildest fantasy of the most imaginative of men. There are those who see in the not too distant future university campuses and classrooms almost completely automatized, libraries replaced by electronic switchboards, and audio-visual devices instead of professors, in a world in which the machine has become, if not our master, at least a necessary tool in our every activity.

I

In recent years we have seen the development of ideas such as programmed instruction, which is becoming every day more important to future educational development. Besides, the increasing technification of communications has made available to education higher levels of aid such as television, radio, sources of information, the availability of any document at a moment's notice—advantages which are still limited to a few privileged countries, but which will soon be available to the world at large. But to what extent will the Caribbean area be ready to take advantage of this avalanche of new ideas which undoubtedly will stir it to its very roots, and to what extent will the individual and society be prepared to meet the challenge of the different concepts of life?

In contrast with the magnificent vision of the future of those countries which have achieved an advanced stage of development, we could analyze in a more realistic sense what can be achieved in the next few years, which, to a certain extent, must be years of preparation to enable us to play our part in this technological and educational revolution.

If we examine the educational panorama of the majority of the nations which comprise the Caribbean area, and if we compare it with that of certain nations of Europe or with that of Russia, Japan, or the United States of America, we must acknowledge that we have a long way to go. When we experience the collective heartache of peoples who feel backward and yet do not understand exactly the reason for their backwardness and cannot endure the thought of their children and their grandchildren following in their footsteps of ignorance and underdevelopment, we realize that these peoples will have to make a gigantic effort to attain at least that state of development already achieved by the more fortunate nations, and that not in the long years ahead but now, in the immediate future.

There exists in all the backward countries in our area an intense ferment of progress and of the desire to attain a better social and economic position, all of which we called "development." And there are many of us who believe that this development can only be achieved on a permanent basis through education.

Development is not material progress alone, nor is it spiritual speculation, but both, and also a complex of factors which include a greater economic stability, a higher and better social way of life, an efficient political structure, and an improved cultural atmosphere. This involves fundamental changes in structure, in organisms, and even in personalities. But how can all this be achieved in countries that have been unable to raise their low standards of education and which lack enough men capable of occupying positions of leadership and institutions to educate the leaders of the future? We could possibly acquire, in a passive way, an advanced technical culture which to a certain degree is gradually making itself felt, but which, without a process of assimilation or of adaptation to the idiosyncracies of countries and individuals, will only result in the creation of human robots, tremendously frustrated as far as their humanity is concerned.

We are left with no alternative but to recognize our deficiencies in all fields and to strive for a progress which is both a reflection of our character and a reality. And this progress could not be other than a comprehensive education which is integral in form,

quality, and quantity. I also believe that if we learn to use with propriety new technological methods, we will advance by leaps and bounds, but without the illusion that we shall soon be on an equal footing with those nations that are already developed, for they in turn are probably advancing still more rapidly.

If a person stops to think of what the world of tomorrow may be like and what must be done to reach that degree of development, he realizes very clearly that we still have a long way to go, especially if we do not dedicate ourselves to the solution of two problems that are working steadily against the march of progress. I refer to a rapidly increasing population and, intimately related to it, the deficit in teaching personnel to educate the masses of new and also present population.

II

Let us examine the picture presented in the following tables. Though I cannot, of course, personally vouch for its absolute accuracy in every detail, it does show vividly the serious problems that confront us. It also reveals to us the priorities that are advisable for our development.

As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, both the general population and the school-age population on primary, secondary, and university levels are expected to increase 60 per cent or more in the next fifteen years. If to this increase we add the present education deficit, we may presume that we shall need personnel, space, and instruction equivalent to an increase of 100 per cent. In other words, we shall need to double our present educational resources in the next fifteen years if we expect to take care of our increasing needs. In the case of several other countries, the problem is still more serious as their present educational deficits are even greater than ours.

We find, on analyzing Table 3, that it will be necessary to almost duplicate the number of teachers on each of the different levels and, if we take into consideration the low quality of their preparation which at present includes almost 70 per cent of the total teaching personnel, we can appreciate the enormous task that lies ahead. Allowances must also be made for the replacement of those who, through retirement or for other reasons, leave the teaching profession. In view of all these factors, we might estimate our teacher-training needs, including both formal education and in-service training, at around 200 per cent of the personnel now in service. It is also important to note that with regard to university personnel, the numbers in Table 3 represent the total

TABLE 1
TOTAL POPULATION BY AGE GROUPS 7-14 AND 15-19 IN SEVERAL
COUNTRIES OF THE CARIBBEAN AREA
1965 AND 1980
(*In thousands*)

Countries	Total Population		Population 7-14		Population 15-19	
	1965	1980	1965	1980	1965	1980
Colombia	17,787	27,691	3550.0	5170.0	1790.0	2660.0
Venezuela	8,752	14,857	1852.1	3195.9	879.3	1586.0
Mexico	41,460	70,581	9038.8	15406.6	4256.0	7638.0
Guatemala	4,343	6,878	940.3	1388.9	462.9	715.3
El Salvador	2,859	4,585	618.4	1029.6	292.4	512.2
Honduras	2,182	3,656	505.1	780.7	221.2	587.7
Nicaragua	1,666	2,791	323.2	415.8	146.5	229.9
Costa Rica	1,424	2,419	248.5	334.7	122.6	182.5
Panama	1,249	2,023	240.0	398.7	121.9	198.8
Cuba	7,523	10,034	1340.0	1685.0	730.0	975.0
Haiti	4,645	6,912	939.4	1497.2	464.0	740.8
Dominican Republic	3,588	6,174	683.2	1055.0	343.7	543.9
Puerto Rico*	2,557	3,117	511.4	623.4	268.5	327.2
English-Speaking Antilles ¹	3,451	4,970	604.0	869.9	345.1	497.0
French-Speaking Antilles ²	617	888	108.0	155.4	61.7	88.8
Dutch-Speaking Antilles ³	278	400	48.7	70.0	27.8	40.0
British Honduras	102	147	17.9	25.7	10.2	14.7
British Guiana	632	910	110.6	159.3	63.2	91.0
French Guiana	35	50	6.1	8.8	3.5	5.0
Surinam ⁴	347	500	60.7	87.5	34.7	50.0
Total	105,497	169,583	21,746.0	34,358.1	10,645.2	17,683.8

*10.5 per cent and 20.0 per cent respectively were chosen for age groups 7-14 and 15-19 for both 1965 and 1980.

1. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Granada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica, Antigua, Monserrat, British Virgin Islands.

2. Martinique, Guadeloupe.

3. St. Kitts-Nevis, Netherlands Antilles.

4. Dutch Guiana.

See notes at end of the paper.

TABLE 2

ELEMENTARY, SECONDARY, AND UNIVERSITY POPULATION
IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES OF THE CARIBBEAN AREA
1965 AND 1980
(In thousands)

Countries	Elementary		Secondary		University	
	1965	1980	1965	1980	% ^a	% ^a
Colombia	1920.6	2797.0	343.7	510.7	37.9	81.2
Venezuela	1326.1	2288.3	182.9	329.9	18.3	35.0
Mexico	5848.1	9968.1	578.8	1038.8	52.1	98.7
Guatemala	347.9	513.9	31.5	48.6	2.8	4.6
El Salvador	350.6	583.8	41.8	73.2	4.2	7.7
Honduras	263.2	406.7	18.6	32.6	1.1	2.1
Nicaragua	188.1	242.0	10.3	16.1	1.0	1.7
Costa Rica	232.5	312.9	39.4	58.6	4.1	6.7
Panama	187.7	311.8	46.3	75.5	6.9	11.7
Cuba	1508.5	1897.3	132.9	177.5	12.0	17.8
Haiti	278.1	443.2	20.4	32.6	1.4	2.4
Dominican Republic	580.0	895.7	24.4	38.6	1.1	2.3
Puerto Rico	255.7	311.7	25.6	34.3	2.8	3.7
English-Speaking Antilles ¹	441.7	536.1	33.3	40.3	2.65	3.52
French-Speaking Antilles ²	78.9	113.7	5.9	8.5	0.4	0.8
Dutch-Speaking Antilles ³	35.6	51.2	2.7	3.9	0.3	0.4
British Honduras	13.1	18.8	1.0	1.4	0.08	0.1
British Guiana	80.9	116.5	6.1	8.7	0.5	0.7
French Guiana	4.5	6.4	0.3	0.5	0.02	0.04
Surinam ⁴	44.4	64.0	3.3	4.8	0.3	0.4
Total	13986.2	21879.1	1549.2	2535.1	149.25	261.56

^aEstimated percentages.

1. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Granada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica, Antigua, Monserrat, British Virgin Islands.
2. Martinique, Guadeloupe.
3. St. Kitts-Nevis, Netherlands Antilles.
4. Dutch Guiana.

See notes at end of the paper.

TABLE 3
TEACHER POPULATION IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES OF THE CARIBBEAN AREA
1965 AND 1980
(In thousands)

Countries	Elementary Teachers		Secondary Teachers		University Teachers	
	1965	1980	1965	1980	1965	1980
Colombia	41.8	69.9	17.2	25.5	5.8	10.2
Venezuela	30.9	64.6	9.1	16.5	2.8	5.8
Mexico	111.1	230.9	28.9	51.9	8.1	16.4
Guatemala	9.7	16.8	1.6	2.4	0.4	0.8
El Salvador	8.7	17.5	2.1	3.7	0.6	1.3
Honduras	6.5	12.9	0.9	1.6	0.2	0.4
Nicaragua	4.5	7.1	0.5	0.8	0.2	0.3
Costa Rica	5.0	7.9	1.9	2.9	0.6	1.1
Panama	5.3	10.2	2.3	3.8	1.1	1.9
Cuba	38.4	53.3	6.6	8.9	1.8	3.0
Haiti	5.4	10.0	1.0	1.6	0.2	0.4
Dominican Republic	8.7	15.6	1.2	1.9	0.2	0.4
Puerto Rico	7.1	8.7	1.3	1.7	0.4	0.6
Total	283.1	525.4	74.6	123.2	22.4	42.6
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English-Speaking Antilles ¹	10.98	13.42	1.75	2.02	0.39	0.66
French-Speaking Antilles ²	2.0	2.8	0.3	0.6	0.06	0.12
Dutch-Speaking Antilles ³	0.9	1.3	0.14	0.25	0.04	0.06
British Honduras	0.3	0.5	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.02
British Guiana	2.0	2.9	0.3	0.5	0.08	0.1
French Guiana	0.1	0.2	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02
Surinam ⁴	1.1	1.6	0.2	0.3	0.03	0.06
Total	17.38	22.72	2.76	3.77	0.62	1.04

1. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Granada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica, Antigua, Monserrat, British Virgin Islands.

2. Martinique, Guadeloupe.

3. St. Kitts-Nevis, Netherlands Antilles.

4. Dutch Guiana.

See notes at end of the chapter.

number of instructors teaching on the university level without making any distinction between full-time and part-time personnel. If this number were changed to indicate full-time employment or its equivalent, it would mean a greater economic burden.

Besides, primary-school teachers educated in the normal schools of our countries receive approximately six years of education above the primary grades; secondary school teachers, ten years; university instructors, twelve or fifteen. It is urgent, therefore, that a campaign be started immediately in all areas to adequately prepare teachers and instructors on all levels so as to be able to guarantee the coming generation of students an education limited only by their intellectual capacity. This is the very essence of what we may call the democratization of education.

III

When we elaborate any program or plan for the future, we first ask ourselves if it is feasible, and if we find that all the elements necessary to its success are not at the moment available, we should establish certain priorities that will in time make our plan practicable. I firmly believe that the primary need of any country is education, but I also understand that it is not possible, in the face of other urgent needs, to dedicate to it the entire resources of a country, for I am aware of the fact that while education is the multiplier of progress, it cannot flourish in a vacuum. But one thing is evident: in many of our countries, education does not receive special attention and it is still abandoned to a secondary position.

As we study programs for education, we must be aware of that fact that it is not possible to put them all into practice at the same time. We must, therefore, establish certain priorities.

The greatest endeavor of many governments is to establish a universal primary education and to undertake massive campaigns destined to this end, without taking into consideration two basic facts: first, that there exists a lack of competent teachers and, second, that those who are being trained are anxious to go to higher levels of education. Besides, there is a strong natural tendency for those who finish the primary grades to continue their education; those who are unable to do so feel frustrated.

There is no other solution, therefore, than to put into effect carefully integrated plans of educational development in which quantity and quality are each given the place that corresponds to their relative importance in that particular country. We must con-

centrate our efforts on the preparation of teaching personnel keyed to all levels of education.

The main problems we face in getting the necessary instructional personnel are the lack of social prestige so common to the teaching profession in our countries and the low salaries that are offered. These two factors, therefore, become fundamental points of transformation upon which we must concentrate our efforts if we expect to get the teaching personnel we need for the future.

Social prestige for the teaching profession can be achieved only if both government and community recognize the social importance of the teacher or instructor and give him the position in society he so rightly deserves. And this position is equal, if not higher, to that of almost any other profession.

Salaries are, to a certain extent, intimately related to social prestige, but in the case of teaching personnel, it is important to recognize the fact that it is necessary to overcome a deeply imbedded traditional concept which has assigned to this profession a lower position on the social structure. And this erroneous traditional concept must be broken if we wish to make the teaching profession, so vital to the development of a country or region, more attractive and thus offer to future generations new incentives. It is important to emphasize the fact that in order to bring about certain fundamental changes, it is necessary to bring about a change in concepts and to break traditional molds which like this one are hindering progress. It is indeed sad to think that we worry more about the technical specifications of highways and about our own personal comfort than we do about the personal and educational qualifications of those who are to be entrusted with the nation's greatest asset—men.

And while we are making an effort to bring about the improvement of the teacher's social position and financial remuneration, we must find a way to achieve greater efficiency in our systems of education so as to avoid unnecessary or wasteful expenses and at the same time give the best use to the scant educational personnel and facilities available. In order to make efficient use of all available resources, it is necessary to achieve the integration of the potentials of space and of manpower, the concentration of students, especially those of the secondary and higher levels, into large groups for theory classes, with of course subdivision into smaller units to facilitate discussion, and the grouping together of students of both sexes, not allowed in many countries.

Besides, it is of fundamental importance that we update our instructors, both present and future, by preparing them to use the

new methodological techniques in the teaching of even larger numbers of students. Countries that are more developed have a tendency to reduce their student-teacher ratio by increasing their potential for education and decreasing their educational deficits. However, I do not think this is going to be feasible in the Caribbean area and in Latin America, as we are still far from reaching our basic needs. In fact, I fear we are losing ground due to our tremendous population explosion.

I do not believe it will be possible under present conditions to train a sufficient number of teachers to cover both the deficit that now exists and that caused by the growth in population. I believe our only salvation lies in the preparation of a teaching staff capable of giving instruction to a larger number of students, and this can only be achieved by utilizing every technique of modern educational methodology and the tools that make the use of this methodology practicable. I give special emphasis on having texts of programmed instruction that will permit more extensive independent study, and also laws that will stimulate or permit a student's educational progress through his own initiative.

In connection with this I have mentioned the in-service preparation of the present teaching personnel, and I wish to stress the fact that it is of vital importance that they take an active part in the development of any educational program for the future. It has been proven that the improvement or education of adults gives greater and immediate results and therefore training in service becomes a most important factor in any project for educational development.

IV

After considering all these factors, it would be well to review and summarize some of the thoughts that passed through my mind as I wrote this article. The main point is that the future progress of a nation is intimately related to its educational development, for its citizens are not only the motivating factor in its progress but also its only guarantee of stability. In turn, educational development is not possible if we do not provide the necessary teaching personnel to bring it about, and this means the adequate preparation of teachers and professors present and future, on all educational levels, increasing social and economic incentives through a breaking of the traditional standards of appreciation and remuneration. I also firmly believe that if we do not take adequate measures to attract more and better elements

to the teaching profession, we shall not achieve the social, cultural, economic, and political progress that our countries need and that our people demand. The quality of education depends on the quality of teachers we have. We do not have another alternative—we pay them or we do not have them.

I also believe that an instructor in our countries, whether they are called developing or underdeveloped, urgently needs all the modern aids that are available to enable him to teach larger groups of students and thus help to cover the present deficit and that created by the rapidly increasing population. I believe this is even more important for our countries than for those that have already achieved a high degree of development. An increased efficiency in the use of the funds destined to education is also mandatory, as is the efficient use of teaching personnel through the better use of space, concentration of students, the application of modern methods of teaching, and the encouragement of independent study.

Perhaps it would have been more attractive to have drawn a picture of the enormous progress that is expected to take place in certain localities in the future, but I have preferred to analyze a few facts and concepts that are key to this development and play a decisive role in the future. Any look into the future must start in the present. I have always been intrigued by the question, "When is the future?" And the answer in my mind has always been confused with the concept of the present.

NOTES ON TABLES

1. The statistical information presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3 was taken from the article "Population of the Non-Spanish Speaking Caribbean" by S. W. Roberts, in *Population Dilemma in Latin America*, pp. 61-85, presented by the author at the meeting of the Asamblea Panamericana which met in Cali in August, 1965. The tabular presentation of the population of countries that form the Caribbean area, its subdivision into age groups, and the study of teaching personnel were done by the Statistician Adonay Moreno of the Oficina de Planeación y Desarrollo of the Universidad del Valle.

2. Due to the lack of information concerning the population of the Caribbean for 1965, particularly the Lesser Antilles and the Guianas, the increase in the population of these areas was calculated on the basis of that of the population of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico. The total population for 1965 was estimated by increasing the 1960 figure by 12.8 per cent. For 1980, the increase was 44 per cent.

The 7- to 14-year-old population for 1965 was calculated as 17.5 per cent of the total population, while the 1980 figure was set at 18.5 per cent. The 15- to 19-year-old figures for both years were based on an estimated 10 per cent.

The primary-school population was calculated on the basis of 12.8 per cent of the total population for both 1965 and 1980; the secondary, 7.5 per cent of

the primary, while the university student population was calculated as 8 per cent of the secondary for 1965 and 8.5 per cent for 1980.

For 1965 and 1980, a teacher-student ratio of 1:40 for the primary level, 1:20 for the secondary, and 1:6.5 for the university level for 1965 and 1:6 for 1980 was taken as a basis for the teaching population. It should be remembered, however, that, on the university level, no distinction has been made between full-time and part-time personnel.

3. Finally, let me say that I do not claim that the figures presented in these tables are absolutely free from error, but I do believe that they represent very clear tendencies that reveal to us the enormous task that lies ahead.

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José A. Mora: THE YOUNG CARIBBEAN MEETS
A NEW CHALLENGE

I HAVE just come from a celebration marking the independence of Barbados, the Caribbean's newest nation. The gay and inspiring ceremonies were a tribute not only to a young nation but also to the promise of youth in the area. Therefore I would like to discuss the challenge facing the Caribbean's younger generation. As you know, the younger generation has a special prominence in the Caribbean where half the population is under twenty years of age.

Over 40 per cent of the people are less than fifteen years of age, which means that a very high percentage of the Caribbean's population is reaching the threshold when education could provide the wherewithal of a useful, meaningful life. It also means that the burden of paying for education must be borne by a smaller number of productive workers than in most world areas. Will these Caribbean men and women of tomorrow become productive citizens in a vital society? Or will they become members of explosive political elements in a modern world for which they are not prepared?

To a large extent the answers to these questions depend on what is done now through education to provide opportunities for national and individual self-realization.

I

Before discussing how this need of the coming generation might be filled, I would like to draw a subjective portrait of the Caribbean's younger peoples, based on personal experience.

The young man of the Caribbean is exemplified by a Venezuelan student at the famous College of Agriculture in Trinidad. There, in the classroom and on the shelves of the library, he is taking advantage of one of the world's oldest research efforts in tropical agriculture. He is learning something about his newly independent English-speaking neighbors and they are learning something about him, about their geographical proximity to the South American continent, which is bound to exercise an important influence over their country's future.

A second young man, from Costa Rica, is studying business administration at the University of Puerto Rico, thanks to a fellowship from the Organization of American States. In the last nine years more than ten thousand young men and women from Caribbean nations have studied at institutions throughout the Americas as part of this OAS program. In the last three years nearly five hundred young people from the Caribbean have studied in Europe, Israel, and the Far East thanks to a Special Training Program of the OAS, made possible by contributions from non member states.

Another typical young Caribbean, a Guatemalan for example, finds himself working on the staff of the new Confederation of Central American Laborers, which has its headquarters in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. There, he is taking part in one facet of the exciting movement toward Central American integration which has created a regional-mindedness in many fields. On campuses at Central American universities, one can feel regionalism. Even since 1948, when the council of rectors of Central American universities was established, there has been a steadily rising volume of educational interchange.

Today a Costa Rican student might be studying at El Salvador's national university or a Nicaraguan on a Guatemalan campus. The objective of this regional effort is to provide for quality instruction in all fields of study at one or more of the universities of Central America through the combination and consolidation of regional university resources. There are other innovations in higher education, which I might mention. For example, the University of the Oriente in Venezuela has developed in its short six-year life a decentralized experimental program. Centers of instruction are located in each of the capitals of five states. The University program is highly original in that it is closely geared to the needs of the people within the community served by each university center. Young people, far removed from the Venezuelan capital, can not only study in formal classrooms, but the univer-

sity comes to them through educational and cultural extension programs suited to their special and practical needs.

In Colombia, more than half a million primary-age school children are reaping the rewards of one of the world's finest educational television and radio systems. The Colombian program reminds us of how much more we can do to bring modern technology to bear on the problem of education.

All of these activities are what I might broadly call expressions of a regional inclination. They indicate that individually and collectively the Caribbean nations are determined not to be bound by the formulas of the past—that the Caribbean is prepared to take a leading role, appropriate to its heritage, in meeting the challenge of change.

Think back for a moment. Ever since Columbus dropped anchor, the Caribbean has been one of the main arenas in the confrontation of new and old values. Youth played a decisive role even in colonial times. Hernán Cortés was barely thirty when he set out to conquer an empire whose existence had been discovered when he was a boy of seven.

In the nineteenth century, the Caribbean nations were a base of operations of the wars of independence. They were in the forefront of the struggle of new nations to achieve their freedom.

Nine of the eleven Organization of American States nations represented at the Congress of Panama in 1826 were Caribbean nations.

In the twentieth century, the Caribbean was once again thrust into a prominent role in the defense of the hemisphere. Owing to their strategic location the Caribbean nations became leaders in the defense of freedom when the defense of the Panama canal was of decisive importance for hemisphere security during the First and Second World Wars.

Time does not permit me to review so many other epic moments played out in the Caribbean: the Mexican Revolution and the Cuban missiles crisis of 1962, to name only two.

With each new threat, each new major change, and each new development, the Caribbean has faced a fresh challenge. And today it is no different from yesterday.

II

Change and danger once more summon the Caribbean to its historic role. By 1975 demographers estimate that there will be fifty per cent more people between the ages of twenty-five and

forty in the Caribbean than there are in the United States or Canada. What kind of people will they be? Will they be as lucky as those young people I mentioned earlier, who are preparing themselves for useful careers? Will they be carrying briefcases or bombs?

To a large extent the answers to these questions depend upon what we can do between now and 1975 in the field of education. In my opinion, the problems of education highlight an important difference between the problems of our day and those of the past. Today there is a greater degree of identity of interest than ever before between the Caribbean and the rest of Latin America. At this moment all of us are searching for answers to commonly shared problems like those raised by education.

The Organization of American States, for example, is considering new responses to the mounting challenges which will fall on the next generation. Throughout the Americas, I sense a preoccupation with what must be done to enable the next generation to compete in a world which is becoming increasingly divided up into huge trading blocs.

To some extent the aspirations of young people have been systematized in the machinery of the Alliance for Progress. Within the Alliance, diverse nations have agreed on common objectives.

In Central America, for example, a vibrant new regionalism has given birth to the Central American Common Market. The young Costa Rican student of business, studying at the University of Puerto Rico, will return home to find that his business opportunities are greatly expanded. He will be able to participate in a community of nations which has created, through far-sighted statesmanship, the institutional mechanisms to nurture economic integration. He will find that the red-tape his father knew—the trade restrictions and the frontier barriers—has been reduced. He will find that his business horizons have been expanded to include a five-nation area of twelve million people, instead of a one-nation area of less than two million. He will have experienced in Puerto Rico the sensations of a throbbing, already industrialized economy which is the result of twenty years of great collective effort. He will have become himself a distinct contrast to the young man I saw on the streets of Santo Domingo during the height of the crisis in April, 1965, who was trying to create opportunity with his rifle.

III

The OAS is giving its full support to efforts at regional integration in the Caribbean, and special concern to young people. Consider, for example what we have been doing in the Dominican Republic, since the period when we helped the transitional Dominican regime hold free elections. We have fielded technical missions in the fields of agriculture and education. We are helping to carry on in the Dominican Republic one of the most comprehensive studies of natural resources ever undertaken in a Latin American country. We are helping to rebuild a nation torn by civil strife.

What we are doing is symbolized by a young man who had just returned from a three-month tour of study in Italy on an OAS grant at the time of the recent elections. The young man, in a sense, was the new man, bursting with new knowledge—ready to roll up his sleeves and get his country going again. The OAS mission is also symbolized by what I saw recently in Israel. There, in classes conducted in Spanish, young people from the Caribbean were learning about what it means to be members of a nation dedicated to development. One cannot adequately describe the reaction of Latin American young people to the achievement of the Israelis in converting their arid lands into productive agricultural plots.

In Israel OAS grantees can see tangible results of what it means to be members of a developing society. The Israel-OAS collaboration is just one example of the kind of alternative—the peaceful response to change—which the OAS is fostering.

In Israel OAS is keenly aware that from 1965 onward about three million young people will reach voting age each year in Latin America. Within a few years, the electorate of all the nations of the Caribbean will incorporate new ideas and value judgments based on vivid alternatives.

That's why social and economic integration is of such overriding importance to the OAS. The OAS is watching with interest the beginning made by Barbados and Antigua in establishing a new common market with Guyana. The surging trade between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic is another promising sign that regional integration is on the move. This year Mexico signed a Charter of Economic Cooperation with the Central American nations, providing for a joint standing committee to strengthen mutual ties.

The OAS vigorously supports these efforts at achieving regional

integration. The OAS would welcome even more formal forms of regional Caribbean integration within the near future.

IV

The importance of success in achieving integration cannot be emphasized too much. Our struggle for economic integration is important not only to us but also to all the other nations of the Free World.

We are being watched to see if we take the path of greater unity, or fall prey to disunity and narrow nationalism. I myself have faith that we will take the path of integration, though it will be a difficult one. The fulfillment of the promise of integration will be one of the chief works of the coming generation.

Consequently, the education of young men and women should be given the highest priority within our plans. Though there is considerable progress to report in providing more and better education in the Caribbean this effort still falls woefully short of the need. We must build faster. We must build educational facilities at the primary, secondary, and university levels which take into account the changes that are occurring in the Caribbean and in Latin America generally.

In education, as in politics, the formulas of the past must be adapted to meet the needs of people living in the age of computers and nuclear arms. This lesson is brought home forcefully to me each time that I read a report with statistical tables on the need for education. This lesson was brought home to me forcefully at the time of the missiles crisis of 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear devastation.

V

As one means of girding ourselves for the struggle ahead, I have repeatedly stressed that the matter of admitting new nations to the Organization of American States is of special urgency. I wish to repeat the invitation I made in Ottawa a few months ago: the hand of friendship is extended to all those hemisphere nations which do not now belong to the OAS. When I was in Barbados, I felt strongly the existence of two reasons why the new nations of the Caribbean should respond to this offer. First, I believe they belong in the hemispheric organization because of their historical experience and their geographical location. Second, at this moment an economically and socially integrated hemisphere is taking

shape. It would seem to be of great importance to the nations in this area to participate in the formulation of hemispheric integration.

A short time ago, the distinguished Chairman of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, Dr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaría was asked: "What do you think of the current emphasis on integration within the inter-American system?" He said, "Doubtless, the process of integration will be long and difficult and filled with setbacks. But of one thing I am certain—the process is irreversible."

In this context, OAS participation in the Dominican crisis and other short-range crises in the Caribbean and Latin America should not obscure our announced long-term objective within the hemisphere: the preservation and extension of freedom. At the moment, the struggle toward that objective is concentrated on achieving economic integration.

Today's Caribbean is characteristically in the eye of the hurricane of change. From this vantage point one or another of the nations or territories have been forcibly propelled from time to time by centrifugal force. But the violence of the storm has not ever, nor can it ever, totally destroy the hurricane's eye which represents the Caribbean's deep and abiding faith in freedom and democracy.

The nature of the storms which have blown across the Caribbean has changed over centuries. Whether the wind blows hard and the seas swell, there always remains that sustaining faith in freedom—and when the storm is over, the promise of clear skies and a calm sea.

Robert Wool: NOTES ON THE CULTURAL
 UNDERGROUND IN THE CARIBBEAN TODAY

TO MAKE SENSE of any broad view of the arts in the Caribbean and Latin America, one has first to remember that there, as everywhere, the arts are a reflection of the times and conditions that produce them. They don't ever exist in a vacuum. Viewed in that manner, I think one first realizes and has to admit that we must have a very distorted view of what contemporary Latin America is like.

I

As a writer and an editor, I know first hand of the minute interest on the part of newspapers, magazines, and television in developing anything approaching reasonably adequate coverage of the area. Unless, of course, there is some juicy disaster—an earthquake destroying an entire city is always good copy or a bloody revolution. The reason for this is very simple: irresponsibility on the part of editors and publishers. Latin America, they say quite frankly, doesn't sell tickets. That they might have a responsibility, nonetheless, to cover the area, is beyond their general comprehension. That they might develop an audience for news in Latin America, an audience which in the future will indeed buy tickets, surpasses their business acumen. The cycle is endless and vicious. It is a case of mean irony that we are indebted to Fidel Castro for the slightly increased coverage of Latin America we have received since 1960. But the increase is hardly sufficient to give a full picture of what is happening, and we are all losers for it.

Not only are we deprived of news, but our ignorance is thickened, enriched by the promulgation of myths and fantasies in the popular arts. Latin America doesn't really exist: it is a make-believe world created by Hollywood, Carmen Miranda and talking ducks, endless lines of peasants in white pajamas, cartridge belts strapped across their chests, Viva Zapata and all those other generals with enormous moustaches and insane brown eyes. . . .

II

The true picture in the Caribbean and Latin America today is one of vast and constant change. In many ways, Latin America joined the twentieth century some twenty years ago, and its race and effort to catch up is awesome.

Surely one of the most significant developments—and one to be seen throughout the artistic world—is urbanization. Every major city in Latin America receives, every day, hundreds of new immigrants from its countryside. And every major city has on its outskirts the ever-spreading slums of these immigrants. They consist of miles of shacks made of packing crates and cardboard boxes that wash away with the heavy rains—jungles of man-made filth and misery, without water, lights, or very much hope.

These cities are also now centers of industrialization. And with the industrialization, there has developed a broader middle class—a middle class which is not revolutionary, which emulates the upper class, and which to some degree has broadened the art world. It is within immediate memory, for example, that the arts in Latin America were almost exclusively the province of the very rich, the patrons. If one spoke of a painter, one usually meant a man who romanticized the families of the oligarchy with saccharine court portraits or did the same for the government on the walls of state buildings. Today, as a certain amount of education and wealth become part of the middle-class estate, their participation in the arts, their patronage, and their numbers bolster the still limited but growing market for painters, writers, playwrights, filmmakers, and architects. More and more, the creative people, who are largely middle class themselves, are being accepted as part of their society, and in some cases even looked upon as a valuable element.

Part of the development and change since 1945 is clearly linked to the obvious: for the first time ever, something approaching a flow of news and information from the rest of the world is entering the incredibly isolated orbit of the continent. There are books

and magazines, films and television—and though there are still huge problems in the dissemination of knowledge and material, especially between one Latin American country and another—the situation is improving and the potential is being recognized. Most importantly, of course, it is now one jet flight from any major point in Latin America to any place in the world.

This increased contact with the outer world is important to the arts. If one looks at the works of a group of painters from Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, one might be hard put to distinguish them from painters of New York, London, or Paris. Not that they are copies, but they are the results of men who have had an opportunity to see new styles and new techniques, to learn about new materials, and who then apply what they have seen and recently experienced to their own lives and perceptions. The distinction is a sharp and important one and it is missed by most United States critics.

Over the last four years, the Inter-American Foundation for the Arts has organized several shows of paintings, mostly in Latin America, and taken the exhibitions to museums and galleries throughout the United States. On the whole, the critical reaction to the shows has been quite favorable. The most painful criticism the Foundation has received at times is that the work is “derivative.” Of course, there is painting in Latin America that is “derivative.” But what the critics are really saying is that the work in these particular shows does not conform to their preconceptions of what so-called “Latin American painting” ought to be. Instead, they say, it reminds them too much of Fifty-Seventh Street. The truth is that the critics are ignorant of Latin America and the variety of influences, past and present, affecting the thinking and expression of its artists.

III

In addition to recognizing the profound impact of urbanization and increased international contact on the arts of Latin America, I think we have to consider the meaning of some local conditions, some pertinent and characteristic qualities of society that deeply affect the artistic milieu in the Caribbean and Latin America.

First, the artist there is a political figure. There is no such thing as the artist *disengagé* in that world. His world is evolving and changing, and he is expected, and usually naturally desires, to contribute to it. He is after all part of an Aristotelian elite, a minority that has had the advantage of education, perhaps travel. In a

country where half the population is illiterate, the citizen who has been blessed with such opportunities has a special responsibility to his state. He is expected to contribute to the actual planning and development of his country. In some cases, the demands made on the man are really beyond his true competence: it is a case of the one-eyed man being king in the land of the blind. But nonetheless, in the Caribbean and Latin America, as in other developing areas, it is from the ranks of the artists and intellectuals that leaders are often chosen.

Beyond official positions, artists and intellectuals in Latin America are daily concerned with social and political problems in their countries and daily make themselves heard on these matters, assuming they are living in countries where that sort of thing is permitted. In articles, pamphlets, through petitions, rallies, speeches, in cafés and classrooms, they take positions on the major issues of their countries and beyond. And they have vast influence, far beyond their numbers, on the thinking of their countrymen, especially on the thinking of the young. As might be expected, almost all the intellectual community of Latin America is on the political left, where it ought to be, ahead of its country and its times.

Much has been made of the communist threat, as it is called, in Latin America, especially in connection with intellectuals. There is good basis in many cases for this, but it is not a simple matter. We have all lived through the McCarthy period in this country, and one result I think is that we are extremely careful, as we should be, of political labels we slap on others. I think we are also properly suspicious of anyone who publicly or privately throws these labels around. But the fact is, of course, that communism is an operating force in Latin America and it takes many forms. Most obvious are the proclaimed guerrilla movements. These are limited affairs, steadily being wiped out by counter-guerrilla military actions. It seems to me that among dissident intellectual circles in Latin America, such guerrilla activities are considered today impractical, romantic methods to an end. Support for the guerrilla action of Fidel Castro was spread through Latin America, and his triumph will always be respected there. But disillusionment with Castro today is just as widespread among intellectuals as support formally was.

The communists are active in certain Latin American universities. We all know now about the forty-year-old students who take control of the National University in Bogotá or the Central University in Caracas. And these student leaders do influence, to

a certain degree, the thinking of other students; they do organize strikes and demonstrations. But I happen to be one who believes that their toll and menace are far less threatening to the body politic of any Latin American nation than to the educational system of a nation. What happens to a student at the National University when his school is closed half a year because of a student strike? What happens to a university where students are granted authority to the extent of faculty appointments, and the student leaders have political rather than educational ends in mind when they exercise their authority?

IV

Being an artist or intellectual engagé affects the individual further. It can, of course, affect the content of a man's creative work. But less and less is this acceptable: pamphleteering does not substitute for fiction, and social realism is cartoons, caricatures, and posters, not art. It is difficult to think of anything more boring than Siquieros, the aging Mexican muralist, painting yet another set of social realist panels, as he is doing today, these to comprise supposedly the largest mural in the entire world for a convention hall in Cuernavaca, Mexico. This kind of thing really has no relation to young Mexico or young anything. I recall one meeting our Foundation had a couple of years ago, when a rather distinguished United States historian rose to inform the young Mexican writers in the room how lucky they were. They had, he told them, all of those immense, splendid murals all around them, covering the walls of their university, to remind them everyday of their great heritage and the great triumph of the Revolution. In reply, a Mexican novelist, who at that time was also working at the university, rose to inform the distinguished American professor that every morning he passed those murals and every morning they made him sick—first because as works of art they are dreadful, and second because they were total lies. The Mexican Revolution, he felt, had been sold out years ago, and it was a crime against the people of Mexico to continue the deception, which, he maintained, was futile anyway since all Mexicans knew the truth of their betrayal.

More than affecting the content of a man's work, the politicization of artists and intellectuals affects the form of the artist's life. It is always a point of great interest and envy at meetings we have had for the Latin American writer to hear a United States novelist tell how he spends his days, working through the morn-

ings in his converted barn up in Connecticut, or his study on the edges of a California campus—a life that is essentially devoted to writing books, with teaching, journalism, criticism, and all else secondary. For the Latin American, this simply is not possible—at least not if he is living in his native country. There he must participate. He must be a public figure, attacking and defending. In fact, this becomes extremely debilitating and enervating for serious artists and drives many of them into periods of self-imposed exile, where they hope they will be free to do their creative work. As might be imagined, making a decision between one's responsibility to one's work and one's responsibility to one's political movement, especially when one's influence appears significant, is profoundly difficult.

The artist's life is also affected by his group. This is true everywhere, of course, and a vivid and awesome example is found in the vogues, camps, and camp followers resident in thirty East-side New York blocks of art galleries, thirty blocks that influence the painting of the entire world. The kinds of pressures developed in Caribbean and Latin American intellectual communities are even greater, because the communities themselves are smaller. This makes independence that much more difficult. If this year's rage is hard-edge, it takes a strong and exceptionally talented man to stick with his experiments in neo-figurative. This is the pressure of a village, of a province, even though it might be applied in the city.

The new urbanization I spoke of, the growth of the populations of cities, has not brought a comparable increase in the number of artists and intellectuals. These are still a limited number of souls who quite naturally band together for preservation. And they do, in a sense, spiritually and intellectually bolster each other. But these little groups can become very protective of their work. They can become very frightened and defensive. They have reached the top of their local mountain and they fear to venture to other ranges. It takes courage for the best playwright in Venezuela or the best painter in Colombia or the best novelist in Mexico to leave his local peak, to leave his country and move to the international scene, to put his work against the best. Only the best have the courage and the knowledge that they must do that in order to grow. Sadly, many of the others stick close to their local café, wallowing in the adulation of the village and stultifying.

Not long ago, talking with a painter in Mexico, I suggested to him that perhaps he might like to spend some time in New York,

that a large number of painters had told me time spent in New York gave them a chance to see work and ideas that would stimulate them for long, long periods once they returned to their own countries. The young man suddenly got angry. "New York," he said, "What the hell's in New York? What've I got to go to New York for?" We had been drinking, so I figured he was tight and changed the subject. I had not, at that point, seen his work, but several Mexicans had touted him very highly to me. A week or so later, I went to the opening of his new exhibition at the most "in" avant-garde gallery in Mexico City. All the gang was there: the two best theatre directors, actors, actresses, the leading literary figures, two world-famous architects, the most important cultural journalists. The painter was part of the group and their obligation was to turn out for the occasion. What was on the walls was unbelievable, especially in view of what the painter had declared to me a few nights earlier: the man was painting with mediocre technique, and at the end of 1964 was just discovering abstract expressionism. The reviews of the show from critics in the gang were of course raves. The reviews from critics outside the gang were pans.

This critical reaction to the show was typical and further indicative of influences on the artistic world in Latin America. There is almost no criticism in Latin America, there are only friends and enemies. We know that all over the world, critics use their power in terrifying, personal ways. But in Latin America I do believe this condition is extraordinary. If a man is your friend, you give him a good review. If he is not, you attack his work, his mother, his sexual potency, and, of course, his politics.

This approach to criticism is also a product of the province. But in the Caribbean and Latin America it is more a reflection of a deep condition called "personalismo." Absolutely nothing happens in Latin America without the personal element. Men do not do business until there is some personal contact and rapport. Judgments are made, often very quickly, on one man's reactions to the personal qualities of another; personal warmth, humor, style, heart, grace—some of the qualities that go into making an individual "simpatico"—register immediately, and acceptance or rejection can be established just as fast.

This can be exhilarating, captivating, and charming, and it can make for some long and divine friendships. Unfortunately, one's delightful friend can also be a dreadful playwright, and if one is a drama critic, this can present painful problems. But, as I noted earlier, in Latin America this sort of problem rarely exists. The

lack of high and dispassionate critical standards, as might be imagined, often makes for temporary comfort. But it also creates a false sense of achievement, and ultimately is very destructive.

V

One begins to see the web that is cast around the artist and intellectual and he expands and strengthens it. He has political obligations which he wants to meet but which can get in the way of his creative work. He belongs to a group of peers, fellow artists, which nourishes him, but which can also isolate him. He must contend with "personalismo" in order to have his play produced, his paintings exhibited, his book published, but the reciprocal requirement is that he conform to the demands of the group of friends. And, if he doesn't enter into the process, the cycle, he has almost no chance whatsoever of professional recognition. What does happen, and one sees several living examples of this in the scores of Caribbean and Latin American writers and painters who are presently living in New York and Paris, is that the man with real talent goes through the system, goes along with the system until he reaches the top. Often, this means until his work begins to gain recognition outside of his own country. And then, taking a very deep breath, he leaps. He gets a fellowship or takes his savings or does whatever he has to do, and leaves. He always tries to leave on a friendly basis. He always says he is just going for a few months, maybe a year, just to look around. Nobody believes him of course. He has a series of feverish good-bye parties, with all the same people at each, everyone wishing him well, everyone secretly envying him, everyone knowing that if he can do it, he may never come back. And then once he leaves, everyone attacks him—publicly in magazines, newspapers, panels, television and lectures, privately in the cafés. He has, after all, left the tribe. He has also reminded them that they don't have the courage to try what he is trying. He is striking at the whole structure of their small world and thereby striking at them in their secure cocoons.

A difficult and somewhat sad situation; but I do not mean to say impossible. Rather, more credit should be given to those who can transcend these conditions and who are producing work in fiction, the visual arts, theatre, architecture and films—that is receiving more and more international attention and acclaim today.

Part V

INTERNATIONAL POSITION

Roland H. del Mar: STRATEGIC CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE CARIBBEAN

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE of the Caribbean to the world, to Latin America, and to the United States continues unabated both in total peace and in total war. The control of the Caribbean and of the Panama Canal remains of paramount importance to the United States. Control is particularly vital during war when the logistical support of our own and allied forces pre-empts the Canal's use. Increasingly the Caribbean and the Canal are playing a dynamic role in the economic development of the Latin American countries as ships of commerce ply from their west coast to our east coast and Europe, from Latin America's east coast to her west coast. The oil of Venezuela and other strategic materials are vital to industry and would be especially to the United States in time of war. The Caribbean remains a crossroad of the world and a lifeline for all of Latin America.

In this brief paper, I will not extend my remarks on air power and air use in the Caribbean, but confine my subject mainly to the commerce, strategic materials, and sea routes of the Caribbean. The bulk of the world's commerce, the logistical supplies in war, go by sea as I have noted in studies of the Mediterranean as well as the Caribbean. In addition, during war, air power must emphasize combat and combat support roles while nations must reckon with the commodities for their populations, with the raw materials of strategic production, with shipments in the thousands of tons per vessel.

I

World War II saw the German submarine fleet operating not only off the east coasts of North and South America, but particularly in the Caribbean. Several hundred ships carrying vital military supplies went to the bottom, as well as the ships loaded with the commodities for daily living destined for Puerto Rico and the other Antilles Islands. Several of the islands were near starvation because of the depredations on commerce and military shipping. Our planes and ships patrolled the sea lines of communication with limited resources. We established naval and air bases around the perimeter of the Caribbean and stationed troops on nearly every island. We recognized that we had to protect our "back door" even with major commitments on other continents.

The Greater and Lesser Antilles form a gigantic arc covering the entrance to the Caribbean and have figured in the history of commerce and military operations through the centuries since Columbus' arrival. From the days of Spanish treasure fleets and Mexican gold shipments to the oil and aviation fuel of Maracaibo and Aruba of World War II, the Caribbean has been sailed by ships of the whole world. Naval control of the Windward Passage, the Mona Passage, and the Panama Canal means control of the passage of supplies, troops, munitions, and strategic materials to the rest of Latin America, to Europe and Asia, and between North and South America. (The sailing distance from New York to San Francisco via the Straits of Magellan is approximately 13,126 miles compared to 5,263 miles via the Panama Canal and the Caribbean—36 days compared to 15 days.)

One out of sixteen barrels of aviation fuel for the allies in World War II was shipped out of Aruba. Forty per cent of all East to West coast shipping in the United States in World War II had to be ship-carried through the Caribbean rather than by rail, truck, or air. Since then, over twenty years ago, strategic materials have been discovered in the Guianas, Venezuela, and Colombia, of vital concern to us and the Free World. The population explosion since World War II necessitates even greater attention to the daily shipment of commodities from coast to coast. It was because of our inability to break the submarine menace for so long that Latin American countries like Brazil, in particular, realized that they could not rely upon the United States to supply their economic needs in time of war. Immediately after the war, they began to industrialize to become self-sufficient. In both World

Wars the United States was the "Arsenal of Democracy" for our allies. Should there be a World War III, with the United States an immediate target, this industrialization of the Southern Hemisphere could well become our "Arsenal of Democracy" as well as of the Free World. In such an unfortunate event, the Panama Canal and the Caribbean would become vitally important to the re-supply of the United States.

II

One must realize that the countries bordering on the Caribbean depend upon it for their strategic existence. In the case of the Guianas, Venezuela, and Colombia, the jungles and mountains in the interior are not conducive to rapid communication overland to the countries to the South. In Central America, similar conditions prevail which stress the importance of sea commerce and communications. The Andes create an East-West barrier.

No great progress has been made in terrestrial communications (such as rail and truck routes) among the countries of South and Central America since the days of Bolívar. Air routes have definitely changed the communications pattern between countries, especially for passengers and mail, and for limited air freight, but the bulk of the commodities still must go by ship from coast to coast and country to country, which means, to an increasing and almost incredible extent, the use of the Panama Canal and the Caribbean. Even within countries, transportation from the coast to the interior, from the lowlands to the cities on or between the high sierras is still difficult and time consuming. With the exception of one country in this hemisphere, the sea is life and the open highway.

With the above in mind, the crucial role that Cuba plays in the future of the Caribbean becomes ever more evident. In a way, the control of the Caribbean and the role of Cuba lends more meaningful intent to the origin of the Monroe Doctrine and its current application. For now, with Cuba as a forward submarine base as well as an island aircraft carrier and missile launching site, the sea lanes of the Caribbean are far more vulnerable to our enemies than in World War II. Our concern then is not only with the transmission of an ideology among the islands of the Caribbean and the countries around it, but with the role Cuba could play in disrupting our lines of communications through the Caribbean, as well as lines to Europe and Asia through the sea passages and the Panama Canal—the disrupting of our support to and from Latin America.

III

A few statistics are worthy of mention to stress the importance of the Caribbean and the Panama Canal in world commerce, in Latin American development, and in the strategic importance of the area. In 1965, 12,909 ships carrying 78,899,012 long tons of cargo transited the Panama Canal. These figures compare with earlier dates as follows:

<i>Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Total Transits</i>	<i>Total Long Tons of Cargo</i>
1915	1,108	4,937,340
1939	7,449	27,523,907
1950	7,690	30,364,982
1965	12,909	78,899,012

In 1965, imports of petroleum and petroleum products from Venezuelan fields and Caribbean refineries to the west coast of the United States increased by 1.7 million tons. An increase of over 1 million tons in iron and steel manufactures occurred between Japan and the east coast of the United States in 1965. An increase of over 700,000 tons in the movement of phosphates occurred between Florida and Australia and New Zealand. All this increase in movement involved the Caribbean and the Panama Canal.

To the east coast of the United States from the west coast of South America in 1965, shipments of ores and metals amounted to 4,196,000 long tons. The flow of cargo from the west coast of South America to Europe increased by 89,000 long tons. Movement of bananas from Ecuador and fishmeal and fish oil from Peru increased by 434,000 tons. Between the east coast of the United States and the west coast of South America, 1,655,000 long tons moved.

Ninety per cent of Chile's waterborne imports and 80 per cent of her exports pass through the Canal. Eighty-eight per cent of Ecuador's waterborne imports and 85 per cent of her exports also transit the Canal. Five million tons of iron ore transit the Canal annually from the west coast of South America to the east coast of the United States. In 1959, it was determined that 95 per cent of the cargo transiting the Canal originated in or was destined for the Western Hemisphere which emphasizes the importance of the Canal in peace or war for the sustenance of this hemisphere—thus, the strategic importance of the Caribbean to Latin America, the United States, Europe, and Asia.

The new refineries in both El Salvador and Nicaragua are dependent on the Canal for their supplies of crude oil and for competitive marketing possibilities in the Atlantic. Colombia has ports on both sides of the Canal and thus has to use the Canal for intercoastal trade. In 1963, this intercoastal trade amounted to 1.8 million long tons. Brazil moved 106,000 tons of iron ore to Japan through the Canal in 1963, but the trade agreement between them, effective this year, calls for an average of 2.8 million tons of iron ore per year shipped to Japan between 1966 and 1984.

Projections updated as of 1964 by the Stanford Research Institute indicate that the commodity tonnage through the Canal will increase almost two and a half times by 2,000 over averages of 1961-63. The common increase of population figures used by demographers, economists, and political scientists indicates growth in Latin America from about 280,000,000 now to 600 million in the year 2,000, with resulting needs for commodities as well as greater shipments of industrial products.

The new nations and islands within the Caribbean show their dependence upon it as a crossroads of the world and upon the Panama Canal. A few statistics will indicate their use of the Caribbean and the Canal in 1965.

West Indies to West Coast U. S.	1,615,000 long tons
West Indies to West Coast Canada	425,000 long tons
West Indies to West Coast Central America/Mexico	292,000 long tons
West Indies to Balboa, C. Z.	221,000 long tons
West Indies to West Coast South America	952,000 long tons
West Coast to Hawaiian Islands	142,000 long tons
West Indies to Oceania	194,000 long tons
West Indies to Asia	1,376,000 long tons
West Indies to U.S.S.R.	98,000 long tons
West Coast U.S. to West Indies	295,000 long tons
West Coast Canada to West Indies	122,000 long tons
West Coast Central America/Mexico to West Indies	11,000 long tons
West Coast South America to West Indies	33,000 long tons
Oceania to West Indies	72,000 long tons
Asia to West Indies	210,000 long tons

During World War II, over 5,000 combat vessels and about 8,500 other ships serving military requirements passed through

the Canal—and thus through the Caribbean. During the Korean War, 2,974 government vessels used the Canal. To support the United Nations forces in Korea, the United States moved 54 million tons of cargo and 22 million tons of petroleum products by the Canal route.

Since World War II, harbors throughout the Caribbean have been improved. Airfields of varying size and capacities are prevalent almost everywhere and some have been improved for jets. The search for a new Canal location to augment or replace the existing Canal has not been completed. A minimum of 57 to 70 ships a day is forecast for the year 2000 as compared to approximately 42 now. This search is required also to provide a Canal capable of handling over 300 ships which are too wide in the beam to use the present Canal.

IV

In summary, the Caribbean and the Canal are lifelines of commerce for the world and especially for this hemisphere. The population explosion will place increasing demands on shipping in the Caribbean. It is important that this strategic area remain in the hands of the Free World as North, South, and Central America depend so much upon it. The exploitation of the hinterlands of all South America and its increasing industrialization will find ever-increasing use of the Caribbean, and the populations of the Caribbean depend on its sea routes for their sustenance.

The history of almost five centuries has filled its bays and harbors with stories, its islands with the tongues of many nations. May the Caribbean continue to serve mankind in his best interests.



John N. Plank: NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS
IN THE CARIBBEAN

THE CARIBBEAN has always complicated hemispheric relations. Its location has made it an area of peculiar importance to the United States; and because it comprises small states not historically noteworthy for their political stability or economic resilience, the United States has, in pursuit of its own national interest, recognized a strategic requirement to oversee the region and occasionally to intervene quite directly. As seen from most of the rest of Latin America, the United States is a collection of states only remotely related to them; its problems are not seen to be their problems, and its interests are not always their interests—except, of course, in the matter of intervention.

That matter of intervention, however, is crucial. For the fear of intervention has conditioned the development of inter-American relations and has, in important ways, soured it.

I do not propose to review the history of United States relations with the countries of the Caribbean or to trace the effects of our behavior there upon our relations with other Latin American states. Nor do I propose to review the record of the Organization of American States (OAS).

I

Rather, at the risk of infringing upon Dr. Arciniegas' theme, I should like to talk about the problems of the Caribbean from a

hemispheric perspective and then to consider, in a very speculative way, what options are open to us in the face of those problems. I depart from two premises. The first of these is that the Caribbean is a very special area, and that we in the United States, the citizens of the Caribbean states themselves, and the peoples of other Latin American countries err—as for many years we have erred—in trying formally, juridically, and in our literature to bracket the region with the rest of the hemisphere. It is a special area in part because of its geographic location and its geographic nature; increasingly it is a special area because of cultural and political features of it that distinguish it from the rest of Latin America. My second premise is that the problems of the area—problems to which abundant reference has been made in earlier meetings of this conference—are inevitably going to get worse in the short run and may get worse in the long run unless we, all of us in this hemisphere, begin to think and plan boldly and imaginatively to ameliorate or resolve them.

Let me say at once that my interest is primarily in the non-mainland states of the region, only Guyana and British Honduras of the mainland territories falling within the area of my immediate concern. I think that the states of Central America and Panama are fully aware of the perilous future that awaits them in the absence of prompt and effective action, and are taking steps—constructive steps with the support of the rest of the hemisphere—to improve their situation. But the option of economic integration with its correlative of truly meaningful political and other forms of joint action that is open to Central America is not open in anything like the same way to the rest of the Caribbean region. In part this is a function of geography: these are not contiguous units, and while seaways are in some respects highways, they are not in respect to real integration. In part also—and fully as important—this is a function of great disparities in culture, race, language, and history.

II

The countries that should particularly preoccupy us, as I think, are Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, British Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Cuba. Each of these entities has its own set of problems, but one problem they all share: none of them is in a position as an autonomous entity to meet the present and emerging demands of its population. Even Cuba,

the largest and best endowed of them, found true independence and autonomy impossible and exchanged a galling dependence upon the United States for an awkward and galling dependence upon the Soviet Union.

One need do no more than mention the development problems that confront these countries. Jamaica has an appalling rate of unemployment, as does the Dominican Republic; Barbados is one of the most densely populated bits of territory on the face of the earth—and nothing in the very short term can sharply reduce population growth. The countries are all producers of primary commodities and, if one excepts Trinidad with its petroleum, Jamaica and Guyana with their bauxite, the commodities that are produced are ones that command less than preferred positions in world trade: sugar, tropical fruits, and fibers. Politically we know that the countries embrace an impressive spectrum: Castro, Duvalier, Balaguer, Bustamante, Williams, Barrow, Burnham, Price; Creole Communism, naked despotism, shaky democracy, stable democracy, incipient race war, fledgling self-government.

Even if the facts of geography permitted easy trade among these states, they are not in a strong position to exchange with one another. What are they to exchange? Even if they were disposed to form a larger political association, what cultural, historical, or political bases do they have for such a union? I do not want to dwell on these problems, not only because they are well known but also because if one dwells on the problems the prospects look bleak to the point of despair. I want rather to accept the problems and then ask, What can be done? What, under the rubric of "neighborly relations," can we as a hemisphere do?

It should be said at once that our—speaking now of those of us who are not ourselves citizens of Caribbean countries—traditional (and even current) reaction to the problems of the Caribbean has been to turn away from them. Washington has not had a Caribbean policy that has gone much beyond a concern for "stability"—defined under a quite narrow interpretation of the United States national interest—and a related concern to estop Communist activity and potential success. I think it fair to say that Washington was not altogether delighted to see the winds of change waft the British West Indies effectively into the Western Hemisphere or to see British Guiana achieve its independence. I think it also fair to say that the other Latin Americans have preferred not to worry about the island territories of the Caribbean. Castro forced their attention to Cuba and the threat it represented, but that was a negative, not a constructive interest. The

Organization of American States was prepared to sanction an intervention in the Dominican Republic—as it had been prepared earlier to censure the Dominican dictator Trujillo; the OAS was not prepared really to think through what the long-term prospects for the Dominican Republic were or how the Organization might operate most effectively to secure a wholesome future for the unfortunate republic. As for Haiti, both we in the United States and our other friends in the OAS fret about what portends for that country but devote little systematic attention to planning for its future. And in respect to the former British dependencies, I think it really needs to be asked whether the larger Latin American states, particularly those of South America, are prepared to accept them into the hemisphere. The official rhetoric runs the other way, I know; but this is a question that must be taken at other than a rhetorical level.

Now we need no crystal ball to tell us that the United States will not continue to subvene the Dominican Republic at the rate it has been doing since May of 1965—reportedly \$140,000,000 of public funds have gone into the island. But what alternative policy does the United States have? Is it, after having intervened massively for the professed purpose of keeping the political and economic future constructively open for the Dominicans, going to phase out and let the Dominicans fend for themselves? Aside from any question of morality (although the moral dimension cannot be lightly dismissed), the result, if the United States does so, is clearly foreseeable—stagnation and decline. These in turn will almost inevitably lead to social and political unrest and the prospect of still another massive intervention.

Nor do we need a crystal ball to tell us that one day Haiti is going to confront a succession crisis and that that republic is going to have to be rebuilt with precious little in the way of indigenous resources—human or material—with which to work. I do not speak with authority about this, but I do believe there are many in Washington who simply dread the prospect of Duvalier's departure, for all that they regard him as being a particularly oppressive and repugnant dictator. I must say, too, that I am unaware of any great stirrings among the other member states of the OAS in respect to a post-Duvalier policy for Haiti. To be sure, they have their own problems at home; to be sure, they know that they can count on the United States not to let any Haitian situation get completely out of hand. But may there not be also present an element of preferring not to focus on such an unpleasant dilemma?

There is Cuba. United States policy and OAS policy are directed toward isolating Castro's government—for reasons that are deemed good and sufficient by most in this hemisphere. Ultimately the objective is to see Cuba reintegrated into the hemisphere. It is almost inconceivable, however, that that reintegration could occur while Castro was still in command on the island. So it can be said that the objective of present hemispheric policy is the overthrow of Castro. But then what is to happen after Castro is overthrown or disappears or is forced to a subordinate role or whatever? Where is the systematic, the forward-looking planning for post-Castro Cuba? If it is going on in the councils of the OAS, I am unaware of it. Perhaps in certain parts of the United States government far-reaching and constructive plans for Cuba are being devised, but I am unaware of them. That is as it should be, perhaps, although I should have thought that if we really wanted to hasten the day of Castro's demise, we might let the Cuban people know with some specificity the kind of post-Castro future that awaits them. That is, if in fact we do know—if in fact we have thought through how we as a hemisphere are going to deal with Cuba, how we are going to handle claims, how we are going to handle the sugar quota, how we are going to sort out the various radical reforms that have been instituted in Cuba under the Castro dispensation, preserving those that were needful and helpful, undoing those that were pernicious.

The attitude toward Haiti and Cuba seems to me to be, however, one of wait-and-see: Let us wait until it happens, then we'll see how to respond. I would suggest that that is not good enough—not good enough for Haiti and Cuba, nor, for that matter, good enough for the Dominican Republic or for the former British dependencies—not good enough by far.

It is, of course, clearly open to us to respond in that fashion: to react to the pressure of events, to react to emergencies, to react in an *ad hoc*, temporary, and temporizing way. The states of the region are juridically sovereign states—their destinies are their own to determine. So we can say, and so we and many in the little countries want to believe. Acting in accordance with these pronouncements, we will give some developmental assistance, we will give disaster relief, we will clearly intervene to prevent any of these territories succumbing to Communist control. But if we do behave in this fashion, what I foresee for the region is a slower or more rapid spiralling down into grinding poverty, disaffection, and turmoil—I do not see either indigenous resources or external assistance adequate to prevent this outcome.

III

What can prevent such an outcome? As I see it, only a radical re-evaluation and re-institutionalization of interstate relations among Caribbean countries and between them and other powers with major Caribbean interests, namely the United States and Canada. It is not easy to say what I am about to say. Like most of us, whether Latin American or North American, I have been long committed to the principles of effective self-determination, of the juridical and sovereign equality of states. Like most of us, in season and out, I have urged that the societies of the Western Hemisphere south of the Tropic of Cancer be allowed to find their own ways, establish their own identities, make their own destinies. As often as anyone, I suspect, I have quoted José Martí: "The wine is bitter, but it is ours." Moreover, who can be unaware of the unhappy record of the past, characterized as it has been by much too much in the way of North American insensitivity, unilateral action, lack of coherent, truly constructive, truly cooperative design?

Today, though, I do find myself obliged to reconsider. The events of the Dominican crisis of April and May of 1965 precipitated this reconsideration: If the United States is going to arrogate to itself responsibility for setting the political limits within which the development of the Dominican Republic can proceed, is it not also bound to assume a long-range, positive responsibility toward the country also? If the United States for strategic reasons claims that the Caribbean is of special interest to it, should not that interest embrace a special—and favored—position for the countries of the Caribbean vis-à-vis the United States?

But the matter goes beyond this. We are today past the mid-point of the twentieth century. What can constitute a viable, independent society today is quite different from what could constitute one a century or fifty years ago. Demands and pressures play upon these little Caribbean states—domestic demands and pressures as well as international ones—that did not play earlier. We who find ourselves in more favorable situations are conscious, moreover, as our forefathers could not have been, of conditions in these countries, and we cannot remain comfortable in our knowledge of what we know their situations to be.

Let us recall that it was only a generation ago when the crying scandal that was Puerto Rico—a dependency of the United States—was brought to our attention. All of us are aware of what then happened: We—the Puerto Ricans and we North American main-

landers—got to work on a bold program of political, economic, even social innovation and invention. Is it altogether presumptuous to suggest that the time has now come for us in this hemisphere—Canadians, United States citizens, and Latin Americans—to take a very hard, a very fresh look at the Caribbean and to consider innovation and invention with regard to that region? Undoubtedly I shall rue by ever having said these things publicly, for they are easily misunderstood or maliciously misinterpreted. But a private citizen has not only the privilege but the obligation to say things that appear outrageous, if only for the purpose of broadening the range of discourse and of discussible questions.

First, then, I see no viable nation-state by relevant twentieth-century standards in the Caribbean today. I do not deny the presence there of robust cultural nations, but I see no state that can play a meaningfully autonomous role, either economically or with respect to international politics. I think that in a profound moral sense to regard these little entities as full-fledged nation-states is unjust. Anatole France spoke of the “majestic equality” of French law which prohibited the rich equally with the poor from sleeping under bridges and begging bread in the streets. Analogies need not be forced, but I see one here that I think should be explored and its implications faced up to. I know that these states—their leaders and publics—are proud of their independence; I know that nationalism is a dominant force in the area. I know, too, that we in the Western Hemisphere are sensitive about infringing upon that independence, about trammelling that nationalism. But I think basic facts have to be faced, by us and by them, and we had best move rapidly to order our thinking and action to accommodate both meaningful independence and significant economic and other advances. It cannot be a question of keeping the United States out of the affairs of the Caribbean states; it can only be a question of how to involve the United States in those affairs in ways that best serve the interests of all parties.

Second, I do not see the answer to the problems of the Caribbean in federation, or at least not in federation alone. The West Indies Federation foundered almost immediately. How much more ephemeral—if indeed it could even be contemplated at this time—would be a federation embracing all the diverse entities of the Caribbean! Nor is a common market the solution.

There is a third matter. All of these states (except Cuba today) are increasingly dependent upon the United States and Canada

for whatever economic well-being they can achieve and for whatever social and political benefits they can derive from that economic well-being. North America is their market; increasingly North America is their provider. This is not a situation to be either applauded or condemned—it is simply a fact.

Last, the United States has a paramount strategic interest in this region. Strategically if in no other sense the Caribbean is *mare nostrum*. We can if we wish speak of it as *mare hemisphericum*, but let us be aware of the flimsiness of that categorization. Argentina and Chile have vital strategic interests in this hemisphere, but their interests in the Caribbean are not of the same order as ours.

IV

Now let me tie all these things together into—I won't call it a proposal—a notion that is perhaps worth intensive investigation. If we in the United States and Canada are really interested in the survival and welfare of these Caribbean states, let us consider some radical approaches. Let us, for example, consider giving these states preferred access to our markets, preferred access on very carefully conceived and judiciously employed bases. What I am advocating is the conscious use of trade policy as an instrument of regional development. Through the careful, coordinated, intelligent employment of preferences and investment, an integrated and optimally productive Caribbean economy could emerge. With differential access to the North American market, the countries of the Caribbean could diversify their agricultural production in complementary ways. They could move toward effective industrialization (without which, over the longer term, there is little hope for them). Implementing a program of this kind would require great sensitivity, abundant information, scrupulous weighing of alternatives and of costs and benefits. It would require patience, skill, and confidence on the part of all countries concerned. It would require short-term sacrifice in pursuit of long-term gain.

It would also require, evidently, a sharp departure from what is now regarded as desirable international trade practice. It would violate our non-discrimination policy vis-à-vis Latin American countries; it would violate our standing commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It would arouse intense opposition, both here at home and, presumably, in other Latin American states.

I am not unmindful of the difficulties and obstacles, but I advance the notion because I see literally no other way out for these Caribbean lands. And of the other Latin Americans who object to this approach I would ask, do any of them, as they project their future development, find that future as bleak as the one they can foresee for the islands of the Caribbean? Moreover, I would point out that this special relationship with the United States and Canada would involve a price. It would involve, at least in the short term, an economic price in the sense that production would be geared specifically and consciously to North American markets. It would involve a political price in the sense that the paramountcy of the United States in the Caribbean would be recognized.

Is this "imperialism" in a new guise? That charge is certain to be raised. And yet, what are the alternatives? In respect of global strategy, the United States is not under any circumstances going to permit these states to align themselves with elements openly hostile to this country in the cold war, it is not going to allow situations to develop or perpetuate themselves in which there is a realistic possibility of Communist domination. It simply is not. The Latin Americans know this. The fact does not change because, as seen from some perspectives, it is a disagreeable one, implying violation of the traditionally sanctioned attributes of national sovereignty.

One often hears the assertion that it is better to leave some things unsaid. But it is precisely that assertion that I am questioning here. Basically what I am saying is that the Caribbean is *not* Latin America, it is a special case, and for a century it has been. That fact should be recognized, faced for what it is, and adjustment made thereto in a constructive, positive fashion.

V

The Caribbean states do not deal extensively with one another. They do not deal extensively with the other states of Latin America. They do deal extensively with the United States and Canada, and the volume of those dealings is increasing. Through channels at once more constricting and more liberating in their dealings with the United States and Canada, they may be brought into more effective dealings with one another in patterns of trade and communication. Ultimately, perhaps, even something approaching viable political community may emerge in consequence of this integrating process.

All of this needs much more study and research, a careful exploration of hazards and opportunities, of hemispheric and global implications. But I confess that I see no way but downward for the Caribbean unless steps something like the one I have adumbrated are taken. All that can be done is to ask the Latin Americans and us North Americans to think the problems through, to examine them coldly. What is suggested here cannot happen soon—not tomorrow, not next year. It may never happen. But all of us—the Caribbeans, the Latin Americans, and we North Americans—desperately need hard thinking, bold thinking, and innovative thinking about the problems of the Caribbean region. And if we cannot meet those problems through intelligence, planning, peaceful change, compassionate understanding, are we not then condemned to meet them—as meet them we will in one form or another at one time or another—through violence, through unilateral (however veiled) intervention, through acts of contingent charity? There is nothing sacrosanct about the present Caribbean dispensation. In its present contours it did not exist a few years ago. It lies with us to change it, for the better, through our conscious, carefully conceived, and judiciously implemented action.

Jacob Canter: AN INTER-AMERICAN EDUCATION:
CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN OBJECTIVES

I

MY PAPER will concern itself, not surprisingly, with educational and cultural affairs—most particularly, those of education, and educational relations in this hemisphere.

In 1966 there were so many developments in the United States in the broad area of international education that one can truly refer to the period as an “International Education Year.” There was President Johnson’s speech at the Smithsonian Institution in September of 1965, followed by his Message to Congress on international education in February, 1966, and the passage by the Congress of the International Education Act in October. It was the twentieth anniversary of the Fulbright Act which launched the United States on a program of educational exchanges on a world-wide basis, and the thirtieth anniversary of the signing in Buenos Aires of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations. Throughout the year nothing engaged the attention of educators of this country more, no one subject was debated with more intensity and concern, than international education—at special meetings like that at Columbia University in September commemorating the Fulbright program anniversary; at regular annual meetings of associations of colleges and universities; at seminars, symposia, and workshops conducted by individual sectors of our academic community. And all of this has

been a reflection of the need that we have come to realize for preparing ourselves for living in the international environment of which we—and all peoples—are now irrevocably a part.

At the same time, a number of important developments occurred in education within the inter-American framework in roughly the same time span—so much so that it would not be amiss to look upon this period as a kind of “Inter-American Education Year.” In this period, concepts, principles, a new focus, a new emphasis, emerged that lay the groundwork for significant progress for education in Latin America.

On the side of the United States the base was established, by Presidential directive and Congressional action, for strengthening the international dimension of our educational institutions, for raising the competence of our people to deal with understanding and insight with peoples beyond our borders, including the peoples of Latin America.

In the inter-American context, the base was established for a heightened attention to education in the Alliance for Progress, for greater dialogue between economic planners and educational planners, for a restructured Organization of American States (OAS) with greater capability in educational, scientific, and cultural affairs.

II

For the United States the key statement of purpose was President Johnson’s address to scholars from eighty nations who gathered together in 1965 in Washington at the Smithsonian Institution for the bicentennial commemoration of James Smithson’s birth. On that occasion the President committed the Administration to five goals in international education:

“First, to assist the education effort of the developing nations and the developing regions.

“Second, to help our schools and universities increase their knowledge of the world and the people who inhabit it.

“Third, to advance the exchange of students and teachers who travel and work outside their native lands.

“Fourth, to increase the free flow of books and ideas and art, of works of science and imagination.

And “Fifth, to assemble meetings of men and women from every discipline and every culture to ponder the common problems of mankind.”

Previous legislation, with some amendments, plus the Inter-

national Education Act of 1966 approved last October, provide the legislative basis for United States government programs designed to carry out this broad mandate. In the study stage careful consultation with representatives of the academic community took place, especially on the need for strengthening our own institutions as a prerequisite for successful involvement in overseas relationships and undertakings.

In his message to Congress on February 2, 1966, the President translated his five-point platform into action goals for this fiscal year, setting a level of over \$500,000,000 world-wide, for the combined education and health programs of the Agency for International Development (AID), the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the Peace Corps, and the Department of State. The Congress did not authorize all the requested funds. Fortunately for this hemisphere, however, funds for the Alliance for Progress emerged relatively unscathed although there was a heavy cut in the request for development loans. The educational and cultural exchange funds were also reduced below the 1965 world-wide level, but the Department of State, AID, and the other agencies are realigning their program priorities in order to give as much emphasis to education as possible within these limitations. The result of this realignment will be visible, of course, in the bilateral programs carried out by these agencies with the Latin American countries. Certainly, the International Education Act will, in coming years, bring a new competence to the people of the United States to deal with Latin American affairs, a deeper understanding of Latin American culture and civilization, of the "Latin American reality" as the Latin Americans themselves call it.

The organizational changes within the United States government can go forward as planned. They do not require new legislation. Thus, the President has directed Dr. John Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to proceed with the establishment of a Center for Educational Cooperation within his Department. After allowance for the necessary planning and staff work involved in an undertaking of this size, it is probable that by the middle of 1967 the Center will be underway.

The Inter-American System has been able over the past seventy-six years to adapt itself to very profound and far-reaching changes. You will recall that the most comprehensive organizational change resulted from the adoption of the present Charter in 1948 at Bogotá. Now the need for further reorganization has asserted itself in order that new and additional responsibilities which have

been laid on the OAS structure over the last eighteen years, in particular those deriving from the Charter of Punta del Este, may be accommodated.

With respect to education, the changes now being proposed in the OAS Charter build upon certain measures which the OAS took in 1962, in particular the establishment of a Department of Educational Affairs grouped together with the Departments of Scientific Affairs and Cultural Affairs under an Assistant Secretary who also serves as Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Cultural Council.

The proposed Charter change of greatest interest, one which will elevate education in the Inter-American System, is the conversion of the present Inter-American Cultural Council into the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture. As one of three proposed Councils of the OAS, it will concern itself with the whole spectrum of educational, scientific, and cultural affairs, giving particular support to Alliance for Progress endeavors, in close cooperation with the Inter-American Economic-Social Council and related agencies.

Education stands much higher in the Alliance for Progress itself. The higher priority now accorded education within the Alliance is the outgrowth of extensive evaluation of progress and problems of the Alliance at its mid-decade. An early indication of trends and conclusions was the letter addressed to American Presidents in August last year by the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP). CIAP pointed out that the social side was lagging seriously behind the economic, and urged greater effort during the second half of the Alliance decade in the sectors of rural modernization, housing, health and population, and education. In education CIAP called, as a first objective, for the development of more first-rate institutions, especially the universities, which should make greater contributions to the development process. CIAP proposed that the curriculum of at least one university in each country be directly related to the national planning effort, thus assuring that the needs of the individual country could be met at both the graduate and the undergraduate levels by Latin Americans themselves.

The CIAP Country Review process, launched in 1964, is nearing the end of its third annual cycle. Social factors now command much more attention than in the past, and a number of the 1966 country reports for the CIAP review contain detailed analyses of the education sector, together with plans for educational development as an integral part of the comprehensive national plan.

It was the meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in March that established new Alliance goals by adopting what was set forth as an "Immediate Action Program" which called for major and accelerated effort on the part of the twenty member countries in critical sectors, including education and technology. The Council recognized that, in relative terms, an enormous growth had taken place in educational services between 1960 and 1965, and this was demonstrated by a 23 per cent increase in primary level enrollment, a 50 per cent increase at the secondary level in most countries, and a 39 per cent increase in enrollment in higher education. Nevertheless, there remained large educational infrastructure deficits, a substantial portion of the population still without educational benefits, and a school system of very low productivity which permitted a dropout rate of 75 per cent at the primary level.

The United States delegate to the Council meeting, Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon, spoke on the urgent need for the countries to develop "workable plans for educational modernization and expansion" so that both national and external resources could be brought to bear on sound projects. He emphasized that "education is not a social welfare luxury to be assigned marginal resources left over from more important objectives . . . [but] a highly productive investment in human capital and a vital ingredient of development . . . indispensable to social mobility . . . [and] a cardinal prerequisite of effective political democracy."

Secretary Gordon's remarks, which were directed to the very able economists who guide the Alliance effort in their countries, served as a challenge to greater dialogue between educational planners and economic development planners and as a firm reminder that this dialogue was vital to the achievement of Alliance goals. In its letter to the Presidents CIAP had stated that "the country review process should be used to encourage this essential communication and linkage."

Of course, central to the Alliance concept is the Inter-American Development Bank which has long recognized the educational challenge facing the hemisphere. It has carried forward a special program of assistance to higher education designed to promote excellence in universities, to build competence in science and technology, and to encourage leadership in the larger task of educational modernization. During 1966 its able President and spokesman, Dr. Felipe Herrera, made clear to Ministers of Education and to Ministers of Finance and of Economic Planning the desire of the Bank to move ahead and rapidly on the educational

front. For this to occur, however, the Bank, like AID and similar agencies, can make an effective contribution only on the basis of well-conceived action plans. Good intentions and broad generalities are not enough.

As a matter of fact, the real obstacle to educational development is often not the lack of funds but rather the lack of imaginative plans based upon careful analysis of the actual situation. Planning in turn is often frustrated by the lack of basic data, and judgment is reduced largely to guesswork. These twin problems of insufficient information and inadequate planning have received increasing attention generally within the Alliance, especially with respect to education through various surveys and technical meetings organized by the major agencies. For example, November 28, 1966, marked the opening of a Technical Meeting on Educational Statistics, organized by the OAS Department of Education to examine present deficiencies in educational data and to try to establish standards and procedures that would help overcome these deficiencies.

Two ministerial-level conferences stimulated the widening recognition of the basic principle that there must be investment in people as well as in things. The Ministers of Education at the Fourth Meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council in Washington in January, 1966, described the job to be done as "a constructive task of extraordinary magnitude" and pointed to the "body of doctrine" evolved over the years from the increasing attention being given to educational, scientific, and cultural needs in the Americas. This conference provided the opportunity for an assessment of progress and problems. The gap between goals and achievements—rather narrow in some few countries and almost impossibly wide in others—was again clear evidence that even in the most favorable circumstances the size of the educational task continued to be much larger than the resources being applied.

In June the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) made a special effort to encourage joint action by inviting both educators and economists to the first regional UNESCO meeting in this area since 1962. Although only one Minister for Economic Affairs attended in contrast to fifteen Ministers of Education, the delegations were generally prepared to discuss education in relation to economic development, and one of the two committees of the meeting concentrated on the subject.

This UNESCO conference covered familiar ground but over a

different time period. Instead of the Alliance decade of 1961-1970, the conference reviewed the decade 1957-1966, which was the period of UNESCO's major project for the extension and improvement of primary education in Latin America.

In the ten-year period UNESCO recorded an increase in total enrollment from 24 million in 1956 to 40 million in 1965, an overall rate of 67 per cent, or more than twice the cumulative population increase, varying from 58 per cent at the primary level to 110 per cent at the secondary and over 90 per cent in higher education. At the same time, however, as of 1965-66, UNESCO recorded, among other things, over 50 million illiterate adults. The meeting re-emphasized the need for greater integration of educational planning in general economic and social development policy and planning, and called on the universities to involve themselves more in national planning of education and of development as a whole. Indeed, a UNESCO-sponsored technical meeting on higher education in Latin America held in San José, Costa Rica, in March, had already urged the universities to play such a role and to carry out structural and other reforms which would equip them to respond to the needs of their countries in the remaining decades of the twentieth century.

The pressing task of development, of course, is not our sole concern. Equally important in the long run is the task of broadening and deepening communication across national and cultural lines, between us and our neighbors. At this conference and later at the Fourth Cultural Council meeting, Assistant Secretary Charles Frankel stressed the fundamental importance of strengthening communication and understanding, along with the most immediate and tangible problems of development. This course of action is both old and new—old in the years of educational exchange and technical assistance programs, both public and private, which have opened doors and established a multitude of contacts in all parts of the world; new in the broader context of the Smithsonian address and the International Education Act.

President Johnson, speaking at the East-West Center enroute to the recent Manila conference, called for a World Conference on Education to be held in 1967. Our colleagues in HEW in collaboration with the State Department are making preparations for this major event which, it is our hope, will bring forth new ideas and a new impetus in the whole range of international education. As part of this process of disciplined communication our educational exchange resources are being increasingly shaped so as to give new emphasis to meetings and seminars designed to en-

courage debate on the common problems that affect humanity as a whole. This certainly will bring together teachers, intellectuals, and leaders in the arts from the hemisphere in an effort to throw light on those penumbral areas which have made understanding between them less than complete where discourse has existed at all.

The combined effect of these interrelated actions and ideas has been to move education front and center in the conduct of our foreign relations generally, and with our Latin American neighbors in particular. No longer is the business of international relations only commerce and politics—it is also education. And within the inter-American framework the past year saw a new focusing on education as one of the cornerstones of development and the greater realization that progress in education was a key to progress on all other fronts. Development is not solely a matter for the economist but also for the educator, and the one must communicate and work with the other, giving attention to the human side of the development equation as well as to material infrastructure. As educators we may say that this is the year when the economists “got the word”—and the word is *education*. At the same time, educators of the hemisphere are more readily taking into account the economics of development and the need to relate education policies and programs to estimates of manpower requirements.

III

Now a brief glance to the future.

In the immediate future we see that the subject receiving the most sustained attention is the proposed Summit meeting of the presidents of the twenty member countries of the Alliance for Progress. The Latin America which the Presidents will discuss is not the Latin America of 1961 and the Charter of Punta del Este. Rapid change has brought both advances and new problems. Expectations are higher and in some areas frustrations are more intense, but there is forward motion in many quarters. A central problem, greater today than five years ago, is the combination of population increase, lagging food production, and migration to the cities.

When the Presidents meet, education will undoubtedly rank high on the Summit agenda. The United States concern in this regard was made quite explicit by the President in his speech on August 17, 1966, commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Al-

liance, when he said "Education must become the passion of us all." He spoke particularly of the need to develop multi-national institutions in science and technology.

By any yardstick the education problem in Latin America is vast and complex, even in rapidly advancing countries like Mexico and Venezuela, or in countries which achieved relatively high educational levels years ago like Argentina and Uruguay.

It is the population factor that must be put into perspective in order to see clearly the physical size of the education problem over the next decades. If the present rate of increase continues, the population of Latin America will rise to 650 million by the year 2000, and the school-age segment will most likely be around 250 million, three times the present level. Consequently, a three-fold increase in educational capacity over the next thirty-four years would only keep pace with the expanding population. It would not represent a net gain in relative capacity or standards. An increase in enrollments from the present 40 million to 120 million would not change today's ratio of only half the school-age population actually entering primary, secondary, or higher level schools, nor would the expansion as such necessarily reduce the current drop-out rate of 75 per cent at the primary level. Trebling the teaching staff to 4 million, or raising public expenditures to 7 or 8 billion dollars a year, are simply other dimensions of the enormous physical expansion which becomes a first call on the energies and resources so urgently needed in the complex task of modernization and economic-social advancement.

The education crisis in Latin America has become more critical not only because of the pressure of more people but because more people want more education now, and because people are leaving the countryside for the cities. The combination of these factors quickly brings matters to the acute stage, especially in the urban areas. This hemisphere, like the rest of the world, is very rapidly becoming a hemisphere of cities, with all the urgent and complex problems that cities around the world have in common.

An inevitable corollary is the growing food crisis. Twenty years ago Latin America was a net exporter of food; today it is a net importer. The United Nations is predicting famine in the less developed areas within 24 to 28 years unless there is a miraculous increase in food production and a significant leveling off in rate of population growth.

Food production can be increased dramatically provided modern methods are adopted. In this age it is no longer feasible to leave agriculture in the hands of untrained rural labor. The mod-

ernization of agriculture, however, cannot be accomplished easily even under the pressure of severe food shortages. It is a matter of education and cultural values.

"Time is not our ally." The essential action today is increasing the size of the effort, improving the quality, and seeking higher goals. The relatively unhurried pace of the nineteenth century, the little red schoolhouse and the three R's, are not the answer today. New techniques in teaching methods, including radio, television, and audio-visuals, must be introduced. We must make innovation the order of the day.

Planning, of course, is vitally essential, but even more important is the creation of new opportunities for education. Creative policies and actions, even if not tidily organized, are the only means to generate high motivation and self-help initiative upon which lasting progress depends. The United States did not draw up a master plan for the opening of the frontier, but it did launch new ideas like the land-grant college system which gave higher education a major role in the development of this country.

The results of the first five years of the Alliance for Progress in general permit what has been called "a sober optimism," but less so in education where the pressures for change continue to mount and each country faces its own set of increasingly urgent problems. The United States academic community has made many invaluable, often decisive, contributions to Alliance educational endeavors thus far. It has now both the opportunity and the challenge to participate more fully in the much larger effort already in progress but requiring a new intensification and a new speed if it is to achieve the ends that this century and this hemisphere so urgently demand.



Irving E. Muskat: INTERAMA AND OUR CARIBBEAN
AND LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBORS

THE THEME of this Conference—"The Hemispheric Role of the Caribbean"—is highly significant to us at the Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center in Miami. It is significant because it is our purpose to bring the countries, industries, and peoples of the Western Hemisphere together at Interama in programs of cooperation and mutual understanding within the framework of free government and free enterprise.

I

The Inter-American Center Authority is an agency of the State of Florida and is responsible for creating, building, and operating Interama under the theme: "The American Way of Life—Progress with Freedom." Interama will be the world's first living, permanent international exposition where an estimated 15 million visitors a year will be able to see and take part in working demonstrations of government, industry, culture, sports, and leisure activities of the Western Hemisphere. Interama will show what the Americas have achieved without the sacrifice of civil liberties and individual freedom—all within the framework of democratic institutions and free enterprise.

These principles will be illustrated by dynamic exhibits, events, and living performances that will be constantly updated, providing for a continuous exchange of cultures, ideas, and peoples. In

spirit and substance, Interama's goals will also parallel and support the economic and social goals of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Alliance for Progress. Although many fine accomplishments have been achieved since the Alliance program was inaugurated five years ago, there are still large and complex tasks that lie ahead.

President Johnson recently stated that he hoped to see the nations of the Western Hemisphere gradually drop trade and commercial barriers in order to form a type of common market for the republics of North, Central, and South America as well as the countries of the Caribbean.

Interama will support this objective by pooling the resources of the Americas in a great common meeting ground where people and ideas will meet and products will be exchanged. This will help speed the goals of the Alliance.

The Alliance charter has recommended that the OAS "spread among the peoples of America, knowledge of each other and of the solutions they are finding to their problems." Interama will help achieve this objective.

II

Let us take a moment to see how Interama will accomplish these things.

First, there is the firm moral and financial support of international organizations, United States, state and local governments as well as many major industries.

As an example, Interama has been endorsed and supported by the OAS, the Chamber of Commerce of the Americas, and the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production.

The federal government has approved a \$22 million loan for the design and construction of the pavilions to house the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

President Johnson has signed a bill authorizing the United States to spend up to \$9.5 million for a United States exhibit and two years of maintenance, and Congress appropriated funds for the United States exhibit on October 22, 1966.

The Florida State Road Department has agreed to construct, at no cost to Interama, ten miles of interior roads and approximately eight miles of access roads. The City of Miami contributed on a deferred-payment basis the 1,700-acre site of Interama. Dade County made \$325,000 available for the preliminary planning. The City of North Miami has contracted to provide water and

sewage facilities throughout the site at no capital outlay to Interama.

Florida Power and Light Co. and Southern Bell Telephone Co. have agreed to provide underground electrical and telephone cables throughout the Interama grounds at no cost to the Authority, and Goodbody & Co. of New York, has underwritten a \$21 million Interama bond issue which is backed by the value of the land.

Through this support, Interama has accomplished several things: The 680-acre core site has been cleared, filled and dredged, with waterways and road beds completed. Schematic designs for the national pavilions of the Western Hemisphere have been completed by six of the leading architects of the United States. Construction is scheduled to start shortly early in 1967. Of nineteen Latin American countries contacted, seventeen have agreed to participate and two are making studies which we expect to be favorable. More than forty major American industries surveyed by the United States Department of Commerce have expressed interest in participating in Interama. These are but a few of the major accomplishments made by Interama.

III

When Interama opens its doors on July 4, 1968, it will represent an investment of many millions of dollars as well as an investment of the best talents of the Americas. It will represent a partnership in progress between the peoples and governments of Latin America and the United States.

Though we are an agency of the State of Florida, let me emphasize that Interama is not a local or state project. It is international in scope and will be built to serve the United States, Latin American and Caribbean nations, and other foreign countries.

In order to accomplish this, we have based all our activities on the achievement of excellence in every phase of our work. For example, we have retained the best financial, engineering, economic, auditing, and architectural talent in the United States to help plan, finance, and maintain Interama's high goal of excellence. We have been unremitting in our efforts to create stronger links of trade and friendship between the republics of the Americas. Interama will further this goal by making possible new and better communication through the exchanges of economic, technical, educational, cultural, and governmental talents.

IV

Interama has created four exhibition areas—separate but interwoven in concept. These have been designated as the International, Industrial, Cultural, and Leisure-Sports-Festival Areas.

The pavilions of the nations of the Western Hemisphere will be located in the International Area. These have been designed by six of the outstanding architects of the United States: Edward Durell Stone, Marcel Breuer, Louis I. Kahn, Dean José Luis Sert, Paul Rudolph, and Harry M. Weese. These pavilions will house exhibits expressing the history, culture, accomplishments, and aspirations of each participating nation.

In the initial planning stage, Interama became aware that many of the nations of the Americas would be unable to provide the necessary capital to finance construction of permanent pavilions to house their exhibits. Therefore, the Authority requested a \$22 million loan from the United States government for the design and construction of pavilions for these nations, as well as the United States government pavilion. President Johnson and members of his cabinet recognized the importance and vitality of Interama's concept and principles and approved the loan.

In addition to their regular facilities, all Interama participants will have at their disposal in the International Area a Parliamentary House for meetings and conferences; a Ceremonial Plaza where open air festivals and ceremonies related primarily to the Western Hemisphere may be held; special projection theaters; and an International Bazaar where visitors may observe skilled artisans at work and purchase handicrafts native to the participating nations.

Interama will have a great impact on the relations between the nations of this Hemisphere, but perhaps one of the greatest contributions it will make will be the student-guide program. Each nation will provide a rotating corps of student guides to aid in the operation of the individual pavilions. These guides—mostly young university students who may be the leaders of their countries in years to come—will tell the story of their nations' history, culture, industry, and aspirations.

Only part of the time spent by the students will be to act as guides and lecture about their nations and exhibits. The remainder of their time may be spent attending United States universities to further their education and learn more about life and culture in the United States. The student-guides will be provided housing on the grounds in the International Area in attractive dormitories

within or near each national pavilion. This is one of the many methods that Interama has developed to help speed the process of exchanging understanding and knowledge between the peoples of the Western Hemisphere.

Participating countries will be encouraged to maintain the highest quality in their exhibits and to constantly revise and upgrade these displays to reflect new achievements of their countries and provide variety for the visitor.

The Cultural Area will contain special types of audience facilities for programs of events which will cover the entire spectrum of human activity. These activities range from domestic and international trade meetings, seminars, conventions, musical events, theatrical performances, sculpture, painting, and exhibits of the treasures of the ancient civilizations of this Hemisphere. Drama, ballet, opera, concerts, and all of the performing arts will be represented in this area as well as art galleries and museums.

National and industrial participants will be able to initiate or supplement programs for vast audiences in the Cultural Area. The American business community has increasingly supported and stimulated the arts in recent years. It has contributed liberally toward the construction of cultural facilities and the promotion of culture on a national scale.

This brings us to our Leisure-Sports-Festival Area. Leisure, sports, and recreation have become an integral part of life. This area will be the center of all such activity in the Hemisphere, providing recreation and entertainment for the entire family and capturing the lighthearted spirit of the peoples of the Americas. For the children, it is a world that brings to life their storybook heroes and legends—a world in which they may actually participate—a world of make-believe come true. For adults, it is a world of sophisticated entertainment and events. It is a place to mingle with their hemispheric neighbors and share the cultural events of many nations.

The fourth area has been set aside for Industry. It will be here that Interama will become an important forum for private enterprise to generate improved understanding of its role in bettering the Hemisphere's economic and cultural life. Industry and business will be provided the opportunity to show how it has and is creating a better world for tomorrow.

Major industries will construct buildings to house exhibits to portray their role in the American Way of Life and tell the story of today's tremendous scientific and productive capabilities which stem from the meeting of men's minds and men meeting to do

business. These exhibits will show how our free enterprise system has stimulated scientific, and industrial accomplishments in transportation, communication, medical science, and public health, the development of natural resources, and international trade. This provides us with an increasing abundance of the necessities and luxuries of life. It will be here that visitors will be able to see what a free and democratic society can contribute to the coming world of tomorrow. In addition to various industrial exhibits, there will be a multi-storied trade mart to provide the facilities for developing new markets in this hemisphere.

V

This is just part of the story of Interama. What I have presented are mostly facts and intent. All of these things, and many more, go into the making of the dream of Interama—a dream that is coming true.

In concluding, I would like to say that Interama's concept and principles are consistent with the objectives of the Alliance for Progress and the American free enterprise system.

Interama offers a great opportunity for the United States and the peoples of Latin America to work together to stimulate on a scale of the greatest magnitude the trade and cultural programs which will lead to the building of a better hemisphere for all of us. Certainly the Caribbean countries will play a prominent part in these activities.



Germán Arciniegas: THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE
OF THE CARIBBEAN

IN DISCUSSING the Caribbean, the first statement which must be made appears obvious: the Caribbean is an archipelago. We must begin with this most simple and elementary fact which, nevertheless, delineates a certain difference from the rest of Latin America, although the latter has not always been free from isolation.

I

The continent had unity in the colonial period, or at least formed two well-united blocks: the Spanish and the Portuguese. In the independence movement these two Americas conducted themselves as two physically and politically integrated units. But when they separated from the Iberian monarchies, they fell into the completest disintegration. Each small sovereign republic withdrew into its own shell, so much so that European-style international wars never occurred among them. From five vice-royalties emerged twenty tenaciously separated republics that preferred dialogue with France rather than with their neighbors. Within that isolation we were unexpectedly faced by two world wars. Now, the more we find ourselves divided, the smaller we appear to the United States. From this fact the Latin American theme of our time has been born, which is integration or reintegration—the return to forming a continent. We are beginning to have a clear consciousness of the continent idea which lost a century as an

archipelago. From this late discovery we derive the idea of creating something like a united states of the south, united by the common market and by a certain political interdependence.

The same does not occur in the Caribbean with respect to the islands. The Lesser Antilles do not integrate or disintegrate at will. Geography and oceanography have favored political isolation because of the physical archipelago. Besides, this chain of islands represents surfacing crests of a cordillera, submerged in geological epochs because of earthquakes. The islands maintain a seismic character. Following the Antilles map is like passing over a chart of volcanoes. This region has remained outside the immediate influences of the rest of Latin America.

II

Certainly, not all of the Caribbean region consists of islands. Here the continent and the archipelago are face-to-face. On the continent some of the developments which promise most for the immediate future of the hemisphere have occurred. Mexico and Venezuela have already emerged, favored by a brilliant solution to economic problems. Central America has accomplished financial integration, a successful example which can be sighted today as indicating the future of the greater common market of Latin America. Colombia has recovered from the rude blow of dictatorships, and the vigorous push given it by Lleras Restrepo synchronizes with the advance of a project which could be the model of transformation for all this area. I refer to the vast plan of the Choco, one of the most ambitious, which will be converted into an immense zone of agriculture and industrial production, with great electrical resources and new communication by water between the Caribbean and the Pacific through a jungle region that up to the present has posed an impenetrable barrier to the Pan American Highway. It can now be affirmed that our America is going to take a great unexpected leap forward which will erase from its image the word underdeveloped, through works like the dam constructed by Mexico in the *Infiernillo* of Yucatán, the development of Caroni in Venezuela, and of the Choco in Colombia. These will form the framework of resurgence on the old map of the Caribbean.

The future of the archipelago of the Antilles cannot be seen with the same clarity as the future of the neighboring areas. To compare today nations highly diverse in their identity, their orientation, and their conduct, such as Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti,

and Puerto Rico, is impossible. In the same way that each island has its own rum, each has its own language and accent. Some speak French and others English, Spanish, Dutch, or *papiamento*. Everything is formed in its own way and in its own style. To increase even more this explosion of languages, which is not seen in any other section of Latin America, Fidel Castro is preparing a new generation who will speak Russian!

I do not wish to overemphasize the picture of contrasts, but neither do I wish to refrain from pointing out the differences that exist between an island situated within the orbit of the United States, like Puerto Rico, and another that has entered the Communist orbit, like Cuba. From the standpoint of the functioning of liberty and democracy, or of elementary or university life, we find ourselves confronted by two different systems. Puerto Rico is a country without troops or generals, and Cuba, of all Latin America, is the most militarized country, with the largest and most acutely disgusting army. The Caribbean nations, which possess a certain degree of political stability, have learned to apply more of the practices of Puerto Rico than those of Cuba, but there is still a problem of a general nature which affects the whole continent, and in particular those countries closest to Cuba: they have been placed in a position in which it is impossible to disarm. The increase of war budgets, to the detriment of those of health, schools, or roads, has been a fatal consequence of the speeches and maneuverings of Fidel Castro and of his new concept of the right to intervene in the internal affairs of others.

III

If the process of integration in the continent accelerates, it is probable that the currents of influence will move opposite from what many anticipate. Inspiration, instead of coming to the archipelago from the Communist island, will come from mainland democracy. But it must not be forgotten that the relationship between the unity of the Latin American continent and the closed redoubts of the islands has always been difficult. Spanish America emerged completely emancipated by roughly 1824 and Brazil became independent in 1822. By contrast, Santo Domingo—the first place in the new world settled by the Spaniards—only took the form of a republic in 1926 and then upon such a feeble basis that it went from a protectorate of the United States to the feudal regime of General Trujillo. Its political structure has so deteriorated that we are still witnessing the results of a most lamentable

intervention by President Johnson, the rudest blow ever inflicted upon the Organization of American States. Cuba was another territory which the war of Bolívar was unable to reach. The cries for independence were uttered on the mainland in 1809 but that of Yara in Cuba not until 1868. This was the only place where the Spanish flag was still flying in 1889, but the Cuban star was somewhat eclipsed by those of the United States' constellation. The same thing happened in Puerto Rico. As for the English colonies, England irrevocably recognized the independence of those on the mainland in 1783, but that of Jamaica was delayed until 1962. A nation like Colombia looks back 147 years to see the fading figure of the last viceroy. Jamaica is only celebrating the fourth anniversary of its independence this year.

Perhaps, deep inside, we are all alike, and for us the words of José Martí weigh as heavily as Bolívar's. But the experiences that have shaped our nationalities and have contributed to molding a style of expression and an international behavior, are diverse. We all move toward the same reintegrated Latin America, this time under principles of liberty closer to the justice that every man who lives in our lands deserves, but it must be recognized that the process has to be accomplished at different paces. There is only one certainty: our ultimate destiny will have to conform to these ideas or the political archipelagos will ultimately disappear below the rising tide of democracy. War has been declared on democratic America. This is evident. But it is also evident that democratic America shall win—and, sooner than is expected.

Part VI

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES



Frederick E. Kidder: HEMISPHERIC ROLE
OF THE CARIBBEAN POLITICAL LEADERS:
A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT BIOGRAPHY

AT THIS CONFERENCE when we are considering the hemispheric influence of the Caribbean area, it seems to me most appropriate to give attention to the contemporary local statesmen whose influence in some way extends from Alaska to Patagonia and in some cases even beyond to the far corners of the earth.

Previous conferences have devoted relatively little attention to the personalities of the playwrights, stage managers, and leading actors in the drama of the twentieth-century Caribbean.*¹ Even the librarians and bibliographers who have preceded me over the years as speakers at these meetings have generally emphasized the facts and figures of politics, economics, social institutions, and culture rather than the importance of biography.²

I

Germán Arciniegas has described the Caribbean as "world hurricane center."³ José Martí wrote, "The pivot of America lies in the Antilles."⁴ Waldemar Westergaard declared that "we may say that the Antilles was the cockpit where the struggle for the domination of the seas was fought out."⁵ To call the Caribbean the "Mediterranean of the New World" is to imply its catalytic force in the development of the cultures bordering it.⁶

In *Latin American Leaders*, Harold E. Davis wrote some paragraphs which apply as aptly to Caribbean leaders:

"Behind every great historical movement stand great men. To

*Notes to this chapter begin on p. 199.

say this is not to endorse the fallacy that great men, through sheer exercise of will, or through some mystic link with deity or with destiny *make* history. So naive a concept will find few serious advocates today. Nor is leadership an automatic product of the working of social forces, in the sense that the situation always produces the man. If that were true the history of human civilization would not be, as it has been, full of great frustrations, tragedies, the decline of great cultures, the breakup of societies. Indeed, man lives constantly under the threat of the collapse of his civilization, erected at such great pains over the centuries, and only a series of miracles keeps this civilization alive. At the heart of such miracles a great leader will frequently be found.

"Nor is mankind in the large entirely passive itself in this process, mechanically obeying certain social 'laws.' At times it shows greater and at times less dynamic force than circumstances would lead the investigator to expect. Hence it is, that in the study of historical developments, a little area of mystery frequently remains to defy the curiosity of the student who attempts to determine why a certain people is capable of great action at one moment in history, less capable at another. It is at this point that leadership plays an important part. The man who senses the meaning of his times is the extraordinary man in any age, and he may exercise great influence. This influence derives not so much from him, probably, as from the currents of social change which he represents and expresses. When, however, by a fortunate juncture of circumstances, such a person is placed in a position to have a decisive voice in the turn of events, and displays in his personality the qualities of winning confidence, commanding respect, and even compelling the action of others by the force of his will—then his leadership may have profound effect. Call him the instrument of history if you will, but he is an active, not a passive instrument. Say his power is not in himself but in those who accept his leadership. All this is true, but in spite of all this, the leader is in a real sense a man of judgment and intelligence, exercising real freedom of choice and will in accordance with these unusual gifts and attainments."⁷

"There is a perennial interest in heroes," says Sidney Hook, "even when we outgrow the hero worship of youth."⁸ "Whether men are heroes for a day or forever does not always matter," adds Charles F. Mullett. "What does matter is that in times of crisis or decision, the human personality is first. . . . No more than quintessences of dust are men merely political or social or economic animals: they think, they feel, they even play dirty tricks but

they also give their lives to causes greater than themselves. They make history. . . .”⁹

Arthur Salter continues in this vein, “Personal characteristics have a twofold historical significance. They help to explain both why those holding political power exercised it on great occasions as in fact they did, and also how they came to acquire that power. The reader who, in studying a particular historic decision, has a clear picture in his mind of the personality of the protagonists, will better understand the decision itself and the sequence of following events.”¹⁰

Considering biography as a literary form, John A. Garraty concludes, “In sum, biography is the reconstruction of a human life. It attempts to describe and evaluate one individual’s career, and also to reproduce the image of his living personality, analyzing its impact upon his actions and the world in which he lived. All biographies must be historical and scientific in that they must be imaginative and artistic, because insight and felicity of expression are essential if the full three-dimensional truth is to be transferred to the flat surface of a printed page. The biographer’s responsibility is large. He assays the role of a god, for in his hand the dead can be brought to life and granted a measure of immortality. He should, at least, then, seek to emulate the more reliable divinities in his zeal for truth, his tolerance of human frailty, and his love for mankind.”¹¹

Mullet goes on to assess the problems involved, saying, “First and last history is about people, what they do, what they think, what happens to them, and how they influence the world in which they live. No matter the attention to deeds, institutions, and ideas, the historian comes back to the men who performed the deeds, ran the institutions, and conceived the ideas. Without people history is inconceivable; the history of a country, an idea, a policy means the men who built it, or thought it, or carried it through. To describe these men is enormously difficult.”¹²

II

It is good that Dr. Thomas Mathews’ topic on political leaders found a place in the agenda of this conference, and I like to think that this bibliographical paper supports the area he analyzed.

Two books, quite by accident, happened to provide the seeds which germinated and brought forth the fruit of this topic. One, *Caribbean Power* by Colin Rickards, is a collective biography of the leading political figures of the contemporary Caribbean (Mex-

ico excluded).¹³ Many of Rickards' biographies are little known outside their homelands, while others are of world renown. This book suggests the question, "Who are the contemporary Caribbean leaders that the world outside the Caribbean deems important enough to publish biographical data about them?" Or, "What contemporary Caribbean leaders are found in collective biographies published *outside* the Caribbean?" In this category, in addition to Rickards, we would have to mention numerous biographical sources, such as *Current Biography Yearbook*, *International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who*, *Who's Who*, *Who's Who in America*, *New Century Cyclopedia of Names*, *Columbia Encyclopedia*, *Almanaque Mundial*, *Who's Who in the United Nations*, *Who's Who in Latin America*, *International Who's Who*, and a good number of other, more specialized works.¹⁴

By cross-checking these biographical sources, I have come up with a list of leaders, the details of whose careers are of interest or importance to readers outside the Caribbean. This is found in the notes to this paper, more than a hundred individuals, mostly related to politics and/or education. How useful it would be to have a "bibliography of the collective biography of Caribbean America" to be able to complete the life-histories of these *próceres* from sources published within the area.¹⁵ Then we could write "the rise of the Caribbean Republics as told in the lives of their leaders."¹⁶

The other book which was germinal in shaping this paper was *Trujillo, the Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator* by Robert D. Crassweller.¹⁷ Even though you may have read his preface, it is worth hearing a second time, and I quote a few paragraphs:

"In the little city of San Cristóbal in the Dominican Republic, at 80 Constitution Avenue, there is a modest green house built in the Spanish-American manner, without front yard or setback from the street. In the doorway of the living room, which opens directly onto the narrow sidewalk, an old man in his pajamas sits in a rocking chair observing the children playing in the street, the occasional car or horse and buggy that passes quietly, and the neighbors walking by who pause to shake his hand in familiar greeting. It is his distinction that almost seventy years ago he was the schoolmaster who taught Rafael Leónidas Trujillo. His name is Don Pablo Barinas, and he is ninety-seven years old.

"This merry old man embodies to the biographer the problem of timing that must be faced by anyone who wishes to write the life of Trujillo. It is certain that full-scale biographies will be written eventually. The Caribbean dictator was too important, too

complex, and too colorful a man, and his influence on the life of the hemisphere was too great, for such books not to be undertaken. But when?

"At a later date the judgment of history will perhaps be sharpened to a greater precision than is now possible. Documents will become available from time to time, from among those that have escaped looting, tampering, and destruction. Letters will come to light. Memoirs may appear, possibly self-serving, and treating of one aspect or another.

"But the strange life of Trujillo and the essence of the regime which came to be known as the Era of Trujillo are not to be found in documents. Trujillo's was not an existence reflected in correspondence, nor was the truth of it conveyed accurately in aide memoires, memorandums, or departmental reports. The life of Trujillo and of the government were intensely personal, intimate rather than official, and the invisible portions bear about the same ratio to the visible areas as they do in an iceberg. It is in the memory of those who lived and worked with this unusual man—the people who shared moments with him in his office, at his dining table, aboard his yachts, or at his country estate, *Estancia Fundación*—that the essence of things is to be found. The tone and color of the Era of Trujillo could not have been communicated to the files even if anyone had wanted to attempt such a thing, and no one did.

"But Trujillo would be five years past the Biblical span if he were living today, and few remain of those who knew him as a young man. Of those who remember him as a child in a small village, Don Pablo Barinas, rocking quietly in his doorway, is almost the sole survivor. Within a few more years it will be impossible to recreate large areas of Trujillo's life from the accounts of those who recall the story accurately. When that time comes, much that is myth and fantasy and silly rumor will harden into the semblance of fact, and a great opportunity will have been lost. Even now several aspects of Trujillo's life are so confused by conflicting reports, including the circumstances surrounding his assassination only a few years ago, that disentangling the strands of truth and fiction is a heavy undertaking.

"I have therefore determined to write the life of Trujillo at this time, using not only such official records as are available but also, and as much as possible, the personal recollections of those who supported him, those who opposed him, and those who observed with curiosity, wonder, or apprehension from some neutral observation point.

"The reader who is only superficially familiar with Caribbean affairs may find the materials of this volume strange. The extent to which violence, both open and covert, is a constant factor in the life of the region may cause surprise. The incongruous and rather unreal quality of many events, whether fanciful or farcial in appearance, may also prove unexpected. If the reader is inclined to doubt the authenticity of certain events, viewing them as too implausible to be true, he may be assured that many more things even more strange, which are possibly and even probably true, have been omitted because their accuracy could not be satisfactorily established. Nothing is included that has not been subjected to every possible verification.

"The reader may also remark the relatively small scale of events in the Caribbean. The number of men and amounts of money involved are generally not large. This phenomenon should not be equated with unimportance. The Caribbean has exerted a profound impact on the United States and on the hemisphere and the world. Four Caribbean countries—Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Venezuela—have had, singly and in combination, true international significance, although they happen to possess together a population only about 10 per cent of that of the United States."¹⁸

It is further suggested that as a complement to a catalog of contemporary Caribbean leaders of international renown, and to a list of sources of biographical information about contemporary Caribbean leaders, we also need a study entitled "Biographies and Biographers of Contemporary Caribbean America."¹⁹ I can only begin such a list by mentioning, in addition to Crassweller's *Trujillo*, studies such as the following: *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution: A Profile of Rómulo Betancourt* by Robert J. Alexander; *Poet in the Fortress*; *The Story of Luis Muñoz Marín* by Thomas Aitken; and *The Remón Era; An Analysis of a Decade of Events in Panama, 1947-57* by Larry La Rue Pippin.²⁰ A quick check of the cumulation for 1960-64 of the *Library of Congress Catalog—Books: Subjects* disclosed one or more biographies of Pedro Albizú-Campos, Juan José Arévalo Bermejo, Arnulfo Arias Madrid, Fulgencio Batista, Rómulo Betancourt, Lázaro Cárdenas, Fidel Castro, Osvaldo Dorticós, François Duvalier, Rómulo Gallegos, Adolfo López Mateos, Ralph Paiewonsky, Marcos Pérez Himénez, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, Rafael Trujillo, and Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes.

Clearly, of course, a real biography is much more than an assembling of facts about the career of an individual. It is an

interpretation of the outreach of his personality. To locate contemporary biographies and autobiographies, as well as collective biographies, one would naturally consult: *The Biography Index*, *Current Caribbean Bibliography*, *Caribbean Acquisitions of the University of Florida Library*, the *Handbook of Latin American Studies*, and other reference works and bibliographies.²¹

III

What, then, are the conclusions of this paper?

1. The hemispheric influence of the Caribbean area must be evaluated in terms of personalities of international impact, studied through biographies, as well as in terms of constitutions, trade statistics, and the history of the flow of ideas.

2. Teachers in the social sciences should include biographical materials whenever relevant and available to round out the interpretation of current events in the Caribbean area.

3. Libraries, both public and academic, should acquire many published sources of biographical information as well as those full-scale, authentic biographies which are valuable both as history and as literature.

4. You and I have something to gain professionally and personally from reading biography, writing biography, collecting biography, and regarding the social sciences as the sum total of the biographies of mankind, leaders and followers, living and dead. May this paper stimulate the study and the collection and the propagation of biography.²²

NOTES

1. Exceptions are: Muna Lee, "Some Early Cultural Relations in the Caribbean" (1951:117-22); the section on presidents and dictators in the 1955 volume as well as A. Curtis Wilgus' introduction to that volume; and Dr. Wilgus' biographical memoir of Esteban Gil Borges in the introduction to the 1962 volume.

2. Lewis Hanke said, "How are bibliographies produced? The two fundamental ingredients have been heroes and/or institutions" (1950:205). Edward M. Heiliger stated, "In the study of political situations, people are important, and one should know the biographical materials available" (1955:306). In her bibliographical paper on Venezuela, Dr. Nettie Lee Benson included bibliography and reference sources for biography (1962:251-53, 273-75).

3. *The State of Latin America* (New York: Knopf, 1952), Chaps. XIV-XV.

4. As quoted *ibid.*, p. 285.

5. As quoted in Arciniegas, *Caribbean, Sea of the New World* (New York: Knopf, 1946), p. 3.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-11.

7. New York, Wilson, 1949, p. 11.

8. *The Hero in History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1943), p. 3.

9. *Biography as History* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 21.
10. *Personality in Politics* (London: Faber & Faber, 1947), p. 239.
11. *The Nature of Biography* (New York: Knopf, 1957), p. 28.
12. Page 3.
13. (London: D. Dobson, 1963), 247 pages, including bibliography and index. The local biographical directory covering the British, Dutch, and United States Caribbean is *Personalities in the Caribbean*, 2nd ed. (Kingston, Jamaica: Personalities Limited, 1965).
14. Robert J. Alexander, *Prophets of the Revolution* (New York: Macmillan, 1962); Brooks Atkinson, *Tuesdays & Fridays* (New York: Random House, 1963); Vera M. Dean, *Builders of Emerging Nations* (New York: Holt, 1961); *The Evening Star* (Washington, D.C.); *New Frontiersmen* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961); Leonard S. Kenworthy, *Leaders of New Nations* (New York: Doubleday, 1959); Teófilo Maldonado, *Hombres de primera plana* (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editorial Campos, 1958); Robert H. Phelps (ed.), *Men in the News, 1958-59* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1959-60), 2 vols.; Ted Szulc, *Twilight of the Tyrants* (New York: Holt, 1959).
15. This would be comparable to the thesis of Josefina Del Toro, *Bibliography of the Collective Biography of Spanish America* (Río Piedras: University of Puerto Rico, 1938).
16. Cf. William Spence Robertson, *Rise of the Spanish-American Republics as Told in the Lives of Their Liberators* (New York: Appleton, 1918).
17. New York: Macmillan, 1966.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. ix-xi.
19. Cf. A. Curtis Wilgus, *Histories and Historians of Hispanic America*, 2nd ed. (New York: Wilson, 1942).
20. Alexander (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964); Aitken (New York: New American Library, 1964); Pippin (Stanford, Calif.: Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies, 1964).
21. *The Americana Annual*, *Britannica Book of the Year*, *Colliers Encyclopedia Yearbook*, *Political Handbook and Atlas of the World*, *The Statesman's Year-Book*, *The West Indies & Caribbean Year Book*, *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations*; the H. W. Wilson Company periodical indexes; Antonio Matos, *Guía a las Reseñas de Libros de y sobre Hispanomérica*, Río Piedras, Biblioteca de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1965; Frederick E. Kidder, *Theses on Pan American Topics* (Washington: Pan American Union, 1962); *Dissertation Abstracts* (Ann Arbor, Mich., University Microfilms, 1938--); *Survey of Investigations in Progress in the Field of Latin American Studies*, triennial (Washington: Pan American Union, 1953--); U.S. Dept. of State, Office of Intelligence Research, *Unpublished Research on American Republics (Excluding the United States) Completed and in Progress* (Washington, 1952--); "Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science . . . in Preparation . . . and Completed," annually in the September issue of the *American Political Science Review* since 1911.
22. The following are the personalities of the sixties in the Caribbean area as revealed by an analysis of biographical information available outside the Caribbean Area:
 Adams, Sir Grantley Herbert, 1898--(Barbados)
 Albizu-Campos, Pedro, 1891?-1965 (Puerto Rico)
 Alfaro, Ricardo Joaquín, 1882--(Panama)
 Arciniegas, Germán, 1900--(Colombia)
 Arévalo Bermejo, Juan José, 1904--(Guatemala)
 Arévalo Martínez, Rafael, 1884--(Guatemala)
 Arias, Harmodio, 1886-1962 (Panama)
 Arias Madrid, Arnulfo, 1897--(Panama)
 Arias, Roberto Emilio, 1918--(Panama)
 Arias Robledo, Eduardo, 1918--(Colombia)
 Armendariz, Antonio, 1905--(Mexico)

- Balaguer, Joaquín, 1906--(Dominican Republic)
 Barrow, Errol Walton, 1920--(Barbados)
 Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio, 1901--(Cuba)
 Bellegarde, Dantes, 1877-1965 (Haiti)
 Benítez-Rexach, Jaime, 1908--(Puerto Rico)
 Betancourt, Rómulo, 1908--(Venezuela)
 Bird, Vere Cornwall, 1909--(Antigua)
 Blaize, Herbert A., 1918--(Grenada)
 Bonnelly, Rafael, 1904--(Dominican Republic)
 Bosch, Juan, 1909--(Dominican Republic)
 Bramble, William, 1901--(Montserrat)
 Burnham, Linden Forbes Sampson, 1923--(British Guiana)
 Bustamente, Sir William Alexander Clarke, 1884--(Jamaica)
 Cárdenas, Lázaro, 1895--(Mexico)
 Caso y Andrade, Alfonso, 1896--(Mexico)
 Castro Ruz, Raúl, 1916?--(Cuba)
 Castro Ruz, Fidel, 1927--(Cuba)
 Charles, George Frederick Lawrence, 1916--(St. Lucia)
 Chiari, Roberto Francisco, 1905--(Panama)
 Díaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 1911--(Mexico)
 Dorticós Torradio, Osvaldo, 1919--(Cuba)
 Duque, Tomás Gabriel, 1890-1965 (Panama)
 Duvalier, François, 1907--(Haiti)
 Facio Segreda, Gonzalo J., 1918--(Costa Rica)
 Figueres Ferrer, José, 1908--(Costa Rica)
 Gallegos, Rómulo, 1884--(Venezuela)
 García-Godoy, Héctor, 1921?--(Dominican Republic)
 Guerrero, Lorenzo, 1900-(Nicaragua)
 Guevara, Ernesto, 1928--(Cuba)
 Guizado, José Ramón, 1899-1964 (Panama)
 Henríquez Ureña, Max, 1885--(Dominican Republic)
 Hochoy, Sir Solomon, 1905--(Trinidad)
 Invader, Lord (pseud. of Rupert Westmore Grant), 1914?-61 (Trinidad)
 Jagan, Cheddi, 1918--(British Guiana)
 Joshua, Ebenezer Theodore, 1907--(St. Vincent)
 Le Blanc, Edward Oliver (Dominica)
 Leoni, Raúl, 1905--(Venezuela)
 Lleras Camargo, Alberto, 1909--(Colombia)
 Lleras Restrepo, Carlos, 1908--(Colombia)
 López Arellano, Oswaldo, 1921--(Honduras)
 López Mateos, Adolfo, 1910--(Mexico)
 Manley, Norman Washington, 1893--(Jamaica)
 Midence, Adolfo V., 1896--(Honduras)
 Miró Cardona, José, 1903--(Cuba)
 Morales Carrión, Arturo, 1913--(Puerto Rico)
 Moscoso, Teodoro, 1910--(Puerto Rico)
 Muñoz Marín, Luis, 1898--(Puerto Rico)
 Obando Lombana, Jorge, 1890--(Colombia)
 Onís, Federico de, 1885-1966 (Puerto Rico)
 Orlich Bolmarick, Francisco José, 1908--(Costa Rica)
 Ortiz Fernández, Fernando, 1881--(Cuba)
 Ortiz Rubio, Pascual, 1877-1963 (Mexico)
 Padilla Nervo, Luis, 1898--(Mexico)
 Paiewonsky, Ralph M., 1907--(Virgin Islands)
 Peralta Azurdia, Enrique, 1908--(Guatemala)
 Pérez Jiménez, Marcos, 1914--(Venezuela)
 Picón Salas, Mariano, 1901-65 (Venezuela)
 Portell Vilá, Herminio, 1901--(Cuba)

- Price, George Cadle, 1919--(British Honduras)
Price-Mars, Jean, 1876--(Haiti)
Quintanilla, Luis, 1900--(Mexico)
Rincón de Gautier, Felisa, 1897--(Puerto Rico)
Rivera Carballo, Julio Adalberto, 1921--(El Salvador)
Roberts, Walter Adolphe, 1886-1962 (Jamaica)
Robles, Marco Aurelio, 1905?--(Panama)
Rodríguez Jiménez, Carlos, 1899--(Venezuela)
Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo, 1900--(Colombia)
Ruiz Galindo, Antonio, 1897--(Mexico)
Sánchez Vilella, Roberto, 1913--(Puerto Rico)
Santos, Eduardo, 1888--(Colombia)
Schick Gutiérrez, René, 1909--(Nicaragua)
Somoza Debayle, Luis Anastasio, 1922--(Nicaragua)
Sosa-Rodríguez, Carlos, 1912--(Venezuela)
Southwell, Caleb Azariah Paul, 1913--(St. Kitts)
Torres Bodet, Jaime, 1902--(Mexico)
Trejos Fernández, José Joaquín (Costa Rica)
Trujillo Molina, Rafael Leónidas, 1891-1961 (Dominican Republic)
Uslar Pietri, Arturo, 1906--(Venezuela)
Valencia, Guillermo León, 1909--(Colombia)
Valle, Rafael Heliodoro, 1891-1959 (Honduras)
Villeda Morales, José Ramón, 1908--(Honduras)
Williams, Eric Eustace, 1911--(Trinidad)
Ydígoras Fuentes, Miguel, 1895--(Guatemala)
Zavala, Silvio, 1909--(Mexico)



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